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ABSTRACT
Correct-by-construction control synthesis methods refer to a collection of model-
based techniques to algorithmically generate controllers/strategies that make the
systems satisfy some formal specifications. Such techniques attract much atten-
tion as they provide formal guarantees on the correctness of cyber-physical systems,
where corner cases may arise due to the interaction among different modules. The
controllers synthesized through such methods, however, may still malfunction due
to faults, such as physical component failures and unexpected operating conditions,
which lead to a sudden change of the system model. In these cases, we want to
guarantee that the performance of the faulty system degrades gracefully, and hence
achieve fault tolerance.
This thesis is about 1) incorporating fault detection and detectability analysis
algorithms in correct-by-construction control synthesis, 2) formalizing the graceful
degradation specification for fault tolerant systems with temporal logic, and 3) devel-
oping algorithms to synthesize correct-by-construction controllers that achieve such
graceful degradation, with possible delay in the fault detection. In particular, two
sets of approaches from the temporal logic planning domain, i.e., abstraction-based
synthesis and optimization-based path planning, are considered.
First, for abstraction-based approaches, we propose a recursive algorithm to re-
duce the fault tolerant controller synthesis problem into multiple small synthesis
x
problems with simpler specifications. Such recursive reduction leverages the struc-
ture of the fault propagation and hence avoids the high complexity of solving the
problem monolithically as one general temporal logic game. Furthermore, by explor-
ing the structural properties in the specifications, we show that, even when the fault
is detected with delay, the problem can be solved by a similar recursive algorithm
without constructing the belief space.
Secondly, optimization-based path planning is considered. The proposed approach
leverages the recently developed temporal logic encodings and state-of-art mixed
integer programming (MIP) solvers. The novelty of this work is to enhance the open-
loop strategy obtained through solving the MIP so that it can react contingently to
faults and disturbance.
Finally, the control synthesis techniques developed for discrete state systems is
shown to be applicable to continuous states systems. This is demonstrated by fuel
cell thermal management application. Particularly, to apply the abstraction-based
synthesis methods to complex systems such as the fuel cell thermal management
system, structural properties (e.g., mixed monotonicity) of the system are explored
and leveraged to ease abstraction computation, and techniques are developed to





1.1 Background and Motivation
Control system design uses a mathematical model of a physical process, usually given
by a differential equation ẋ = f(x, u, d) (or by difference equations for the discrete-
time systems), that describes how the system state x is affected by the control input
u and the disturbance d. The term control design refers to searching for control input
u under which the dynamical system achieves the desired behavior, e.g., stability,
trajectory following, optimizing certain performance metric, etc., regardless of the
disturbance d.
Fault-tolerant control is a branch of control theory that consists of a set of tech-
niques to detect and identify possible faults in the control system, and to design
controllers to still achieve a desired (possibly degraded) closed-loop behavior with
the knowledge of the fault occurrence [87]. Often times, the degradation of the sys-
tem is captured by a change of a performance metric [14]. Designing such resilient
systems that can operate in the presence of failures is crucial in many application do-
mains, especially for safety critical systems like aircraft flight control systems [21, 35],
manufacturing systems [68], and automobile systems [5]. The typical control design
paradigm used for fault-tolerant control systems design, similar to that used in many
1
other system design problems, is the “design V” process [37], where the designers
iterate between testing and tuning/redesigning the control systems until all the test
cases are passed by the designed controller. As the systems being tested for fault
tolerance and the tasks these systems should fulfill get more complicated, however,
the design-testing procedure becomes harder and more time-consuming. First, the
fault-tolerant controller designed against a single performance metric may not be
sufficient to lead to a complicated system behavior that is necessary for its safe op-
eration. Moreover, the testing procedure is not complete in the sense that undesired
behaviors may still exist under some untested corner cases created by the interac-
tions between different modules in the system. Hence more expressible specification
formalisms and more reliable design paradigms are needed.
Correct-by-construction control synthesis methods, on the other hand, can algo-
rithmically generate a controller under which the closed-loop system is guaranteed
to satisfy a formally defined specification. Such techniques are helpful to remove bad
designs at an early state and avoid the time-consuming “design V” iterations. The
term “correct-by-construction” was originally invented by the computer science com-
munity and used to generate software with correct logical behavior. In recent years,
there has been significant amount of research on using similar ideas to synthesize
controllers for cyber physical systems, where both digital software and continuous-
state dynamics exist, to accomplish more complicated tasks. Applications include
robotic motion planning [32, 62], autonomous driving and cruise control [29, 81, 121],
control of aircraft subsystems [74], and building thermal management [41, 82], just
to mention a few. Figure 1.1 shows a simple flow diagram of correct-by-construction
synthesis methods, where a formally defined system model and a formally defined
specification are required. In practice, however, the system dynamics may experi-
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ence a sudden change due to component failures, in which case achieving the original
specification may not be feasible and the system is expected to satisfy certain relaxed
requirements, and hence degrades gracefully. This suggests that more complicated
(yet formal) models and specifications are necessary to take the effect of faults into
account. To achieve graceful degradation, the controller needs to be reasonably more
conservative compared to the one designed for the unfaulty system even when the
system is operating healthily, so that the system will not enter a situation where
achieving the relaxed specification is not feasible after fault occurrence. Moreover,
in practice, the fault can be only detected with a certain amount of delay after its oc-
currence. Control synthesis problems with such delayed fault detection can be viewed
as a special class of partial information games, which are usually solved with belief
space construction. This dramatically increases the computational effort required to
solve the problem.
Figure 1.1: Illustration: correct-by-construction control synthesis
Motivated by the issues mentioned above, the correct-by-construction fault-tolerant
control problem is studied in this work. In particular, we concern three aspects of the
problem. First, we consider model-based detectability analysis that provides a guar-
antee on finite time fault detection. Such finite time detectability not only enables
online fault detection with a receding horizon scheme, but can be also incorporated
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in correct-by-construction control synthesis. Second, we consider synthesizing fault-
tolerant controllers/strategies that achieve a graceful degradation whenever fault
occurs. In particular, the obtained fault-tolerant controllers/strategies should be
robust to the detection delay. Last but not least, we concern the computational effi-
ciency of the fault-tolerant control synthesis algorithms. To this end, the structural
properties in the continuous system dynamics and the specification are explored for
a more tailored synthesis algorithms.
1.2 Literature Review
Fault detection is a key step towards fault tolerant systems and is studied by different
communities. For discrete (e.g., software-based) systems, monitoring and run-time
verification techniques have been proposed [6, 10, 49, 97, 102]. Similarly, fault de-
tection algorithms have also been studied for continuous-state dynamical systems
using ideas from learning, filtering or optimization [38, 53]. In particular, model
invalidation [47, 92, 108], a robust system identification technique that is closely re-
lated to set membership fault detection [52, 59, 116], can be used for this purpose.
Such model invalidation based detection is more suitable for providing a finite de-
tection guarantee rather than an asymptotical one given by, for example, classical
residual generation approaches [38]. Recently, a topic called detectability analysis
[40, 46, 45, 47, 48] are studied, concerning finding the worst case detection delay via
offline analysis. Such worst case detection delay, once found, can be incorporated in
correct-by-construction control synthesis. However, due to its worst case nature, the
computed detection delay can be overly conservative and needs to be improved.
The concept of correct-by-construction systems was first introduced by computer
scientists to algorithmically construct a software that fulfills certain requirements
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specified by, e.g., temporal logic [67, 120]. In the past two decades, the idea of correct-
by-construction synthesis attracts great attention in the control theory domain. One
major difference between the problems considered by the two communities is that,
there is a dynamical model that must be respected in the controller synthesis problem.
Under this setting, the correct-by-construction design methodology gets significantly
extended using the ideas from control theory, especially from model based constraint
control. For simple specification like invariance, control barrier functions [4, 55],
Hamilton Jacobi (HJ) methods [75, 122] and controlled invariant sets are proposed
[13, 98]. For more general linear temporal logic (LTL) specifications, the two most
commonly used approaches are abstraction-based synthesis and mixed-integer-linear-
programming (MILP) based temporal logic path planning.
In abstraction-based synthesis, a discrete graph structure is constructed to over-
approximate the behavior of the underlying continuous-state system (or concrete sys-
tem). Then two-player game solving techniques developed for such discrete systems
are leveraged to synthesize controllers that guarantee the correctness of the contin-
uous state system by the behavior overapproximation relation [110]. Such methods
are usually conservative due to the behavior overapproximation relation, and compu-
tationally expensive due to the abstraction computation and the high complexity of
game solving [11]. While a line of research focuses on reducing the conservatism via
refining [41, 51, 63, 82, 85, 103] and post processing [26, 89, 109, 136] the abstraction,
other work concentrates on improving the scalability, by i) exploring and exploiting
structural properties of the underlying continuous system and of certain LTL frag-
ments, and ii) decomposing the synthesis problem into smaller ones. For example,
system structural properties like linearity [60], multiaffine property [61], monotonic-
ity [69], mixed monotonicity [26], incremental stability [42], polynomial dynamics
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[89] and symmetry [83] are explored. For structural properties of the LTL specifi-
cation, mode target game [9], reach-stay-avoid game [82], general reactivity of rank
1 (GR(1)) [86] and other fragments in [80] are considered, and tailored polynomial-
time algorithms are developed for these gfragments. For decompositional methods
for control synthesis [66, 73, 135], contract design is usually used and similar ideas
are also used for controlled invariant set computation of high dimensional systems
whenever only safety is of our concern [23, 34, 84]. Finally, a relevant topic is games
under partial information, see, for example, [22, 76, 101, 134]. Synthesis with partial
information is in general quite harder as it requires an exponential power set con-
struction to keep track of belief states, which exponentially increases the complexity
of the controller synthesis.
For MILP-based approaches, unlike the problems solved with the abstraction-
based approach, where a winning set (i.e., a set of initial conditions starting from
where the specification is achievable) is to be searched, an initial condition is given
as part of the problem setup. This allows one to encode LTL/STL with mixed in-
teger linear constraints and search for an open-loop strategy associated with the
given initial condition, which achieves the specification [58, 95, 119]. Comparing
to abstraction-based synthesis, the MILP-based approaches are less conservative and
scale more favorably, but the resulting open-loop controllers tend not to be robust/re-
active due to lack of feedback. Recent work aimed at addressing this latter issue
includes counter-example-guided methods [96], considering the robust [100] or proba-
bilistic [99] satisfaction of LTL/STL, searching for feedback controllers parametrized
by disturbance [39, 104] together with MILP-based trajectory planning. Though,
the type of environment uncertainties against which robustness/reactiveness can be
achieved by these methods is still limited. Therefore, there is a need for research
6
that provides reactiveness for different classes of uncertainties, e.g., the potential
fault occurrence in the system.
1.3 Main Contribution
The contributions of this thesis are threefold.
In the first part, the detectability analysis is considered together with extra LTL
constraints that the correct system must satisfy. In this setting, we combine the idea
of LTL monitoring and model invalidation based detection for a less conservative
fault detectability analysis. It is shown via a unmanned aerial vehicle consensus
problem that the worst case detection delay can be reduced from infinite to finite.
In the second part, the fault-tolerant control problem is defined by introducing a
hierarchical control system that captures the changes in the system dynamics caused
by unrecoverable faults, and by clarifying the meaning of graceful degradation with
LTL. To solve the problem, we look into both abstraction-based synthesis by game
solving and MILP based LTL path planning.
For the abstraction-based approach, we consider the fault-tolerant control problem
on finite transition systems. By exploiting the fact that the occurrences of faults can
be represented by a directed acyclic graph leading to a partial order, we show that
the synthesis problem can be decomposed, which leads to an algorithm that avoids
solving the problem as a general LTL game and hence a more efficient solution.
The proposed approach can be seen as a special case of decompositional synthesis,
where the decomposition naturally comes from the structure of the faults. The
other half of the work regarding this topic tries to incorporate the detection delay.
Such detection delay results in controller not having full information of the state at
decision time, and is a special case of partial information. We show how the proposed
7
algorithm can be modified to handle detection delays, without constructing the belief
space. The soundness and completeness of the proposed algorithm is proved for a
special fragment of LTL. This work follows the line of research that develops efficient
algorithms for specification with special structural properties.
To show that the approach developed for finite transition systems also applies
to continuous state systems, we synthesize a correct-by-construction controller for a
fuel cell thermal management system with complicated dynamics and requirements.
We first develop a control-oriented model for the thermal management system of
a fuel cell stack, list the requirements associated with thermal management and
formalize them using LTL. Then the existing synthesis tools are extended in two
ways to solve the control problem. First, we leverage a structural property of the
fuel cell thermal dynamics called weak sign-stability to compute the abstraction more
efficiently. Second, we extend the notion of progress group [89] to further reduce the
spurious behavior of the obtained abstraction. This work contributes to achieving
less conservative and computational more scalable abstractions.
The last part of the thesis presents an optimization-based approach to solve the
fault tolerant path planning problem for linear systems to achieve graceful degrada-
tion. We propose a hierarchical fault-tolerant controller with a MILP-based trajec-
tory generation at the higher-level and an output-feedback regulator at the lower-
level. It is further shown that when the system dynamics are linear, the lower-level
regulator design problem reduces to a quasi-convex optimization problem. Our MILP
formulation encodes complicated tasks specified with LTL and incorporates reactive-
ness to faults while being robust to finite detection delays, and hence can be viewed
as a move towards obtaining reactive/robust LTL path planning.
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Thesis Organization. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II
presents preliminary results on system and specification structural properties, which
will be used in later chapters. In Chapter III, an improved fault detectability anal-
ysis with LTL constraints is presented. Then the fault-tolerant control problems is
formally defined in Chapter IV. Chapter V presents an abstraction-based approach
to solve the fault-tolerant control problem. The specification properties introduced
previously are used to verify the correctness and completeness of the proposed algo-
rithms. In Chapter VI, we define and solve a fuel cell thermal management problem
with abstraction-based approach. The system structural properties introduced in
Chapter II are used to ease the abstraction computation for this fuel cell system.
Chapter VII presents an optimization-based approach to solve the fault-tolerant path
planning problem. Finally, the thesis is concluded by Chapter VIII.
Acknowledgment of previous publications. Most of the results in this thesis
have previously appeared as published works or technical reports. For Chapter II,
the relevant publications are [126, 127, 131, 128]; for Chapter III [130]; for Chapter
V [128, 133]; for Chapter VI, [124, 125]; and for Chapter VII, [132]. Other publica-
tions [24, 123, 129] developed during the PhD study are also related to correct-by-
construction control synthesis but are not included in this thesis.
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CHAPTER II
Preliminaries and Structural Properties
To achieve more scalable control synthesis, it is important to understand and ex-
ploit the structural properties of the system dynamics and the desired closed-loop
system specifications. By structural properties of the system dynamics, we mean
the properties of the vector field f of the system described by the differential equa-
tion ẋ = f(x, u, d); while the structural properties of the specifications refer to some
properties of the LTL formula ϕ that is used to specify the system’s desired behavior.
Such structure properties, if exist, can be leveraged by the synthesis algorithms and
improve the algorithms’ scalability.
In this chapter, we present preliminary results on the structural properties of the
systems and the specifications considered in this work. A system property called
mixed monotonicity is explored, and is shown to be a fairly general property rather
than a useful structural property. However, mixed monotonicity provides a nice way
to view certain structural properties that can be leveraged by synthesis algorithms.
In particular, we introduce a system structural property called weak sign-stability
and analyze its usefulness by viewing it as a special case of mixed monotonicity. It is
shown that the efficient abstraction computation methods developed for sign-stable
systems can be extended to weakly sign-stable systems, e.g., the fuel cell thermal
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management system considered in Chapter VI. We then introduce one novel specifi-
cation structural property called absolutely decomposable property, which leads to a
simplified controller synthesis process for the fault tolerant problem, as will be shown
in Chapter V. An existing concept called suffix-closed property is also introduced
for the same purpose.
Chapter overview. In Section 2.1.1, mixed monotonicity is introduced and it
is proved that every function in Rn is mixed monotone under element-wise order.
In Section 2.1.2, we then introduce a structural property called weak sign-stability
and show its usefulness in terms of function image approximation. In Section 2.2.1,
LTL is introduced as a preliminary, and then in Section 2.2.2 and Section 2.2.3 a
novel specification structural property called absolutely decomposable property and
an existing specification property called suffix-closedness are introduced respectively.
Related work. Mixed Monotonicity is previously studied in [25, 107] to ana-
lyze global stability of nonlinear systems, and recently attracts certain attention in
correct-by-construction control community [26, 28, 33]. Although the concept of
mixed monotonicity is general, the works mentioned above only focus on a special
class of systems called sign-stable systems, whose vector field can be easily veri-
fied mixed monotone. The weak sign-stability is a generalization of sign-stability,
and extends the computational approaches developed for sign-stable systems to a
broader class of systems. See, for example, [70, 71, 72] where the weak sign-stability
extension is used. In particular, the abstraction computation technique induced by
weak sign-stability can be also seen as a way to bound the Lipschiz constants of the
vector field f , and similar ideas appeared in [136] where they are used to compute
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abstraction for systems without any stability assumptions.
The concepts of absolute liveness [106] and suffix-closedness [18] are not new, but
they are not leveraged in the context of control synthesis to the best knowledge of
the author. In the literature, there are also many works studying efficient synthesis
algorithms for specific fragements of LTL formulas, such as reach-stay-avoid game
[82], mode-target game [8] and GR(1) [86]. The properties presented here are at a
more abstract level but the purpose is also efficiency. That is, by studying these
properties, we wish to understand when the later proposed efficient fault-tolerant
control synthesis algorithms provide sound and complete solutions, especially in the
existence of detection delays.
2.1 Structural Properties of Systems
In this part, a system structural property called weak sign-stability is introduced.
We analyze the usefulness of this property by viewing it as a special case of mixed
monotonicity.
2.1.1 Mixed Monotonicity
We start with introducing the concept of mixed monotonicity. Intuitively, a function
is mixed monotone if it can be decomposed into a monotonically increasing part and
a monotonically decreasing part. From the definition, it is not immediately clear if
this is a general property or a very restrictive structural property. The main result
is to show that every function in Rn is mixed monotone by implicitly constructing
its decomposition as a solution to some optimization problems. In particular, this
decomposition is tight in the sense that it provides a potential way to tightly approx-
imate the function images with a hyper box. However, this decomposition cannot be
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evaluated efficiently unless the function is sign-stable. Therefore mixed monotonicity
is not structural property, but it provide a way of viewing functions nonetheless.
Notations: Let Rn be n-dimensional Euclidean space. We use lower case letter
x ∈ Rn to denote a n-dimensional vector, and use xi to denote the ith component
of a vector x. When necessary, we will use superscript, e.g., x[i], x[j] to distinguish
different vectors (bracket is used to distinguish from the power and the higher order
derivatives). We use ≥ to denote the element wise order on Rn, i.e., for x, y ∈ Rn,
x ≥ y if and only if (iff) xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For x, x ∈ Rn such that x ≤ x,
we denote the hyperinterval {x ∈ Rn | x ≤ x ≤ x} by [x, x].
Definition 1. (Mixed Monotone Function) A function f : Rn → Rm is mixed mono-
tone if there exists g : R2n → Rm satisfying the following:
1. g(x, x) = f(x);
2. x ≥ x′ ⇒ g(x, y) ≥ g(x′, y);
3. y ≥ y′ ⇒ g(x, y) ≤ g(x, y′).
A function g satisfying the above conditions is called a decomposition function of f .
The following theorem allows us to approximate the values of a mixed monotone
function in some region, using its decomposition function.
Propoition 1. (Theorem 1 in [26]) Let f : Rn → Rm be a mixed monotone function
and let g be one of its decomposition functions, then
{f(x) | x ∈ [x, x]} ⊆ [g(x, x), g(x, x)].(2.1)
It should also be noticed that decomposition function may not be unique. To
see this, consider a simple example where f(x) = 1. Clearly both g(x, y) = 1 and
g(x, y) = x/y are decomposition functions of f . As discussed above in Proposition
1, a decomposition function g can be used to approximate the function value of
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f . Motivated by the use of decomposition functions to tightly over approximate
{f(x) | x ∈ [x, x]} with a hyperinterval, we introduce the following definition of
tightness of a decomposition function.
Definition 2. (Tight Decomposition) Let f be a mixed monotone function and g be
a decomposition of f . Decomposition function g is called tight if for all x, x ∈ Rn
s.t. x ≤ x, [g(x, x), g(x, x)] is the smallest (in set inclusion sense) hyperinterval that
contains {f(x) | x ∈ [x, x]}. That is [g(x, x), g(x, x)] = [infξ∈[x,x] f(ξ), supξ∈[x,x] f(ξ)].
The key result in this part is that every function whose extreme values are well
defined has a tight decomposition. To prove this, we introduce the following notation:





infξ∈[x,y] h(ξ) if x ≤ y
supξ∈[y,x] h(ξ) if x > y
.(2.2)
The following simple facts regarding the opt operator are useful in later proofs.
Lemma 1. opt
(x,y)
ξ h(ξ) is monotonically increasing in x and monotonically decreas-
ing in y, that is, x ≥ x′ ⇒ opt(x,y)ξ h(ξ) ≥ opt
(x′,y)






Proof. We prove x ≥ x′ ⇒ opt(x,y)ξ h(ξ) ≥ opt
(x′,y)
ξ h(ξ) in the following three cases
respectively:
(i) y ≥ x ≥ x′: opt(x,y)ξ h(ξ) = infξ∈[x,y] h(ξ) ≥ infξ∈[x′,y] h(ξ) = opt
(x′,y)
ξ h(ξ);




(iii) x ≥ x′ ≥ y: opt(x,y)ξ h(ξ) = supξ∈[y,x] h(ξ) ≥ supξ∈[y,x′] h(ξ) = opt
(x′,y)
ξ h(ξ).
The proof for y ≥ y′ ⇒ opt(x,y)ξ h(ξ) ≤ opt
(x,y′)
ξ h(ξ) is similar.
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Lemma 2. Let h : R → R and h : R → R be such that h ≥ h for all ξ ∈ R, then
opt
(x,y)
ξ h(ξ) ≥ opt
(x,y)
ξ h(ξ) for all x, y ∈ R.
Proof. This should be clear by the definition of opt.
With above lemmas, we can prove the following result.
Theorem 1. Let f : Rn → Rm be such that opt(xi,yi)ξi f(ξi) is well defined
1, then the
following g : R2n → Rm defined element-wise by










j = 1, 2, . . . ,m(2.3)
is a tight decomposition function of f .
Proof. We first prove that g is indeed a decomposition function of f .
1. Clearly, g(x, x) = f(x) by definition.
2. To show that x ≥ x′ ⇒ g(x, y) ≥ g(x′, y), it is sufficient to show that this is
true for a simple case where x and x′ differs by only one element, i.e., xi ≥ x′i
and xj = x
′
j for j 6= i. For general case, let x = x0 ≥ x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xn = x′,
where xi and xi−1 has exactly the same coordinates except for the ith position.
Then applying the result for the simple case for n times yields the desired result
for the general case.




. . . opt
(xn,yn)
ξn
f(ξ). Since xj = x
′
j for j 6= i, h(x,y)(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξi) =
h(x
′,y)(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξi) and we will use h to denote the function in what follows for
1For reachable set computation, it makes sense to assume that f is bounded on any bounded set so that the
system xk+1 = f(xk) is forward complete. With such assumption, opt
(xi,yi)
ξi
f(ξi) is always well defined. However,
if we only want to talk about mixed monotonicity of the function f , it is enough to assume that the domain of f is
Rn.
15








. . . opt
(xi,yi)
ξi










. . . opt
(x′i,yi)
ξi
h(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:h(ξ1,ξ2,...,ξi−1)
.(2.5)
Since xi ≥ x′i, by Lemma 1, we know that for all ξ1, ξ2, . . . ξi−1:
h(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξi−1) ≥ h(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξi−1).(2.6)
Applying Lemma 2 for i− 1 times leads to g(x, y) ≥ g(x′, y).
3. Proving that y ≥ y′ ⇒ g(x, y) ≤ g(x, y′) is similar as bullet 2.
This hence proves that g is a decomposition function of f . Next, we show that g is a
tight decomposition. To see this, let x, x ∈ Rn to be such that x ≤ x. Since xi ≤ xi
for all i, by definition of g in Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.2), we have




. . . inf
ξn∈[xn,xn]








. . . sup
ξn∈[xn,xn]




and this shows that g is a tight decomposition function.
Corollary 1. In general, a mixed monotone function f may not have a unique tight
decomposition function.




being arranged in an ascending order of i. Therefore one
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can rearrange the opt
(xi,yi)
ξi
operators and this does not change the fact the resulting
g is still a tight decomposition, yet it is well know that g may be different in general
after such a rearrangement. For example, let f : [0, 2]× [0, 2]→ R2 be such that
f1(x) =

0 if x ∈ [0, 1)× [0, 1] ∪ [1, 2]× (1, 2]
1 otherwise
f2(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ [0, 2]× [0, 2].(2.9)
Consider candidate decomposition function g and g′ where














and g2(x, y) = g
′
2(x, y) = 0. By Theorem 1, both g and g
′ are tight decomposition
functions of f . However, at point x = [2, 0]T and y = [0, 2]T , it can be verified
that g1(x, y) = 1 while g
′
1(x, y) = 0. Hence g 6= g′ and we have two different tight
decomposition functions of f .
Remark 1. Note that Corollary 1 is not surprising because decomposition functions
are defined on the space of (x, y), while the tightness of a decomposition function
g only depends on its value g(x, y) on the set S := {(x, y) | x, y are comparable}.
Therefore, tight decomposition functions are not unique on the entire space of (x, y),
although they do coincide with each other on set S.
The main purpose of Theorem 1 is to show that for any function on Rn whose
supremum and infimum are well-defined, there exists a tight decomposition function,
so all these functions are mixed monotone. However, this is an existential result
rather than a computational one. Indeed, the tight decomposition function defined
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above is not directly useful in the image set approximation as its construction involves
computing the infimum and supremum of the function f , which is already equivalent
to solving for the extreme coordinates of the image set, and this defeats the purpose
of constructing the decomposition function (i.e., approximating the image of function
f using Porposition 1.
2.1.2 Weak Sign-stability from the View of Mixed Monotonicity
Although mixed monotonicity is A structural property called weak sign-stability is
introduced. We analyze the usefulness of weak sign-stability by viewing it as a special
case of mixed monotonicity.
Definition 3. A continuously differentiable function f : Rn → Rm is called sign-
stable on set X ⊆ Rn if either ∂fj
∂xi
≥ 0 for all x or ∂fj
∂xi
≤ 0 for all x.
Propoition 2. (Proposition 1 in [26]) A sign-stable functions f has a tight decom-
position function in the following form:













A notable feature of the decomposition function g defined by Eq. (2.13) is that
it can be constructed directly from the expression of function f . We call such de-
composition function evaluable. By Proposition 1, if g is evaluable, one can easily
approximation the image of sign-stable function f when x takes value from a hyper
box, by evaluating its decomposition function g. On the contrary, the decomposition
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function g in Theorem 1, which is implicitly defined as the solution of an optimiza-
tion problem, cannot be constructed directly from the expression of f and hence is
not evaluable2.
Definition 4. A differentiable function f : Rn → Rm is called weakly sign-stable on
a set X ⊆ Rn if
∂fi
∂xj
(x) ∈ (aij, bij),∀x ∈ X,(2.14)
where aij, bij ∈ R, satisfying aij < bij but (aij, bij) 6= (−∞,∞).
Theorem 2. Let f : Rn → Rm be a weakly sign-stable function on X, f has an
evaluable decomposition function.
Proof. We prove Theorem 2 by constructing a decomposition function for f , then f
is mixed monotone by definition.
By assumption ∂fi
∂xj
(x) ∈ (aij, bij) for all x ∈ X, the interval (aij, bij) must satisfy
at least one of the following four cases:
case 1: sign-stable positive aij ≥ 0
case 2: sign-unstable “positive” aij ≤ 0, bij ≥ 0,
|aij| ≤ |bij|
case 3: sign-unstable “negative” aij ≤ 0, bij ≥ 0,
|aij| ≥ |bij|
case 4: sign-stable negative bij ≤ 0.
According to the above cases, define g : Rn × Rn → Rm as
∀i ∈ 1 . . . ,m :
gi(x, y) = fi(z) + (αi − βi)T (x− y),(2.15)
2Mathematically, it is hard to define evaluability because it is a property characterized by the computational
effort rather than a qualitative criteria.
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where z = [z1, . . . , zn]
T , αi = [αi1, . . . , αin]
T , βi = [βi1, . . . , βin]




xj case 1, 2




0 case 1, 3, 4




0 case 1, 2, 4
−|bij| − ε case 3
,(2.18)
where ε is a small positive number.
Next we show that g is a decomposition function of f .
1. Obviously g(x, x) = f(x) by equations (2.15) and (2.16).
























+ |aij|+ ε case 2
























−|aij| − ε case 2
∂fi
∂yj





It follows from definition 1 that g is a decomposition function of f and hence Theorem
2 is proved.
We now discuss some implications of this result. By Theorem 2, all differentiable
functions with continuous partial derivatives are mixed monotone on a compact set,
because the partial derivatives are bounded on the compact set, and hence satisfy
the hypothesis of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 is a natural extension of the result in [26], which only handles the case
with sign-stable partial derivatives. The idea here is to use linear terms to create
additional offset to overcome the sign-unstable partial derivatives, which leads to
a decomposition. These linear terms are chosen to be as small as possible so that
the decomposition function constructed by Theorem 2 gives a tighter approximation
when applying Proposition 13. In the case where all the partial derivatives ∂fi
∂xj
are
sign-stable, the decomposition function constructed here gives a tight approxima-
tion in Proposition 1, that is, the inequality in equation (2.1) reduces to equality
3The proof of Theorem 2 would still go through if we combine case 2 and case 3, but we can get smaller coefficients
in front of the linear term by treating these two cases separately.
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at some x ∈ X [26]. However this is not true when there are sign-unstable partial
derivatives. Thus in general the approximation given by Proposition 1 might be con-
servative when using the decomposition function constructed in Theorem 2. However,
one can reduce such conservatism by dividing region X into smaller subregions and
applying the same approximation on each subregion. Then the extremum function
value over region X can be obtained by combining the extremum function values
on those subregions. This divide-and-conquer approach, of course, requires more
computational effort because one needs to approximate the ranges of sign-unstable
partial derivatives on each subregion.
Note that the construction of the decomposition function requires to approximate
the ranges of the sign-unstable partial derivatives. Therefore, Theorem 2 together
with Proposition 1 “shift” the difficulty of approximating the function value of f
into approximating its partial derivatives ∂fi
∂xj
. By doing such, the difficulty may
not be reduced in general. However, in many control applications, the considered
systems including thermal systems [124] and traffic networks [28], are naturally mixed
monotone. If one can approximate the partial derivatives of system flow once and
for all and prove its mixed monotonicity, such properties can be used to simplify the
system analysis and design techniques.
2.2 Structural Properties of Specifications
In this part, we introduce LTL as the specification formalism and two structural
properties of specifications, one called absolutely decomposable property and one
called suffix-closed property, that will be useful to analyze the fault-tolerant control
synthesis algorithms proposed in the following sections. The concept of absolute
safety is novel and some useful esults are established.
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Notations: Let S be any set, lowercase letters (e.g., x) are used for denoting a point
from set S, bold font lowercase letters are used for finite sequences of points (e.g., x),
and blackboard bold font lowercase letters are used for infinite sequences (also called
ω-words) of points (e.g., x). We use S∗ to denote the set of all finite sequence over
set S, and Sω to denote the set of all ω-words over S. By convention, let x(i) (or
x(i), respectively) be the ith element in the sequence x (or x, respectively), and let
xi = x(i)x(i+ 1)x(i+ 2) . . . be the sub-sequence starting from the i
th position. We
call xi a suffix of x, and call x(1) · · ·x(n) a prefix of x (or a prefix of finite sequence
x if applicable). For a set P ⊆ (Sω), we use pref(P ) (resp. suff(P )) to denote the
set of prefixes (resp. suffixes) of ω-words from P .
2.2.1 Formal Specifications in LTL
We use LTL to specify the desired closed-loop system behavior. In what follows we
briefly introduce the syntax and the semantics of LTL, and refer the reader to [7] for
more details.
1) Syntax: Let AP be a set of atomic propositions, i.e., a set of statements on
system and environment variables whose truth values can be determined by checking
whether the associated variables are within given sets, the syntax of LTL formulas
over AP is given by
ϕ ::= π | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ©ϕ | ϕ1 U ϕ2(2.21)
where π ∈ AP . Logical operators ¬ and ∨ correspond to negation and disjunction
in boolean logic, while temporal operators © and U are called “next” and “until”
operators respectively. With the grammar given in Eq. (2.21), we define the other
propositional and temporal logic operators as follows:
• conjunction: ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 := ¬(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2),
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• implication: ϕ1 → ϕ2 := ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2,
• eventual: ♦ϕ := True U ϕ,
• always: ϕ := ¬♦¬ϕ,
• release: ϕ1 R ϕ2 := ¬(¬ϕ1 U ¬ϕ2).
These extra logical operators do not extend the expressive power of LTL but with
them an LTL formula ϕ can be written into a formula ϕ′ in positive normal form,
that is, all the negations in ϕ′ only appear in front of the atomic propositions [7]. As
will be presented in the later sessions, such formula manipulation comes in handy
when the robust satisfaction of an LTL formula is considered.
2) Semantics: Let x = x(1)x(2)x(3) . . . be a infinite sequence of points in Rn
and let AP be a set of atomic propositions. We define a labeling map L : Rn → 2AP



















• x |= ¬ϕ iff x 2 ϕ,
• x |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff x |= ϕ1 or x |= ϕ2,
• x |=©ϕ iff x2 |= ϕ,
• x |= ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff ∃s ≥ 1 : xs |= ϕ2 and ∀t < s : xt |= ϕ1.
Given an infinite word x and an LTL formula ϕ, we say ϕ holds for x (or x satisfies
ϕ) iff x |= ϕ.
For a continuous-time signal ξ : [0,+∞)→ Rn one can consider the LTL fragment
without next operator ©, denoted by LTL\©. The ω-word x = x(1)x(2)x(3) . . .
that is consistent with continuous signal ξ can be generated by breaking signal ξ





= x(k) for all t ∈ [tk, tk+1]. Such an consistent ω-word x is stutter equivalent
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with the continuous-time signal ξ [7]. In the rest of this work, we will consider LTL\©
formulas when dealing with a continuous-time system.
2.2.2 Absolutely Decomposable Property
A linear time property called absolutely decomposable property is defined. Intu-
itively, it specifies a property whose satisfaction can be “reset” at anytime, as long
as it has not been violated yet. This is the key property that assures the later pro-
posed control synthesis algorithms to be robust to detection delay. In what follows
we first introduce some preliminaries on linear time properties and its decomposition.
A linear time (LT) property P over atomic propositions AP is a subset of (2AP )ω.
An LT property P is called a safety property if a word w belonging to P is equivalent
to the following: for all p ∈ pref(w) there exists s ∈ (2AP )ω such that ps ∈ P ,
where ps is an ω-word obtained by appending s behind p. An LT property P is
called a liveness property if for all p ∈ (2AP )∗ there exists s ∈ (2AP )ω such that
ps ∈ P . It is well known that any LT property can be written as the conjunction
of a safety property and a liveness property [7]. In particular, such decomposition is
not unique but a canonical sharp one exists [7]. That is, there exists a decomposition
P = P ?safety∩P ?liveness, such that for any other decomposition P = Psafety∩Pliveness, one
has P ?safety ⊆ Psafety and Pliveness ⊆ P ?liveness. Here P ?safety is called the safety closure of
P and P ?liveness is called the liveness closure of P .
Whenever an LT property P is defined by an LTL formula ϕ, i.e., P = Word(ϕ) :=
{w ∈ (2AP )ω | w |= ϕ}, one can find LTL formulas ϕsafe, ϕliveness such that ϕ =
ϕsafe ∧ ϕliveness and Word(ϕsafety), Word(ϕliveness) are safety and liveness properties,
respectively. This can be done systematically by i) constructing two nondeterministic
Buchi automaton (NBA), one generating the safety closure of Word(ϕ) and the other
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generating the liveness closure of Word(ϕ) [3], and ii) converting the two NBA’s into
ϕsafe and ϕliveness respectively
4.
Next, we introduce a special type of LTL formula that specifies an absolutely
decomposable property [128], which is defined as follows.
Definition 5. Let P ⊆ (2AP )ω be a property over set AP . Property P is called
absolutely decomposable if there exists a decomposition P = Psafety ∩ Pliveness, such
that
• Psafety is an absolute safety property, i.e., it is a safety property, and p ∈
pref(Psafety), w ∈ Psafety implies that pw ∈ Psafety;
• Pliveness is an absolute liveness property, i.e., it is a liveness property, and p ∈
pref(Pliveness), w ∈ Pliveness implies that pw ∈ Pliveness.
Note that pref(Pliveness) = (2
AP )∗, thus the definition of absolute liveness coincides
with the one given by [2]. In what follows, some useful results regarding absolutely
decomposable properties are presented. To this point, we first give a lemma about
general safety properties that is used in the later proofs.
Lemma 3. Let P1 and P2 be two safety property over AP , pref(P1) = pref(P2)
implies that P1 = P2.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that pref(P1) = pref(P2) but P1 6= P2. Without
loss of generality, this means there exists w = w(1)w(2) · · · ∈ P1 such that w /∈ P2.
Since w /∈ P2 and P2 is a safety property, we immediately know that w has a bad
prefix p := w(1)w(2) · · ·w(t) /∈ pref(P2). But on the other hand, w ∈ P1 and this
implies that p ∈ pref(P1) = pref(P2), which is a contradiction.
Propoition 3. Let P be an absolutely decomposable property, for all p ∈ pref(P ),
4In general, it is possible that an NBA cannot be described by an LTL formula, but there exist algorithms doing
the conversion whenever it is possible [31].
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w ∈ P , pw ∈ P .
Proof. Let p ∈ pref(P ) and w ∈ P . First, notice the fact that P = Psafety ∩Pliveness.
This implies that (i) p ∈ pref(P ) ⊆ pref(Psafety), (ii) p ⊆ pref(Pliveness), (iii)
w ∈ Psafety and w ∈ Pliveness. By bullet 1 in Definition 5, we have pw ∈ Psafety, and
by bullet 2, pw ∈ Pliveness. Thus pw ∈ P = Psafety ∩ Pliveness.
With the following proposition, we show that GR(1) formulas, an LTL fragment
of vast interest in reactive synthesis, is absolutely live.








where I and J be finite index sets, and ϕi, ϕj are propositional formulas, then
Word(ϕ) is an absolute liveness property.
Proof. By definition, it should be clear that
1) absolute liveness properties are closed under union and intersection, and hence
LTL formulas specifies such properties must be closed under disjunction and
conjunction;
2) ♦ψ and ♦ψ specifies absolute liveness properties for any propositional for-
mula ψ.
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Applying bullet 1) and 2) to Eq. (2.23) proves that ϕ is absolute live.
Propoition 5. Let P1, P2 be two absolute safety properties, P = P1 ∩ P2 is also
absolute safety property.
Proof. Proposition 5 easily follow from the definition of absolute safety properties.
Propoition 6. Let P be an absolutely decomposable property with the specific
decomposition P = Psafety ∩ Pliveness, then pref(P ) = pref(Psafety).
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 3, we already know that pref(P ) ⊆ pref(Psafety).
Next we show the other direction. For this purpose, let p ∈ pref(Psafety) and w ∈ P
be arbitrary. Next we show pw ∈ P and conclude p ∈ pref(P ).
(a) First, note that p ∈ pref(Psafe) and that w ∈ P ⊆ Psafe. By bullet 1 in
Definition 5, we have pw ∈ Psafety.
(b) Secondly, also note that p ∈ pref(Pliveness) = (2AP )∗, and w ∈ P ⊆ Pliveness. By
bullet 2 in Definition 5, we have pw ∈ Pliveness.
Combining (a) and (b), we have pw ∈ Psafety ∩ Pliveness = P . Therefore p ∈ pref(P )
and this finishes the proof.
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Propoition 7. Let P be an absolutely decomposable property with a specific de-
composition P = Psafety ∩ Pliveness, and let P = P ?safety ∩ P ?liveness be the sharpest
decomposition, then Psafety = P
?
safety.
Proof. By P = P ?safety ∩ P ?liveness, we have P ⊆ P ?safety. This hence gives
pref(P ) ⊆ pref(P ?safety).(2.24)
On the other hand, since P ?safety comes from the sharpest decomposition, P
?
safety ⊆
Psafety. This implies that
pref(P ∗safety) ⊆ pref(Psafety).(2.25)
Combine (2.24), (2.25), we have
pref(P ) ⊆ pref(P ?safety) ⊆ pref(Psafety).(2.26)
But by Proposition 6, we know that pref(P ) = pref(Psafety), which forces all
“⊆” in Eq. (2.26) to be “=”. Thus we have pref(P ?safety) = pref(Psafety). Applying
Lemma 3, we have P ?safety = Psafety.
Propoition 8. Let P1 be an absolutely decomposable property under decomposition
P1 = P1,safety ∩ P1,liveness, and let P2,safety be an absolute safety property, then P =
P1 ∩ P2,safety is absolutely decomposable under P = Psafety ∩ Pliveness, where Psafety =
P1,safety ∩ P2,safety and Pliveness = P1,liveness.
Proof. First note that Psafety is indeed a safety property and Psafety ∩ Pliveness =
(P1,safety∩P2,safety)∩Pliveness = P2,safety∩ (P1,safety∩P1,liveness) = P is a valid decompo-
sition. Moreover, by Proposition 5, Psafety is a absolute safety property. By definition
P is absolutely decomposable, and Psafety = P1,safety ∩ P2,safety is the unique absolute
safety property involved in the decomposition by Proposition 7.
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2.2.3 Suffix-closed Property
A linear time property called suffix-closed property is introduced.
Definition 6. (Suffix-closed Property) Let P ⊆ (2AP )ω be an LT property over set
AP . Property P is called suffix-closed if suff(P ) ⊆ P . We call an LTL formula ϕ
suffix-closed if Word(ϕ) is suffix-closed.
It can be shown that GR(1) formulas is suffix-closed.
Propoition 9. GR(1) formulas are suffixed closed.
Proof. By definition, it should be clear that
1) suffix-closed properties are closed under union and intersection, and hence suffix-
closed LTL formulas are closed under disjunction and conjunction;
2) ♦ψ and ♦ψ are suffix-closed for any propositional formula ψ.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 4, applying bullet 1) and 2) to Eq. (2.23) proves
that ϕ is suffix-closed.
We next discuss the connection between suffix-closedness properties and abso-
lutely decomposable properties. An important LT property that bridges the two
aforementioned properties is invariance.
Definition 7. (Invariance) An LT property P ⊆ (2AP )ω is an invariance property if
there exists a propositional formula ψ such that for any w = w(1)w(2) · · · ∈ P and
any j, we have w(j) |= ψ.
Propoition 10. An LT property P ⊆ (2AP )ω is both suffix-closed and absolutely
safe iff P is an invariance property.
Proof. Clearly, invariance property is both absolutely safe and suffix-closed. To
show the “only if” part, define Wi(P ) := {w ∈ 2AP | w = w(i) for some w =
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w(1)w(2)w(3) · · · ∈ P}. We can find a propositional formula ψ in disjunction nor-
mal form such that w |= ψ iff w ∈ W1(P ). Since P is suffix-closed, we have
Wi+1(P ) ⊆ Wi(P ),(2.27)
whereas by P being absolute safety, we have
Wi+1(P ) ⊇ Wi(P ).(2.28)
Hence Wi+1(P ) = Wi(P ). This implies that Wi(P ) = W1(P ) for all i. Hence for any
i and w ∈ Wi(P ), w |= ψ holds, i.e., P is an invariance property.
Moreover, it can be shown that if an LT property is both absolutely decomposable
and suffix-closed, its safety closure must be an invariance property.
Propoition 11. If P ⊆ (2AP )ω is both absolutely decomposable and suffix-closed,
then its safety closure P ?safety is an invariance property.
Proof. Since P is absolutely decomposable, we know that P ?safety is absolute safety
by Proposition 7. It is then enough to show that P ?safety is also suffix-closed, and the
desired result will follow from Proposition 10.
To show P ?safety is indeed suffix-closed, let w = w(1)w(2) · · · ∈ P ?safety be arbitrary,
and let s = w(r)w(r+1) . . . be arbitrary suffix of w starting from rth position. Since
P ?safety is the safety closure of P , we have
∀t : ∃w ∈ P : ∀τ ≤ t : w(τ) = w(τ).(2.29)
Let s = w(r)w(r + 1) . . . , we know s ∈ P as P is assumed to be suffix-closed.
Together with Eq. (2.29), this implies
∀t : ∃s ∈ P : ∀τ ≤ t : s(τ) = s(τ).(2.30)
That is s ∈ P ?safety. Recall that s is arbitrary suffix of arbitrary w ∈ P ?safety, P ?safety is
hence suffix-closed by definition and the proof is completed.
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CHAPTER III
Fault Detectability Analysis with LTL Constraints
Fault detection is one of the key component of fault tolerant control as contingent
actions cannot be taken without knowing if the fault has already occurred or not.
Since the correct-by-construction control synthesis techniques are all model-based
approaches in essence, they naturally incorporate better with model-based fault de-
tection, which are more promising in terms of providing a formal guarantee. At high
level, such model-based fault detection algorithms, regardless of being developed for
discrete or continuous state systems, are all trying to solve the same problem at run-
time, i.e., checking if the observed data is consistent with the healthy system model
or not. Due to the nondeterminisitc nature of these system models, a fault may
not be detected immediately after their occurrence because the uncertainties (e.g.,
disturbance, noise) in the model may hide the fault. For finite discrete systems, a
determinization of the system can be done via power set construction. However, this
method is intractable for continuous state systems because the memory it requires
grows with time. This is one of the key challenge in developing model-based detection
for complex systems where both discrete and continuous states are present.
One way to address the aforementioned issue is to consider a detector with finite
memory of length T , but also provide a proof that, even in the worst-case, the faulty
32
system can be distinguished from the healthy system in finite time T as well. This
constant T can be also interpreted as the worst case detection delay, and a smaller
T is clearly favorable. Whenever the model of the healthy and the faulty system
are both available, it is also possible to determine the minimum T . This is called
detectability analysis, and it essentially amounts to checking whether the reachable
sets of the healthy and faulty models become disjoint within time T . However,
such worst case analysis may sometimes conclude conservatively that a fault is not
detectable in finite time, while this may not be true in practice because some extra
side information (e.g., the LTL specification that the system should satisfy) are not
incorporated in the detectability analysis.
In this chapter, we consider switched affine systems, whose detectability analysis
can be accomplished by solving a MILP. We further assume that when the system
operation is normal (i.e., the system is healthy), the switching mode signal satisfies
a certain LTL formula; and in case of faults, it satisfies a different (possibly trivial)
formula, capturing the potential switching patterns during normal operation and
anomalies, respectively. The main contribution is to show that by combining dy-
namical models (given as switched affine systems) and behavioral models (given as
LTL formula), one can reduce the worst-case fault detection time a receding horizon
algorithm guarantees. We express the LTL constraints (restricted in a finite horizon)
with a nondeterministic finite state machine called a monitor, which is then trans-
formed into a set of mixed integer linear constraints that can be easily integrated in
the MILP used for the detectability analysis.
Chapter overview. In Section 3.1, we formally introduce the concept of switched
affine systems, model invalidation based fault detection, MILP based fault detectabil-
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ity analysis and LTL monitoring. The connection between model invalidation and
monitoring is also discussed. In Section 3.2, the detectability analysis problem with
LTL constraints is defined. In Section 3.3, we present the proposed approach. It
is shown that detectability analysis in the setting can be conducted by creating a
monitor finite state machine for the LTL formula and encoding the restriction the
formula imposes on the system behavior as mixed integer linear constraints, which
is then incorporated into the MILP for the offline worst-case detectability analysis.
Finally, these ideas are illustrated with an example in Section 3.4, where a collection
of unmanned aerial vehicles are implementing a consensus protocol over a commu-
nication network with time-varying connectivity. We show how detectability can be
guaranteed when network connectivity patterns change using the proposed approach.
Related work. The work presented in this chapter is related to several fault de-
tection approaches developed by different communities. For discrete (e.g., software-
based) systems, monitoring and run-time verification techniques have been proposed
[6, 49, 10, 97, 102]. Similarly, fault detection algorithms have also been studied for
continuous-state dynamical systems using ideas from filtering or optimization [53, 38].
This work tries to bring together the ideas from the two communities to obtain a
less conservative fault detection method for a class of hybrid systems, governed by
both discrete and continuous variables.
In particular, we approach the continuous aspects of this problem from the per-
spective of model invalidation [47, 92, 108]. Model invalidation is a robust system
identification process that checks whether some given input output data can be ex-
plained by a given model, and is tightly related to fault detection as pointed out
in [90, 91]. Comparing to other widely used model-based fault-detection methods
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such as residual generation [38], the model invalidation based approach is more suit-
able for providing a finite detection guarantee rather than an asymptotical one. The
idea of model invalidation is also very similar to the model conformance problem
studied in computer science community [17, 113], in particular to the input/output
conformance for discrete-time systems [113, 114].
The discrete aspect of the fault detection problem is handled with LTL monitoring
[10]. At high level, model invalidation and the LTL monitoring can be both viewed
from the standpoint of set membership fault detection [116, 59, 52], because they
essentially amount to computing the reachable set of some uncertain model under
a given input sequence and checking if the observed output sequence (trajectories)
lies in this reachable set or not. This connection provides the key intuition to bring
together these two techniques.
The work on the fault detectability presented here tightly follows [47] and its con-
ference versions [46, 45, 48], and is also related to their follow-up work for structured
systems [40]. In [47], the detectability analysis with LTL constraints is discussed,
but those LTL constraints are only imposed on the switching sequence for the faulty
system, which is easy to incorporate in the MILP encoding [58, 117]. The key novelty
of this work is to handle the case where another LTL formula ϕ is used to describe
the healthy mode switching sequence. Since this LTL formula ϕ a is not necessarily
evaluated at the beginning of the receding horizon of the detector, its MILP encoding
is not trivial without using a monitor finite transition system.
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Fault Detection for Switched Affine Systems via Model Invalidation
Switched Affine Systems
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A discrete-time switched affine system S is described by the following difference
equations:
xt+1 = Astxt +Bstut + Estwt +Kst ,
yt = Cstxt +Dstut + Fstvt,(3.1)
where
• x ∈ X ⊆ Rn is the unobserved internal state,
• u ∈ U ⊆ Rm is the observed input,
• w ∈ W ⊆ Rl is the unobserved input,
• y ∈ Y ⊆ Rp is the observed output,
• v ∈ V ⊆ Rq is the unobserved measurement noise (can be viewed as input),
• s is the observed switching mode from a finite set Σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σK}.
We also assume that sets U, V,W,X, Y are polytopes in their spaces, and that As ,
Bs , Cs , Ds , Es , Fs , Ks are matrices with proper sizes.
Such models can be used to describe, for instance, physical systems with discrete
actuation or closed-loop systems with continuous plants and logic-based controllers.
Switching mode captures the discrete, logic-based variables.
Guaranteed Fault Detection via Model Invalidation
In this chapter, we consider fault detection of switched affine systems. By a fault,
we mean a sudden and permanent change of the system dynamics in Eq. (3.1),
due to physical component failures or extreme operating conditions. Such changes
can be reflected by dynamics being governed by different system matrices, and by
having larger admissible uncertainty set V and W . Since the uncertainty w and v
may “hide” a fault in the worst case, the behavior of the faulty system may not be
distinguishable from the healthy one immediately after the fault occurs. Our goal
is to detect the fault occurrence as soon as possible. In particular, the correctness
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of the detection needs to be guaranteed, meaning that the fault must have already
happened, once detected.
It is shown in [47] that such guaranteed fault detection can be done using a
model invalidation approach. The model invalidation problem addresses the following
question: at time instant t0, given a sequence {ut, st, yt}t0t=t0−N+1 of past inputs and
outputs over a finite window of length N , can we find an admissible unobserved
sequence {xt, wt, vt}t0t=t0−N+1 such that the output {yt}
t0
t=t0−N+1 is indeed generated
by the system in Eq. (3.1) under input {ut, st, wt, vt}t0t=t0−N+1? If no such unobserved
sequences can be found, the actual observation cannot possibly be generated by the
healthy system model (i.e., the model is invalidated). We can hence claim that a
fault that changes the system dynamics must have occurred within the examined
time window.
For switched affine systems, the model invalidation problem can be formulated as
a linear program (LP)
(3.2)







Aσkxt +Bσkut + Eσkwt +Kσk
)
,







Cσkxt +Dσkut + Fσkvt
)
,
∀t ∈ [[t0 −N + 1, t0]],
xt ∈ X,wt ∈ W, vt ∈ V, ∀t ∈ [[t0 −N + 1, t0]],
where [[a, b]] := {c ∈ N | a ≤ c ≤ b} for two integers a < b, and atk is a binary
indicator that takes value 1 if and only if (iff) st = σk. Note that {ut, yt}t0t=t0−N+1
and atk (which is known from {st}
t0
t=t0−N+1) are all parameters rather than variables
in the above feasibility problem, as {ut, st, yt}t0t=t0−N+1 are observed at each time.
This means the feasibility problem in Eq. (3.2) does not contain integer variables
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Figure 3.1: Growing horizon scheme (left) versus receding horizon scheme (right). The red boxes
mark the growing/shifted time window.
and is hence an LP.
To perform model invalidation based fault detection at run-time, one needs to
update the time window (i.e., horizon) to incorporate newly collected data. As
pointed out in [47], there are two ways of changing the horizon at run-time: one is
called the growing horizon scheme (Fig. 3.1, left) and the other is known as a receding
horizon scheme (Fig. 3.1, right). With the growing horizon scheme, we start at time
t = 0 with a horizon of length N = 0, and increase N by one at each time step. In this
case, N → ∞ as time grows. Under the receding horizon scheme, we stop growing
the horizon length whenever it reaches a certain value, and we start to shift the
time window after that. That is, at every time instant t0, we collect the most recent
history of the observed variables from time window [[t0 −N + 1, t0]] and perform the
above model invalidation procedure. If the system is invalidated, we claim a fault;
otherwise we shift the time window to [[t0 −N + 2, t0 + 1]] and repeat the procedure
with the updated data in the shifted window. Theoretically, the growing horizon
scheme may lead to an earlier detection than the receding horizon scheme because
the latter one drops older observations. We say the receding horizon detector is more
conservative compared to the growing horizon detector in the sense the former may
miss a fault that is detectable by the latter. However, the growing horizon scheme
is not practical because it requires the memory to grow to infinity. We hence always
implement the receding horizon scheme in practice to keep the memory finite.
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Detectability Analysis
Note that the fault detection technique via model invalidation may not be complete,
in the sense that a fault may remain undetected indefinitely. There are two sources
of this: (i) the fault dynamics can be inherently indistinguishable from the nominal
dynamics, (ii) the invalidation process is conservative, e.g., due to using a fixed
horizon. For the latter issue, a longer window tends to make the detector “closer” to
being complete. On the other hand, if the models of both the healthy system S and
the faulty system S f are known, it is possible to verify if the detection is complete
with a given window length N . That is, if a fault occurs whether it will be detected
within N time steps by the receding horizon detector. We call a healthy-faulty system
pair (S,S f) to be “N -detectable” if this is the case.
For a given healthy-faulty system pair (S,S f) and a positive integer N , the de-
tectability analysis answer the following question: is system pair (S,S f)N -detectable?
If yes, what is the minimal N such that the pair is N -detectable? From a theoretical
point of view, it is important if we can prove N -detectability of a system pair be-
cause it allows us to use a receding horizon detector without missing any faults due
to its conservativeness compared to the growing horizon detector. From a practical
point of view, it is also important to find the minimal N so that the receding horizon
detector does not need to keep an unnecessarily long memory.
To analyze the detectability of system pair (S,S f), we construct the so called
N -behavior set BN(S) (and BN(S f), respectively), i.e., the set of all observed input-
output sequences of length N that can be possibly generated by the healthy system
S (or the faulty system S f , respectively), and check if the two sets intersect. If
BN(S) ∩BN(S f) = ∅, then the healthy and the faulty behavior must differ within
N time steps. In this case, the minimal horizon length T that is necessary for
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the detection to be complete (i.e., T := min
{
N | BN(S) ∩ BN(S f) = ∅
}
) can be
computed by a line search over ascending N , starting from N = 1.
If the dynamics of system S satisfies Eq. (3.1), the N -behavior set of system S can
be described by mixed integer linear constraints. In this case, BN(S) ∩BN(S f) = ∅
is equivalent to a MILP being infeasible. Formally, BN(S) is defined by Eq. (3.3).
(3.3)
BN(S) =
 {ut, st, yt}
N
t=1 ∈
(U × Σ× Y )N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃{xt, wt, vt}
N
t=1 ∈ (X ×W × V )N :
{ut, vt, wt, xt, yt, st}Nt=1 satisfy S’s dynamics
 ,
where the constraints in Eq. (3.3) can be expressed with exactly the same set of the
formulas in Eq. (3.2) (after shifting the time window to [[1, N ]]), except that now the
observed sequences {ut, yt}Nt=1 and the auxiliary binary variables atk are also variables
rather than parameters of the constraints, and that ut, a
t
k, yt must satisfy
ut ∈ U, yt ∈ Y, ∀t ∈ [[1, N ]],(3.4)
atk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀t ∈ [[1, N ]], k ∈ [[1, |Σ|]],(3.5)
and atk must also satisfy ∑
σk∈Σ
atk = 1, ∀t ∈ [[1, N ]].(3.6)
Note that with atk being variables, the constraints describing BN(S) now contain






kvt (see Eq. (3.2)). These bilinear constraints can
be transformed into linear ones by introducing some continuous-valued auxiliary
variables, which leads to a set of (mixed integer) linear constraints. The detailed
transformation procedure can be found in [46]. To simplify the notations, we will











atk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀t ∈ [[1, N ]], k ∈ [[1, |Σ|]],(3.7)
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where ξob is the continuous-valued auxiliary variable that comes from a
t
kut, and ξun is






N is an affine function
that depends on the system matrices of S and horizon length N . With this notation,















































atk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀t ∈ [[1, N ]], k ∈ [[1, |Σ|]] ≤ 0.
(3.8)
3.1.2 LTL Monitoring
In this work we consider fault detectability analysis of switched affine systems whose
mode sequences x = s1s2s3 . . . must satisfy certain LTL formulas. In particular,
our goal is to show how such side information can improve detectability analysis. In
what follows, we briefly recall LTL and some related concepts from automata theory
that will be useful to encode the LTL constraints on x.
Monitor
We introduce several concepts related to LTL monitoring that will be used to encode
the LTL constraints in the fault detectability analysis.
Definition 8. Let ϕ be an LTL formula. A finite word p ∈ Σ∗ is called a bad prefix
of ϕ if1 for all s ∈ Σω, ps 2 ϕ, where ps is the ω-word obtained by concatenating s
to p. Otherwise we call p a (valid) prefix of ϕ.
Definition 9. Given and LTL formula ϕ, a monitor Mϕ is a tuple (Σ, Q,Qinit, δ),
where Σ is a finite set of letters, Q is a finite set of states, Qinit ⊆ Q is a set of
1Note that ϕ has no bad prefixes if it specifies a liveness property, hence a finite word being a bad prefix of ϕ is
equivalent to the word being a bad prefix of the safety closure of the language accepted by ϕ.
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initial states, and partial function δ : Q×Σ→ 2Q is the nondeterministic2 transition
map. Moreover, Mϕ satisfies the following condition: a finite word p = p1p2 . . . pN
is a valid prefix of ϕ if and only if there exists q = q1q2 . . . qN+1 ∈ QN+1 such that




for i ∈ [[1, N ]].
The monitor finite state machine Mϕ can be viewed as a model that generates
sequences exactly from {p ∈ Σ∗ | p is a valid prefix of ϕ}. It is well known that a
monitor Mϕ can be constructed for every LTL formula ϕ [30].
3.1.3 Fault Detection versus Run-time Verification
We would like to point out the connection between the model invalidation based
fault detection and run-time verification.
In run-time verification, we are given an LTL formula and desire to verify if a
sequence s = s1s2 . . . sM ∈ Σ∗ is a bad prefix of ϕ. To this end, we construct monitor
Mϕ = (Σ, Q,Qinit, δ) and check if s leads to a valid run on Mϕ. The monitor Mϕ
can be viewed as a model with internal state set q ∈ Q, and the sequence s can
be viewed as an N -behavior that may be generated by the model Mϕ, under some
admissible nondeterministic transitions. The run-time verification procedure reduces
to computing a set QN of the reachable states of Mϕ after reading s1s2 . . . sN and
checking if QN = ∅ for some N ≤ M . If yes, the anomaly (i.e., violation of ϕ) is
claimed.
In the model invalidation based fault detection, we check if a sequence of observa-
tion {ut, st, yt}Nt=1 is generated by a model described by Eq. (3.1), with internal state
x that is analogue to q of a monitor, and with bounded uncertainty w, v that are
analogue to the nondeterministic transition of the monitor. Very similar to the idea
2Often times in the literature, the term “monitor” are used to refer to the deterministic finite transition system
that are determinzed from M via standard power set construction. Here we follow [30] and use the term “monitor”
to refer to the nondeterministic finite transition system.
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of run-time verification, the model invalidation reduces to checking the emptiness
of a set XN , which consists of the healthy system’s reachable states that are con-
sistent with observation {ut, st, yt}Nt=1 under some admissible uncertainty sequence
{wt, vt}Nt=1. In fact, set XN can be viewed as the projection (onto the internal state
space) of a high dimensional polytope that is described exactly by the linear con-
straints in Eq. (3.2). However, unlike the case in the run-time verification where
the internal state set QN is finite no matter what N is, XN consists of infinite states
and its representation complexity (i.e., the number of linear constraints required to
describe XN) may blow up as N →∞. This can be viewed as another interpretation
of the issue that a growing horizon detector requires infinite memory. Hence we have
to use the receding horizon scheme to compute an over approximation of XN , whose
description complexity is bounded. Detectability analysis tells us how tight this over
approximation should be so that no fault is missed by the detector.
3.2 Problem Description
In this work we consider fault detectability analysis for switched affine systems whose
mode sequences satisfy certain LTL constraints. To define the problem, we first define
how the LTL-based side-information can be incorporated in the behavior description
of the system. Let S be the healthy system and S f be the faulty system, and ϕ and
ϕf be the corresponding LTL formulas. We assume the side-information to be of
following form:
(i) if the fault never occurs, x, 1 |= ϕ;
(ii) if the fault occurs at time to, then s1s2 . . . sto−1 is a valid prefix of ϕ, and
x, to |= ϕf .
43
As mentioned previously, we collect the input-output pairs of length N in the
receding horizon fault detection process. The above extra LTL constraints further
restrict the sets of N -behaviors of the healthy and faulty systems, which now take






∃{xt, wt, vt}Nt=1 ∈ (X ×W × V )N :
{ut, vt, wt, xt, yt, st}Nt=1 satisfy S’s dynamics








∃{xt, wt, vt}Nt=1 ∈ (X f ×W f × V f)N :
{ut, vt, wt, xt, yt, st}Nt=1 satisfy S f ’s dynamics
∃w ∈ Σω : s1s2 . . . sNw |= ϕf

.
The key difference between the definitions of BN(S, ϕ) and BN(S f , ϕf) is regard-
ing the constraints on the N -sequence of modes, which are highlighted with the
boxes. Fig. 3.2 shows an illustration that may help understanding this difference.
The blue line represents the switching sequence when the system is always healthy,
whereas the dashed red line represents the switching sequence assuming the fault
occurs at time to. The shaded region highlights the switching mode sequence within
time window [[to, to + N − 1]], and our goal is to check if the behavior generated by
the healthy system under the blue shaded mode sequence differs from the behavior
generated by the red faulty system under the red shaded mode sequence. Since we re-
quire x, to |= ϕf , this suggests that the most recent N -segment of the mode sequence
(the red shaded area) must be a valid prefix of ϕf . This hence leads to the boxed
condition in Eq. (3.10). On the other hand, we require x, 1 |= ϕ, the N-segment
represented by the blue shaded region can be completed into a valid prefix of ϕ by
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the timeline in the healthy and faulty case.
adding p ∈ Σ∗ in the front, which leads to the condition marked by the box in Eq.
(3.9).
We now formally state the detectability analysis problem.
Problem 1. Assume the following are given:
(i) a healthy system S and a faulty system S f , both of which have switched affine
dynamics in form of Eq. (3.1),
(ii) LTL formulas ϕ and ϕf that govern the switching mode sequences of the healthy
and the faulty system,
(iii) a positive integer N ,
determine whether BN(S, ϕ) ∩BN(S f , ϕf) = ∅.
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the minimal horizon length T := min
{
N | BN(S, ϕ)∩
BN(S f , ϕf) = ∅
}
can be found through a line search over N , starting from N = 1.
The usefulness of studying Problem 1 is that the extra LTL constraints may lead to
a smaller T compared to the detectability analysis without such constraints. This is
because these LTL constraints further restrict the behavior set so that the healthy
and faulty behaviors differ earlier. We state this result with the following proposition.
Propoition 12. Let T1 := min
{





N | BN(S) ∩BN(S f) = ∅
}
, we have T1 ≤ T2.
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Proof. By definition (see Eq. (3.3), (3.9), (3.10)), we have BN(S, ϕ) ⊆ BN(S)
and BN(S f , ϕf) ⊆ BN(S f). This means BN(S) ∩ BN(S f) = ∅ ⇒ BN(S, ϕ) ∩
BN(S f , ϕf) = ∅. Hence
{




N | BN(S, ϕ)∩BN(S f , ϕf) =
∅
}
, which implies T1 ≤ T2.
3.3 Solution Approach
In this section, we present a solution to Problem 1. The main challenge is to express
the condition in the boxes in Eq. (3.9), (3.10) in a way that can be easily integrated
in the MILP in Eq. (3.8). Note that MILP encoding of bounded LTL [58] is not
applicable to impose the boxed constraints in Eq. (3.9). Our solution is to first
transfer the LTL formula into a monitor that captures the boxed conditions in Eq.
(3.9), (3.10) induced from the given LTL formula. We then convert the monitor
into its boolean representation that can be easily expressed as mixed integer linear
constraints.
3.3.1 Monitor and System Behavior Constraints
We first connect the constraints marked by the boxes in Eq. (3.9), (3.10) with a
monitor.
Let ϕ, ϕf be the LTL formulas from Eq. (3.9), (3.10), and let Mϕ, Mϕf be
the associated monitors. The condition marked by the box in Eq. (3.10) says that
s1s2 . . . sN is not a bad prefix of ϕ
f , i.e., s1s2 . . . sN can be generated byMϕ
f
. On the
other hand, the boxed condition in Eq. (3.9) says that s1s2 . . . sN can be “completed”
by adding a finite prefix p ∈ Σ∗ in the front so that ps1s2 . . . sN can be generated
by Mϕ. This suggests that s1s2 . . . sN can be generated by another monitor Mϕ′,
which is exactly the same asMϕ except for the initial conditions. We formally state
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this fact with the following proposition.
Propoition 13. Given an LTL formula ϕ and Mϕ = (Σ, Q,Qinit, δ), the monitor
that recognizes the valid prefixes of ϕ, assume that all states in Q are reachable from
Qinit
3, the following are equivalent:
(i) there exist p ∈ Σ∗, w ∈ Σω such that ps1s2 . . . sNw |= ϕ;
(ii) there exists q1q2 . . . qN+1 ∈ QN+1 such that q1 ∈ Q, qt+1 = δ(qt, st) for all
t ∈ [[1, N + 1]].
and the following are equivalent:
(iii) there exist w ∈ Σω such that s1s2 . . . sNw |= ϕ;
(vi) there exists q1q2 . . . qN+1 ∈ QN+1 such that q1 ∈ Qinit, qt+1 = δ(qt, st) for all
t ∈ [[1, N + 1]].
3.3.2 MILP Encoding of Monitor
We present a technique to encode a monitor with mixed integer linear constraints.
The idea is to use Proposition 13 to convert the two boxed constraints w.r.t ϕ and
ϕf from Eq. (3.9), (3.10) into two monitors, and then write the monitors in their
boolean representations and convert the boolean representations into two sets of
MILP constraints. Since the encoding is for the nondeterministic monitor directly,
it does not require determinizing the monitor with the power set construction and
hence avoids an unnecessarily large MILP.
Let Mϕ = (Σ, Q,Qinit, δ) be a monitor of LTL formula ϕ. At each time instant
t, we associate each state qi ∈ Q with a binary variable bti, which takes value 1 if
the state of Mϕ is equal to qi at time t and takes value 0 otherwise. Similarly,
3This assumption can be made without loss of generality because states in Q that are not reachable from Qinit
can be removed without changing the sequences generated by M.
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we associate each letter σk ∈ Σ with a binary variable atk that takes value 1 iff the
monitor reads letter σk at time t. To guarantee that the monitor’s state (or the read
letter) exists and is unique at any time, we impose the following constraint:








Moreover, the state indicator bt+1i must update according to the transition relation
δ of the monitor. To this end, we require the following constraints to hold:




where ptijk is a binary variable satisfying:
∀t ∈ [[1, N ]], i, j ∈ [[1, |Q|]], k ∈ [[1, |Σ|]]
such that qi ∈ δ(qj, σk) :
1 + ptijk ≥ btj + atk, ptijk ≤ btj, ptijk ≤ atk.(3.14)
It might be useful to point out that Eq. (3.14) forces ptijk = b
t
j ∧ atk. In fact, variable
ptijk can be viewed as an indicator that takes value 1 iff there is a chance that the
monitor’s state is taken to qi (at time t + 1) from qj, by reading letter σk at time
t. Then Eq. (3.13) guarantees that bt+1i is set to 1 only if there is such a chance
for the state to be equal to qi at time t + 1. Note that b
t+1
i can still be zero if
some ptijk = 1, but Eq. (3.12) and (3.13) together guarantee that there must be one
i′ ∈ {i | ∃j, k : qi ∈ δ(qj, σk), ptijk = 1} such that bt+1i′ = 1. This hence captures the
nondeterministic transition relation of the nondeterministic monitor Mϕ.
Note that if a transition of Mϕ is labeled as “True”, i.e., for all σk ∈ Σ, qi ∈










The correctness of the construction so far is summarized with the following propo-
sition, which can be easily verified using Proposition 13.
Propoition 14. Let ϕ be an LTL formula over mode set Σ andMϕ = (Σ, Q,Qinit, δ)
be its monitor. For a finite word s1s2 . . . sN ∈ Σ∗, assume that binary variable atk is
such that atk = 1 iff st = σk, then the following are equivalent:
(i) there exists q1q2 . . . qN+1 ∈ QN+1 such that q1 ∈ Q, qt+1 = δ(qt, st) for all
t ∈ [[1, N + 1]];
(ii) there exist binary variables bti, p
t




and the following are equivalent:
(iii) there exists q1q2 . . . qN+1 ∈ QN+1 such that q1 ∈ Qinit, qt+1 = δ(qt, st) for all
t ∈ [[1, N + 1]].
(vi) there exist binary variables bti, p
t




Remark 2. Note that if ϕ is in the form of conjunction of several shorter formulas
ϕi, i.e., ϕ =
∧
i ϕ, the overall encoding can be done by stacking the mixed integer
linear constraints derived from each Mϕi . This may not reduce the size of MILP
formulation, but is useful when the size of the monitor for the overall ϕ is too large
and generating the monitor becomes the bottleneck.
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3.3.3 Detectability Analysis Augmented with LTL Constraints
Let ϕ and ϕf be the LTL formulas that constrain the mode sequences of the healthy
and faulty system respectively. Denote the constraints in Eq. (3.12)-(3.14) that is








where η is a vector obtained by stacking auxiliary binary variable bti and p
t
ijk together,
and GϕN is an affine function that depends on ϕ and N . Similarly, we denote the











The MILP used for detectability analysis with LTL constraints can be then formu-



































































atk ∈ {0, 1},∀t ∈ [[1, N ]], k ∈ [[1, |Σ|]],
η ∈ {0, 1}|η|,ηf ∈ {0, 1}|ηf |,
(3.18)
where |η| and |ηf | are the length of vectors η and ηf respectively.
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3.3.4 Run-time Fault Detection
With the detectability analysis technique presented above, we can determine the
minimal N so that BN(S, ϕ)∩BN(S f , ϕf) = ∅. As a result of such analysis, we only
need to check whether the latest collected {ut, st, yt}t0t=t0−N+1 ∈ BN(S, ϕ) at the
current time t0 and claim anomaly iff this does not hold. To this end, it is sufficient
to run the monitorMϕ (as described in Section 3.1.3) and the model invalidation LP
(Eq. (3.2)) with horizon N in parallel. If no fault occurs, the monitor keeps running
with current state set Qt0 6= ∅ and the model invalidation keeps being feasible, and
no anomaly is claimed in this case. If a fault occurs at time to, either the switching
sequence turns into a bad prefix of ϕ before time instant to +N − 1 and the monitor
detects violation of ϕ immediately, or the switching sequence is still a valid prefix of
ϕ up until time instant to +N − 1, which validates the boxed condition in Eq. (3.9)
and hence the model invalidation LP must turn infeasible at time t0 = to + N − 1
by the N -behavior isolation of the faulty and healthy systems. In other words, any
fault is detected with at most N -delay without any false alarm.
3.4 Case Study: UAV Altitude Consensus
We use an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) altitude consensus protocol to demonstrate
the proposed detectability analysis technique. We say that a set of UAVs reaches
altitude consensus if their altitude eventually converge to the same value. There are
several consensus protocols based on local communication. In particular, we assume
the UAVs implement the nearest neighbor rules from [54]. Under this protocol and
assuming single integrator dynamics for vertical motion, the altitude dynamics of
the UAVs can be modeled as follows. We let x = [x1, x2, . . . , x8]T ∈ R8 be the state
where xi is the altitude of the ith UAV. We assume that a leader UAV, indexed by
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1, reaches a set point while the other UAVs adjust their own altitude according the
nearest neighbor protocol [54], induced from the UAVs’ communication topologies
shown in Fig. 3.4 (Left). Let Aσk , Kσk be the system matrices representing the UAVs
dynamics while implementing this protocol. The ith rows of matrices Aσ1 , Kσ1 take
the following form:
1) i = 1, (Aσ1)11 = 0.9 and (Aσ1)1j = 0 for j ∈ [[2, 8]], (Kσ1)1 = 0.3 this leads to a
dynamics that guarantees the leader altitude to converge a set point at x1 = 3
(i.e., x1t+1 = 0.9x
1
t + 0.3);
2) i 6= 1, the ith UAV update xi by averaging its own height and those of its





if i connects j in topology 1
0 otherwise
,
where d(i) is the number of edges incident to node i.
Similarly, we define Aσ2 , Kσ2 for topology 2 with the same leader UAV set point
(i.e., x1 = 3); and define Aσ3 , Kσ3 (and Aσ4 , Kσ4 , respectively) for topology 1 (and
topology 2, respectively) with the same leader UAV dynamics but a different set
point at x1 = 6.
We assume the changes in the communication topology and fault detection scheme
(high-level decisions) run at a slower timescale than the consensus dynamics (low-
level control) – i.e., 15 times slower. Then the dynamics relevant for fault detection
can be written as the following switched affine system (denoted by SUAV in the rest
of the paper):
xt+1 = Aσixt +Kσi + Eσiwt(3.20)
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, A13σi , . . . , Aσi , I].(3.21)
Note that in this setting there is no continuous control input ut, and for simplicity
we assume that the output yt = xt with no measurement noise vt. Finally, we
assume that xt ∈ X := {x ∈ R8 | 0 ≤ xi ≤ 7, ∀i ∈ [[1, 8]]} and disturbance
wt ∈ W := {w ∈ R120 | −0.1 ≤ wi ≤ 0.1, ∀i ∈ [[1, 120]]}.
The faulty system model S fUAV we analyze results from a failure in the communi-
cation links between nodes 3-5 and 4-6 in topology 2, changing the system matrices
Aσ2 and Aσ4 (both induced by topology 2) and the corresponding Aσ2 , Kσ2 , Aσ4 ,
Kσ4 in Eq. (3.21). Note that the healthy-faulty system pair (SUAV,S fUAV) is not
N -detectable for any finite N because the fault will never be detected unless the
system switch to mode σ2 or σ4. However, we know that switching to mode σ2 or
σ4 infinitely often is required to achieve consensus because communication topol-
ogy 1 is not a connected graph. We can hence incorporate this information in the
detectability analysis to compute worst-case detection delay.
We assume that the mode sequence satisfies the LTL formula ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3






























(σk ∨ σl) ∨©(σk ∨ σl) ∨©2(σk ∨ σl)
)
.(3.24)
Formula ϕ1 and ϕ2 together restrict the dwell time for set point changes by the
leader UAVs to be within [[7, 20]], while formula ϕ3 assures that each of the two
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Figure 3.4: Fault detection of the UAV consensus system at run time.
communication topologies are used within every three time steps. They together
guarantee enough time and communication for convergence to a consensus. We also
assume that the mode sequence does not need to satisfy any LTL formula after the
fault occurs, however in the example we choose the mode sequence after the fault to
be consistent with ϕ, therefore a pure discrete monitor will not be able to detect this
fault without taking continuous dynamics into account. Gurobi [88] is used to solve
the obtained MILP. The obtained minimal length of horizon T = 30, which is finite
and this result agrees with Proposition 12.
Fig. 3.4 (Right) shows the fault detection results. The upper plot shows the
altitude of the eight UAVs (solid lines) and the set point profile (dashed black line)
when no fault occurs. The middle plot shows the same set of trajectories of the faulty
system. The lower plot shows the alternating of the two communication topologies.
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One can check that the given LTL formula ϕ is satisfied (even after fault). In this
illustration, the fault occurs at time t = 8, at which time the consensus is already
achieved (with set point at 3). Hence the fault does not lead to behavior isolation
immediately. However, the fault is detected later at time t = 23 after the set point
of the leader changes. The detection delay is 15, which is shorter than the delay
bound T = 30. This experiment hence agrees with the theory. We also run the
model invalidation at a higher frequency, using the timescale of the dynamics, for
faster detection though this comes at the expense of solving LPs of larger size (15
times larger) and more often.
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CHAPTER IV
Graceful Degradation of Faulty Systems
This is a short chapter that formally describes the problem studied in this work.
The problem is defined by two ingredients: a system model and a specification. We
first introduce a special type of hierarchical hybrid system, called control systems
with fault configurations, to model the system whose dynamics experiences a sudden
change due to faults. We then introduce two slightly different LTL formula that
specify the so called graceful degradation of such systems’ desired behavior. The
difference between the two LTL specification are briefly discussed.
4.1 Control System with Fault Configurations
A control system Σ is a six tuple (X,U,D, f, AP, LX). The continuous-time dy-
namics is define by
ẋ = f(x, u, d),(4.1)
where x ∈ X ⊆ Rn is the state, u ∈ U is the control, and d ∈ D ⊆ Rp is the distur-
bance. Note that control u can be a combination of discrete actions and continuous
control input, which leads to a hybrid system. Similarly, a discrete-time system can
be defined by replacing Eq. (4.1) with x+ = f(x, u, d) where x+ is the updated state
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at the next time instant. Set AP consists of the atomic propositions of interest, and
LX : X → 2AP is the labeling map. We use AP and LX to describe the behaviors of
system Σ (see Section 2.2.1).
Let F = {φ[1], . . . , φ[M ]} be a finite set, each element φ[i] is called of a faulty mode
(or a fault for short). A partial order  is defined on set F to capture the severity
of different faults in F . That is, φ[i]  φ[j] means that fault φ[j] is more severe than
or equal to fault φ[i], and φ[i] ≺ φ[j] means that fault φ[j] is strictly more severe.
The tuple (F,) is called the a fault configuration. We define the set of minimum
elements of E ⊆ F to be
min(E) := {φ[j] ∈ E | @φ[i] ∈ E s.t. φ[i] ≺ φ[j]},(4.2)
and max(E) can be defined in a similar way. We will assume F always has a unique
minimum element that represents the healthy configuration. By convention we al-
ways denote this healthy configuration by φ[1]. Finally we define the successors of a
fault φ[i] ∈ F to be
succ(φ[i]) := min
(
{φ[j] ∈ F | φ[i] ≺ φ[j]}
)
.(4.3)
By definition, fault φ[j] is a successor of fault φ[i] if φ[j] is more sever than φ[i] and
there are no other faults in between.
A control system with fault configurations, denoted by ΣF = (F,,S, APF, LFX),
is a hierarchical system where
• (F,) is a fault configuration.
• S is a set of sub systems Σ[i] = (X,U [i], D[i], f [i], AP, LX), each associated with
a fault φ[i] ∈ F . In particular, we assume that all the subsystems share a
common state domain X, atomic proposition set AP and labeling function LX ,
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but different subsystems can have different control input set U [i] and disturbance
set D[i] to capture the loss of control authority and extreme operating condition
under different faulty modes.
• APF = AP ∪ {π[1], . . . , π[M ]}, where π[i] is an auxiliary atomic proposition as-
sociated with fault φ[i].
• LFX : X × F → 2AP∪{π
[1],...,π[M ]} is a labeling map such that
LFX(x, φ
[i]) = π[i] ∪ LX(x),(4.4)
which is consistent with LX and allows one to associate atomic proposition π
[i]
with fault φ[i].
The state of ΣF is a pair (x, φ), where φ ∈ F indicates the faulty status and x updates
according to the subsystem associated with fault φ, i.e.,
ẋ = f [i](x, u, d) if φ = φ[i].(4.5)
The evolution of the fault status φ is governed by order , i.e., φ may change from
φ[i] to φ[j] if and only if φ[j] ∈ {φ[i]}∪ succ(φ[i]). A change is called nontrivial if φ[j] ∈
succ(φ[i]). Note that the fault status φ either maintains to be the current governing
system or transits into its successors. This means two things: first, the faults are
permanent, i.e., the system will never recover once the faults occur; secondly, the
system never “goes down” more than two levels at once.
Example 1. We illustrate the concepts by an engine thermal management system,
whose dynamics is defined by
Ṫe = c1(Te − Ta) + c2vw(Te − Tr) + c3h
Ṫr = (c4 + c5sg)(Tr − Ta) + c6vw(Tr − Te),
(4.6)
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where the coefficients c1, . . . , c6 are known constants and the variables are defined in
Table 4.1
Table 4.1: Definition of Variables
Symbol Physical Meaning Unit Range Used
Te Engine temperature K [290, 410]
Tr Radiator temperature K [290, 410]
v Flow valve position - {0.25,1}
g Radiator grill shutter opening - {0.25,1}
h Heat from engine combustion W [15000, 19000]
s Vehicle speed m/s [10,20]
w Coolant pump flow rate kg/s [0.03,0.045]
Ta Ambient temperature K [282, 288]
The fault configuration considered in this example contains four faults, i.e., F =
{φ[1], φ[2], φ[3], φ[4]}. Each fault φ[1] is associated with a subsystem Σ[i] = (X,U [i], D[i], f [i]).
For simplicity, we omit AP , APF, LX and L
F
X . In this example, state x = [Te, Tr]
T
and X = [290, 410] × [290, 410]. The vector field f [i] is given by Eq. (4.1), but the
role of the variables could change, i.e., some variables can be control input in one
faulty mode but becomes a disturbance in some other faulty modes. The description
for each fault and associated subsystem is defined as follows:
(1) φ[1]: the system is healthy,
u = [v, g]T , U [1] = {0.25, 1} × {0.25, 1},
d = [h, s, w, Ta]
T , D[1] = [15000, 19000]× [10, 20]× [0.03, 0.045]× [282, 288].
(2) φ[2]: the coolant flow valve is stuck at an unknown position from 0.25 to 1.
u = g, U [2] = {0.25, 1},
d = [h, s, w, Ta, v]
T , D[2] = [15000, 19000]× [10, 20]× [0.03, 0.045]× [282, 288]×
[0.25, 1].
(3) φ[3]: the radiator grill is stuck at an unknown position from 0.25 to 1.
u = v, U [3] = {0.25, 1},
d = [h, s, w, Ta, g]
T , D[3] = [15000, 19000]× [10, 20]× [0.03, 0.045]× [282, 288]×
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[0.25, 1].
(4) φ[4]: both the coolant flow valve and the radiator grill are stuck at an unknown
positions from 0.25 to 1.
U [4] = ∅,
d = [h, s, w, Ta, v, g]
T , D[4] = [15000, 19000]× [10, 20]× [0.03, 0.045]× [282, 288]×
[0.25, 1]× [0.25, 1].
Finally, the partial order defined on F is visualized by the lattice diagram in
Figure (4.1). The arrow in the diagram marks to the possible nontrivial transition
between the fault status, i.e., there is an arrow from φ[i] to φ[j] iff φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]). In
this example, It is a natural choice to define φ[1] ≺ φ[2] ≺ φ[4] and φ[1] ≺ φ[3] ≺ φ[4],
while φ[2] and φ[3] are not comparable.
Figure 4.1: Visualization of the partial order defined on F in Example 1.
4.2 Graceful Degradation of Faulty System
In this part we give two LTL formula that defines slightly different graceful degra-
dation of a control system with fault configurations.
Let F = {φ[1], . . . , φ[M ]} be the collection of the faults under consideration, and
let AP ∪ {π[1], . . . , π[M ]} be the overall set of atomic propositions. The two LTL
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where ϕ[i] is an LTL formula over AP , specifying the system’s desired behavior when
the final fault configuration is φ[i] ∈ F .
• Eq. (4.7) says: if the fault status eventually stays at φ[i], the specification ϕ[i]
associated with this fault is achieved starting from the very beginning. Note that
the fault status of a faulty system is guaranteed to reach a specific configuration
φ[i] ∈ F and stays there forever. This is because fault set F is finite and a fault
only transits into its successors in F , hence there can be only finitely many
transitions.
• Eq. (4.8) says: if the fault status eventually stays at φ[i], specification ϕ[i] should
be satisfied immediately after the occurrence of fault φ[i].
Typically ϕ[j] is chosen to be less stringent than ϕ[j] if φ[i] ≺ φ[j] (i.e., w |= ϕ[j] →
w |= ϕ[i]), in which case the LTL formula Φ and Ψ capture a graceful degradation in
the system performance.
The difference between Φ and Ψ are resulted from the fact that a word w satisfying
an LTL formula is different from its suffix wt satisfying the formula (see the syntax
of LTL in Section 2.2.1). Depending on the application, we can either require the
entire word w to satisfy ϕ[i] associated with the final fault (captured by Φ), or only
require the suffix wt to satisfy ϕ
[i] where t is the time instant when the final fault
φ[i] occurs (captured by Ψ).
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CHAPTER V
Abstraction-based Fault-tolerant Control Synthesis
In this chapter, we present an abstraction-based approach to solve the fault-tolerant
control problem, with immediate and delayed fault detection. A class of hierarchical
nondeterministic finite (state) transitions systems are used as the abstractions of
the continuous-state control system with fault configurations. By construction, the
abstraction overapproximates the behavior of the underlying continuous-time system
(i.e., the concrete system). We then leverage the control synthesis algorithms devel-
oped for finite transition systems as basic building blocks to construct a bottom-up
recursive algorithm that solves the fault-tolerant control synthesis problem on the
abstraction. The soundness of the proposed algorithm is verified. In particular, the
proposed algorithm achieves LTL specification Ψ (Eq. (4.8), Section 4.2) without any
further assumptions, and achieves Φ (Eq. (4.7), Section 4.2) assuming the LTL speci-
fication for each subsystem (i.e., ϕ[i] in Eq. (4.7)) specifies an absolute decomposable
property. The obtained controller is guaranteed to achieve the graceful degradation
specification when applied to the concrete system by the behavior overapproximation
relation. Since the focus of this chapter is solving the problem on abstractions (i.e.,
on finite transition systems), we only provide theoretical analysis of the proposed al-
gorithms and to highlight the type of specifications that enable efficient synthesis in
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both full information and delayed information settings. We will omit in this chapter
the abstraction construction that leads to such behavior overapprximation. Later,
we will illustrate detailed abstraction computation process in the next chapter where
we aim at applying the developed methodologies to a fuel cell thermal management
problem.
Chapter overview. In Section 5.1, we first introduce the LTL game on a finite
transition system with fault configurations and define four variants of the fault-
tolerant control synthesis problems, depending on the type of graceful degradation
considered and whether detection delay exists. In Section 5.2, we present a set of
recursive algorithms to solve these problems. The soundness and the completeness
of the proposed algorithm are stated and proved under certain conditions on the
specification ϕ[i] for each faulty mode. Finally a simple example is used to illustrate
the impact of the detection delay.
Related work. The work presented in this chapter is initiated from and sig-
nificantly extends [133], which only considers simple faulty mode specifications of
invariance and persistence with no detection delay. Essentially, the problem consid-
ered in [133] can be viewed as a mode target game [8] but with an extra structure
that governs the mode changing. The problem solved in this chapter has the same
structure but involves a larger fragment of LTL, and is hence not comparable to
mode target game in general. However, the solutions of the two problems are similar
because in both cases, it is essential to keep the capability to respond to a mode that
may dominate later. In that sense, it is also related to [65] where the system may
enters different modes with extra preview information of mode changing.
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The fault-tolerant control synthesis problem with detection delay can be viewed as
a partial information game, whose solution usually involves belief space construction
[22, 29, 101], which allows one to estimate the missing information (to detect the
fault in our case). The key difference of this work is, by exploring the structure of the
fault configurations and by restricting ourselves to certain fragment of LTL, we can
avoid constructing the belief space and this significantly reduces the computational
burden.
5.1 Finite Transition Systems with Fault Configurations
We first define finite transition systems with fault configurations, the discrete
analogue of continuous-state control systems with fault configurations. The former
one can be viewed as the abstraction that overapproximates the behavior of the latter
one. To this point, we first define regular finite transition systems.
Definition 10. A finite transition system, denoted by TS, is a tuple (Q,A,→
, AP, LQ), where
• Q is a finite set of states,
• A is a finite set of actions,
• →⊆ Q× A×Q is a transition relation,
• AP is a finite set of atomic propositions,
• LQ : Q→ 2AP is a labeling function.
Particularly, we assume that a finite transition system TS can start from any state
in Q, and the transitions happen only at time instant t ∈ N.
The LTL game defined on a regular finite transition system defined above proceeds
as follows:
1) at time t, the system’s state is at q(t),
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2) a strategy K : Q∗ → 2A determines a control action a(t) ∈ K
(
q(1)q(2) · · · q(t)
)
,





4) step 1) to step 3) are repeated.
Let q = q(1)q(2) · · · be an infinite sequence generated by system TS under strategy








· · · .
Clearly, the set of possible ω-words is uniquely determined by the system TS, the










. A set of such initial conditions at which a winning strategy
exists is called a winning set. Clearly a maximal winning set exists and it can be
determined by solving a Rabin game [11].
In this work, we are interested in finite transition system with fault configurations
(faulty systems for short), which is the discrete analogue of the systems defined in
Section 4.1. Such a system consists of a collection of different regular finite transition
systems (regular systems for short), each governing the system transitions under a
specific faulty situation, and these different regular systems may degrade from one
to another in the order of their corresponding fault severity. The formal definition is
given below.
Definition 11. A finite transition systems with fault configurations, denoted by TSF,
is a tuple = (Q,F,A,→TS,→F , APF, LFQ) where
• Q, A have the same meanings as the ones in a regular finite transition systems,
F = {φ[1], . . . , φ[M ]} is the given fault configuration, and there is an atomic
proposition π[i] ∈ APF associated with each fault φ[i] ∈ F ;
• →TS⊆ Q×F×A×Q is a transition relation that describes the system’s evolution
under some specific fault;
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• →F⊆ F×F is the transition relation of the faults, and we assume that the transi-
tions of faults always start from healthy configuration φ[1], and that (φ[i], φ[j]) ∈→F
iff φ[j] ∈ {φ[i]} ∪ succ(φ[i]), a fault transition (φ[i], φ[j]) is called nontrivial if
φ[i] 6= φ[j];
• LFQ : Q× F → AP is the labeling function, such that π[i] ∈ LFQ(q, φ) iff φ = φ[i].







· · · , where
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φ(t), φ(t + 1)
)









, · · · .
A few remarks regarding to the definition above are in order. First, It might be
helpful to think TSF as a hierarchical transition system with M different regular
finite transition systems as subsystems. Each subsystem TS[i] is associated with
the fault configuration φ[i] ∈ F of the same subscript. Every TS[i] has a distinct





Q(·, φ[i]). The transition of the overall system TSF can be seen as
being governed by →[i] that corresponds to the current fault status, while transition
relation→F describes the degradation of governing subsystem TS[i] in case the fault
status changes.
Secondly, by definition, TSF has a common state set Q, atomic proposition set
APF and action set A that is shared by all of its subsystems TS[i]. Note that we may
have different control authority and atomic proposition of interest under different
fault configurations. However, the assumption for common atomic proposition set
and common action set can be made without loss of generality. In case we have
different propositions AP [i] of interest in different fault configurations, a common
atomic proposition set AP can be simply chosen to be
⋃M
i=1AP
[i], and the difference
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can be handled by defining non-surjective labeling function L
[i]
Q . Moreover, the lack
of control authority under more severe fault configurations can be captured by a
transition relation →[i] that is not affected by some inactive control action a ∈ A.
State dependent control authority can be also easily incorporated.
Finally, note that the fault transition relation →F is beyond our control, hence
it introduces additional nondeterminism into the system, and such nondeterminism
can be combined with that of a regular system—whose state set is Q×F—to obtain
the faulty system TSF. This means a faulty system is nothing but a special type
of regular finite transition system. However, as will be presented later, the special
structure of fault configurations can be leveraged to develop a recursive synthesis
process when the considered specification is in certain from. We hence distinguish it
from regular systems.
5.1.1 Fault Detection on Finite Transition Systems with Faulty Modes
In practice, if the faulty mode of the system changes, we may not know this
immediately. For systems that evolve on discrete time, it will take at least one time
step for the faulty behavior to distinguish from the healthy behavior and therefore
the fault is detected with at least one step delay. Moreover, as shown in Chapter III,
the fault detection performed on the continuous state system that a faulty transition
system abstracts may be delayed by a time period, and this period can be upper
bounded by a constant T . Therefore a true faulty mode sequence f = φ(1)φ(2) · · ·
may not be the same as the status sequence f̂ = φ̂(1)φ̂(2) · · · .
Definition 12. Let f = φ(1)φ(2) · · ·φ(t + 1) ∈ F t+1 and f̂ = φ̂(1)φ̂(2) · · · φ̂(t + 1) ∈
F t+1, we say (̂f, f) is valid if
• further faults do not occur before the latest fault is detected: φ̂(t) 6= φ(t−1) ⇒
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φ(t+ 1) = φ(t);
• the detection is delayed by at least one step: φ(t+1) 6= φ(t) ⇒ φ̂(t+1) = φ(t);
• the detection of φ[i] is delayed by at most T [i] ≥ 1: φ(t) = · · · = φ(t−T [i] +1) =
φ[i] ⇒ φ̂(t+ 1) = φ[i].
Let f, f̂ ∈ F ω, the pair (f̂, f) is valid if (̂ft+1, ft+1) is valid for all t, where ft+1 (and
f̂t+1 respectively) is the prefix of f (and f̂ respectively) until time t+ 1.
Clearly, the notion of validity only depends on the fault configuration F and the
set T := {T [i]}i:φ[i]∈F that specifies the bounds of the detection delay. We will denote
the set of all valid pairs by Vdelay(F, T ).
Also note that any valid pair (̂f, f) is extendable, i.e., if (̂f, f) is valid, where f =
φ(1)φ(2) · · ·φ(t+1) and f̂ = φ̂(1)φ̂(2) · · · φ̂(t+1), then there always exists valid (ĝ,g)
such that g = φ(1)φ(2) · · ·φ(t+1)φ(t+2) and ĝ = φ̂(1)φ̂(2) · · · φ̂(t+1)φ̂(t+2), where





In this work, we will assume one of the following is true.
Assumption 1. (Immediate Detection) Let f be the sequence of true faulty modes
and f̂ be the fault status sequence returned by the detector, we assume that f = f̂
and the only rule they need to follow is
(
φ(t), φ(t + 1)
)
∈→F . We denote the set
of the pairs of such identical faulty mode sequences by Vno−delay(F ), where F is the
fault configuration set.
Assumption 2. (Delayed Detection) Let f be the sequence of true faulty modes
and f̂ be the fault status sequence returned by the detector, we assume that (f̂, f)
is valid, i.e., (f̂, f) = Vdelay(F, T ), where T = {T [i]}i∈F specifies the detection delay
bounds.
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5.1.2 LTL Games on Finite Transition Systems with Faulty Modes
Given LTL formula Ψ and Φ defined in Chapter IV, we define in what follows the
LTL game between the controller and the environment w.r.t the given specification.
At any time t,
1) the system state is at q(t), the faulty mode is φ(t),












3) the environment picks the next state q(t+1) s.t.
(
q(t), φ(t), a(t), q(t+1)
)
→TS,
4) at time t+ 1, the environment pick φ(t+ 1) and φ̂(t+ 1) s.t. (̂ft+1, ft+1) is valid,
5) step 1) to step 4) are repeated.
Let q(1) be the initial state, and f, f̂ be the (valid) true and estimated faulty mode
sequence, the set of words generated by the system TSF is uniquely defined by f, f̂,
control strategy µ and q(1). We denote the set of such a word by W
(
f, f̂, µ, q(1)
)
.
Definition 13. (Winning Strategy/Set) Strategy µ is winning at q(1) against LTL
formula ϕ if
∀(f, f̂) ∈ V,w ∈W
(
f, f̂, µ, q(1)
)
: w |= ϕ,(5.1)
where V can be either Vno−delay(F ) or Vdelay(F, T ), depending on if immediate de-
tection is assumed or not. A set of initial states q(1) at which µ is winning is called
a winning set, and clearly a maximal winning set exists.
Problem 2. (Fault-tolerant Control Synthesis) In the rest of the chapter, we consider
the problem of finding a winning set (preferably the maximal one) and the associated
winning strategy µ. Depending if immediate detection is assume or not, and also if






Remark 3. When there is a detection delay, a notable feature of the above LTL
game is that it might be undetermined [22]. That is, there might be certain states at
which neither the environment nor the controller wins for sure. To achieve correct-
by-construction, we shall avoid such undetermined states, and this is exactly how
the winning set is defined (see Definition 13), i.e., we only search for the initial states
from where the controller is guaranteed to win.
5.2 Bottom-up Fault-tolerant Control Synthesis
In this section, a set of bottom up recursive algorithms are proposed to solve
Problem 2. The soundness and completeness of the proposed algorithms can be
proved under certain assumptions on ϕ[i], and are summarized with Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Summary of soundness and completeness of the algorithms









absolute decomposable Algorithm 3






absolute decomposable Algorithm 3
+ suffix-closed Sound & Complete
5.2.1 Synthesis against Specification Ψ with Immediate Detection
In this part, we present Algorithm 1 that solves Problem(Ψ, no-delay).
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Algorithm 1 [W [i],K[i]] = WinFΨ,no-delay(Ψ, TS
F, φ[i])
1: Initialize W [i] = ∅, K[i] = ∅
2: if φ[i] ∈ max(F ) then
3: [W [i],K [i]] = Win(ϕ[i], TS[i])
4: K[i] = {K [i]}
5: else
6: for φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]) do
7: [W [j],K[j]] = WinFΨ,no-delay(Ψ, TS
F, φ[j])
8: ψ[i] = ϕ[i] ∧ (W [j])
9: end for
10: [W [i],K [i]] = Win(ψ[i], TS[i])
11: K[i] = K[j] ∪ {K [i]}
12: end if
13: return W [i], K[i]
1) Inputs: Algorithm 1 takes a system TSF, an LTL formula Ψ in form of
Eq, (4.8), and a fault configuration φ[i] as inputs. Fault φ[i] can be seen as the
initial configuration. Note that a faulty system always starts from being healthy by
definition, here φ[i] is used to track the recursion.
2) Outputs: Algorithm 1 returns set W [i] as a winning set w.r.t. specification
Φ when system TSF starts from fault configuration φ[i]. K[i] := {K [j]}φ[j]φ[i] is a
collection of maps K [j], each map K [j] : Q∗ → 2A is a sub-strategy that achieves
specification ψ[j] if the system starts from state q ∈ W [j] and stays at fault configu-
ration φ[j] forever. The fault-tolerant strategy, with initial fault φ[i] and initial state
q(1), can be then extracted from K[i] by appending strategy fragments of K [j](q)’s
according to the latest fault status and the recent states after that fault occurring.











q(s)q(s+ 1) · · · q(t− 1)q(t)
)
,(5.2)
where n in “K [n]” is the superscript of latest fault φ(t) = φ[n], and
s = min




Let qt = q(1)q(2) . . . q(t) where q(1) = q1 and ft = φ(1)φ(2) . . . φ(t), we denote the
set of admissible actions at time t suggested by strategy µ by µ(qt, ft).
3) Recursion: Algorithm 1 repetitively calls itself until the worst faults are
achieved as base cases. In each round of recursion, we need the following oracle
[W [i], K [i]] = Win(ψ[i], TS[i]), which returns the maximum winning set W [i], and a
map K [i] associating a state from W [i] with a winning strategy, so that all executions
of TS[i] under such strategy satisfy LTL formula ψ[i]. If a worst fault is reached,
function WinF simply returns the normal winning set and strategies, because the
system will not further degrade from there. Otherwise a further degradation is
possible. To avoid generating prefixes that violate the specification for the final
fault, we strengthen the current specification by W [j] where W [j] is the winning set
returned by deeper recursions. Finally oracle Win is called to synthesize the winning
set w.r.t. specification ψ[i] and this finishes the round of the recursion. Figure 5.1
shows an illustrative example of the recursion.
Figure 5.1: Illustration of Algorithm 1.
The correctness and completeness of Algorithm 1 is stated with the following
theorem.
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Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 solves Problem(Ψ, no-delay) soundly and completely.
Proof. Algorithm 1 is sound and complete essentially because W [i] ⊆ W [j] for all
φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]) is sufficient and necessary to guarantee correctness. For detailed
proof, please see Appendix 1.1
5.2.2 Synthesis against Specification Φ with Immediate Detection
In this part, we modify Algorithm 1 to solve Problem(Φ, no-delay). We start with
introducing the idea of the modification in an intuitive way, and then explain the
algorithms by highlighting its difference from Algorithm 1. Finally, the correctness
of the modified algorithm is stated and proved under certain assumptions.
First, we would like to point out the key difference between Φ and Ψ. Suppose
φ[i] is the final fault that occurs at time t, Φ requires the corresponding LTL formula
ϕ[i] to be satisfied from the very beginning, while Ψ only requires ϕ[i] to be satisfied
from time instant t. To achieve specification, we hence need to be more careful with
the system’s behavior before φ[i] occurs. This leads to the following challenge:
(I1) (bad prefix issue) the finite word generated by the old strategy may violate
the new specification ϕ[j],
The other major challenge in solving Problem(Φ, no-delay) is: the final fault con-
figuration is not known in advance, nor is the time this fault occurs. Therefore,
the controller has to assume the current fault configuration φ[i] is the final one, and
give a strategy that achieves the specification associated with the current configura-
tion. However, unless no other faults are strictly more severe than the current one,
there is always a chance for the system to further degrade. Therefore, the controller
must also maintain the capability to achieve the specifications for possible succeeding
faults φ[j]. This leads to another challenge
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(I2) (succeeding strategy issue) there may not be a new strategy to achieve
specification ϕ[j] starting from the current state.
Finally note that the argument also applies to the new fault φ[j] and its succeeding
configurations, if any. This hence suggests the following recursive algorithm similar
to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 [W [i],K[i], ψ[i]] = WinFΦ,no-delay(Φ, TS
F, φ[i])
1: Initialize W [i] = ∅, K[i] = ∅, ψ[i] = ϕ[i]
2: if φ[i] ∈ max(F ) then
3: [W [i],K [i]] = Win(ϕ[i], TS[i])
4: K[i] = {K [i]}
5: else
6: for φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]) do








9: ψ[i] = ϕ[i] ∧ (W [j]) ∧ ψ[j]safety
10: end for
11: [W [i],K [i]] = Win(ψ[i], TS[i])
12: K[i] = K[j] ∪ {K [i]}
13: end if
14: return W [i], K[i], ψ[i]
One key difference from Algorithm 1 is that Algorithm 2 also returns an LTL for-
mula ψ[i] called the strengthened formula, which is obtained by strengthening ϕ[i]
by additional safety specifications. ψ[i] can be seen as the specification of an over-
all system that captures all possible degradations from current fault φ[i]. With this
strengthened formula, ϕ
[j]
safety propagates in the recursion and is added on top of the
requirements for all proceeding modes of φ[j], i.e., the faulty modes that may degrade
to φ[j] in the future. Such construction will guarantee φ[j] to be satisfied from the
very beginning.
The correctness of Algorithm 2 is stated and proved.
Theorem 4. Assume that each ϕ[i] specifies an absolutely decomposable property,
then Algorithm 2 solves Problem(Φ, no-delay) soundly.
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Proof. See Appendix 1.2
Computational Complexity
Even with immediate fault detection, the proposed algorithms are computationally
advantageous as it breaks the synthesis problem in to a collection of smaller synthe-
sis problems using the structure of the fault configuration. We briefly discuss this
benefits in what follows.
As mentioned earlier at the end of section 5.1, faulty system TSF can be modeled
by a regular transition system with state space Q × F . Problem(Ψ, no-delay) and
Problem(Φ, no-delay) hence can be solved theoretically by solving a Rabin game
[11], whose complexity is given by
O
((
|A| |Q| |F | 2(2|Φ||Φ)|
)2k)
,(5.4)
where |A| is the size of action set, |Q| is size of state space of a regular system for
each fault configuration, |F | is number of faults, |Φ| is the length of LTL formula in
Eq. (4.7), and k is the number of accepting pairs in associated Rabin automaton,
which is a small number that is usually equal to 1 [27].
The complexity of Algorithm 2, ignoring the complexity for LTL formula decom-








where |ϕ| = maxi:φ[i]∈F |ϕ[i]|. The complexity of our approach is linear in |F |, the
number of faults, while the complexity in Eq. (5.4) contains term O(|F | 2(2|Φ||Φ)|)2k)
where |Φ| is linear in |F |.
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5.2.3 Synthesis against Specification Ψ with Delayed Detection
In this part, we modify Algorithm 1 to solve Problem(Ψ, delay). In what follows,
we will first briefly discuss the challenges when the fault detection is delayed. Then
the modified algorithm is presented. The correctness of the modification is proved
with additional assumptions on ϕ[i] that specifies the desired behavior under faulty
mode φ[i].
Challenges under Detection Delay
We first address the challenges caused by detection delay. Assume that the system
degrades from configuration φ[i] to φ[j], there will be a time period, called unin-
formed execution horizon, within which the latest degradation is not known to the
controller. This time horizon starts from the instant when transition (φ[i], φ[j]) hap-
pens, and lasts for at most time T [j] by our detectability assumption. Within the
uninformed execution horizon, the controller will assume that the evolution is gov-
erned by original system TS[i] and apply the old strategy, while the system dynamics
evolves according to the transitions of the new system TS[j]. As a result, two things
may go wrong during the uninformed execution horizon, i.e.,
(I3) (bad prefix issue) the wrongly-controlled partial execution may violate spec-
ification ϕ[j] for some possible succeeding fault configuration φ[j]  φ[i];
(I4) (succeeding strategy issue) the execution may be led to parts of the state
space where no strategies are available to achieve specification ϕ[j] for some
succeeding faults.
Note that the bad prefix issue (I3) is related to issue (I1), but different. Essentially,
issue (I1) is a result of specification Φ requiring ϕ[i] to be satisfied starting from the
very beginning instead of the time instant of fault occurrence, while (I3) is simply
resulted from possible improper operation between fault occurrence and its delayed
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detection. Issue (I3) cannot be solved by simply applying Algorithm 2. In Algorithm
2 (line 9), the specifications under succeeding faults are taken into consideration
when synthesizing controller for current fault φ[i]. However, the synthesis is done
for system TS[i] rather than TS[j]. Within the uninformed execution horizon, the
controller applies strategy designed for system TS[i] while the system evolves as TS[j].
Therefore the outcome prefix may still violate strengthened formula ψ[i], hence violate
ψ
[j]
safety and the specifications for the succeeding faults. For a similar reason, issue (I4)
cannot be solved by simply enforcing W [j]. Because W [j] may still be violated if
the controller applies strategy designed for TS[i] while the system evolves as TS[j].
Synthesis with Invariance Restrictions
We now present the modification of Algorithm 1 to solve Problem(Ψ, delay). The key
idea is to synthesize controllers for each faulty mode with extra invariance constraints.
Algorithm 3 [W [i],K[i]] = WinFΨ,delay(Ψ, TS
F, φ[i])
1: Initialize W [i] = ∅, K[i] = ∅
2: if φ[i] ∈ max(F ) then
3: [W [i],K [i]] = Win(ϕ[i], TS[i])
4: K[i] = {K [i]}
5: else
6: define I : Q→ 2U to be s.t. I(q) = U, ∀q ∈ Q
7: for φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]) do
8: [W [j],K[j]] = WinFΨ,delay(Ψ, TS
F, φ[j])
9: [C [j], I [j]] = CInv(W [j], TS[j])
10: ψ[i] = ϕ[i] ∧ (C [j])
11: I(q) = I(q) ∩ I [j](q), ∀q ∈ Q
12: end for
13: TS[i]  I := TS[i] with u /∈ I(q) disabled at state q ∈ Q
14: [W [i],K [i]] = Win(ψ[i], TS[i]  I)
15: K[i] = K[j] ∪ {K [i]}
16: end if
17: return W [i], K[i]
The key modification on top of Algorithm 1 is that, in line 9, we search for the
maximum controlled invariant set C [j] ⊆ W [j], under the dynamics of TS[j]. A map
I [j] : C [j] → 2A is also found, so that C [j] is invariant as long as we keep applying
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any action from I [j](q) at any state q ∈ C [j]. Such set C [j] and map I [j] can be
found by fixed-point type algorithms given in [82]. In particular, I [j] can be made
maximally permissive [20] in the sense that I [j]
′
(q) ⊆ I [j](q) for any mapping I [j]′
that also guarantees invariance of C [j] under TS[j] dynamics. Then oracle Win is
called as before, except that the synthesis is restricted within state set C [j], while
the actions available at each state q ∈ C [j] are restricted within I [j](q). When there
are multiple possible faults φ[j] succeeding current fault φ[i], an intersection set C
can be computed as
⋂
j:φ[j]∈succ(φ[i]) C




[j](q). Then winning set W [i] is then synthesized by Win
restricted to state set C and control actions in I(q). By the above modification,
the states will always stay within C [j] ⊆ W [j] even after the system degrades from
fault configuration φ[i] to φ[j]. This hence guarantees a succeeding strategy after an
uninformed execution horizon of any length.
Note that, due to the detection delay, the fault tolerant strategy is defined slightly
differently from Eq. (5.2). Let φ̂(t) be the estimated faulty mode outputted by the











q(s)q(s+ 1) · · · q(t− 1)q(t)
)
,(5.6)
where n in “K [n]” is the superscript of latest fault φ̂(t) = φ[n], and
s = min
0 ≤ τ ≤ t
φ̂(τ) = φ̂(t)
τ.(5.7)
Here, we denote the above strategy by µ̂ to conceptually distinguish it from the
strategy associated with the maximal winning set, because it is not yet clear if the
two are equal at this point. Similar as before, let f̂t = φ̂(1)φ̂(2) . . . φ̂(t), we use
µ̂(qt, f̂t) to denote the action set suggested by µ̂.
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We summarize the properties of the above modified algorithm by the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. Under Assumption 2, Algorithm 3 is sound and complete for Problem(Ψ,
delay) if ϕ[i] is both absolutely decomposable and suffix-closed for all i.
Proof. See Appendix 1.3
The assumption that ϕ[i] is both absolutely decomposable and suffix-closed may
look strong at the first sight, but it indeed covers an important class of LTL fragments
that are widely considered in the literature of reactive synthesis, i.e. invariance and
GR(1) formulas that can be solved relatively efficiently.
Corollary 2. Under Assumption 2, Algorithm 3 is sound and complete for Problem(Ψ,






safety specifies an invariance property and
ϕ
[i]
liveness is a GR(1) formula.
Proof. By Proposition 10 in Chapter II, invariance property is the only property
that is both absolute safe and suffix-closed. By Proposition 9 and Proposition 4 in
Chapter II, a GR(1) formula specifies a property that is both absolute liveness and
suffix-closed. Applying Theorem 5 immediately proves Corollary 2.
Discussion
The key insight from the proof of Theorem 5, especially the proof of the completeness
part, is that tolerating one-step detection delay is equivalent to tolerating any finite
detection delay under the assumption on ϕ[i]. First, with the soundness proved,
we have W [i] ⊆ W (Ψ, TSF, T ) where W (Ψ, TSF, T ) is the maximal winning set.
With the completeness proved with Lemma 5 in the Appendix, we have W [i] ⊇
W (Ψ, TSF, T1) ⊇ W (Ψ, TSF, T ) where W (Ψ, TSF, T1) is the winning set assuming
one-step detection delay. Hence we have W [i] = W (Ψ, TSF, T1) = W (Ψ, TS
F, T ).
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This means that, to solve Problem(Ψ, delay), it is necessary and sufficient to tolerant
one-step delay. This is resulted from the presumed suffix-closedness of ϕ[i], which
leads to Lemma 4 in the Appendix. By Lemma 4 the winning set W [j] assuring a
suffix-closed property must be controlled invariant, and hence the control actions
that keep the states in W [j] for one step (i.e., tolerating one-step delay) must lead to
invariance (i.e., tolerating any finite delay).
The equivalence between tolerating any finite delay and tolerating one-step delay
in this settings is the key to avoid belief state space construction. This is because
the belief of the faulty mode φ(t) can only be established after at least one step of
evolution so that the fault makes an impact, while at that point the true φ(t) is
known to the controller by one-step delay assumption anyways.
This impact of the feature mentioned above can be also interpreted from the point
of view of separating control design and detection. The setting considered here is
slightly different from the general partial information game because the fault detec-
tion in this work is assumed to be done for the continuous state system directly as
described in Chapter III, whereas only the worst case detection delay is incorpo-
rated in the control synthesis on the discrete abstraction. Since the detection for the
continuous system is less conservative but the detection on the discrete abstraction
is not considered, our approach is in general not comparable to those approaches
involving belief space construction. However, if we restrict ourselves to a certain
fragment of LTL, i.e., if ϕ[i] is both absolutely decomposable and suffix-closed, we
do not gain anything from the detection on the discrete system. Hence the fault
detection and the fault-tolerant control synthesis that respects the detection delay
can be done separately for such LTL fragment.
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5.2.4 Synthesis against Specification Φ with Delayed Detection
The key result in this part is that, under the assumption that LTL specification
ϕ[i] for each faulty mode is both suffix-closed and absolutely decomposable, solving
Problem(Φ, delay) and Problem(Ψ, delay) are equivalent in the following sense.
Theorem 6. Assume ϕ[i] in Φ is both suffix-closed and absolutely decomposable for
all i, then Algorithm 3 solves Problem(Φ, delay) soundly and completely.
Proof. We first prove the soundness. Let W [i] be returned by Algorithm 3, we know








. . . |= Ψ by Theorem 5, where
q(1)q(2) . . . is the state sequence and φ(1)φ(2) · · · is the faulty mode sequence. Sup-
pose that the final faulty mode is φ[i] and let t be the first time instant such that













. . . |= ϕliveness, and this implies w |= ϕliveness as ϕliveness is













. . . |= ϕsafety, and this implies q(s) ∈ W [i] for all s ≥ t
because is ϕsafety specifies an invariance by Proposition 11. Also note that
q(s) ∈ W [`] for any s < t where ` : φ[`] = φ(s), but W [`] ⊆ W [j] by construction.
Hence q(s) ∈ W [i] for all s < t as well and this implies w |= ϕsafety
Therefore w |= ϕ[i] and Φ is achieved as φ[i] is the final faulty mode.
To show the completeness, it is enough to prove that
w |= Φ ⇒ w |= Ψ,(5.8)
and this immediately gives W (Φ, TSF) ⊆ W (Ψ, TSF), which verifies the complete-
ness. To see Eq. (5.8), denote the final fault by φ[i] and let t be the first time instant
s.t. φ(t) = φ[i]. w |= Φ implies that w |= ϕ[i] as φ[i] is the final mode, and this
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Figure 5.2: Faulty system TSF. Left: regular system TS[1] associated with fault φ[1], right: TS[2]
associated with fault φ[2]. Different colors marked different propositions predicate: w (purple), x
(green box), y (orange), z (grey).
further gives wt = w(t)w(t+ 1) · · · |= ϕ[i] because ϕ[i] is suffix-closed. Hence we have
w |= ¬π[i] U
(
π[i] ∧ ϕ[i]) and hence Ψ.
An the end of this chapter, a toy example is presented to illustrates the proposed
solution approach.
Example 2. Consider a faulty system TSF = (Q,F,A,→TS,→F , AP, L), where
Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5}, F = {φ[1], φ[2]}, A = {a, b}, AP = {w, x, y, z}. The only fault
transition in→F is (φ[1], φ[2]). The system transitions→TS and the labeling function
are defined in Fig. 5.2. The graceful degradation of system TSF is specified by an
LTL formula in form of Eq. 4.7, where
ϕ[1] =(¬z) ∧ (♦x) ∧ (♦w) ∧ (♦y),(5.9)
ϕ[2] =(¬z) ∧ (♦x)(5.10)
It an be verified that ϕ[1], ϕ[2] are both absolutely decomposable and suffix-closed.
In this case, the graceful degradation Ψ and Φ are equivalent. In what follows we
compute the fault tolerant winning set W (Ψ, TSF) = W (Φ, TSF) for both cases with
and without detection delay, to demonstrate the difference introduced by the delay.
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Winning Set without Detection Delay
To find the fault tolerant winning set, Algorithm 2 starts from fault φ[2] as base case.
Winning set W2 can be found as {q2, q3, q4}. We then go to fault φ[1], and strengthen
ϕ[i] as ψ[1] = ϕ[1] ∧ (W [2]) ∧ (¬x), where the last term (¬x) is the safety part
of ϕ[2]. Finally we compute W [1] = Win(ψ, TS[1]) = {q2, q3, q4}, and we claim that
W [1] is a fault tolerant winning set W .
Note that q1 /∈ W , even though a strategy can achieve ϕ[1] starting from q1 on
system TS[1]. This is because the fault may occur when we are at q1. In that case
the system degrades to TS[2] and no succeeding strategy exists to avoid state q5, and
hence to achieve ϕ[2].
Winning Set with Detection Delay
Assume a finite delay is required to detect the fault, we compute the fault tolerant
winning set and show it is different from the above result. Then, similar as before,
Algorithm 1 starts from fault φ[1] and computes winning set W [1] = {q2, q3, q4}. We
then compute C [j] as the largest controlled invariant set in W [2]. In this example,
C [2] = W [2]. Map I2 is also found such that I2(q) contains the actions at state q
that make C [2] invariant. In this example, I [2](q2) = {b}, I [2](q3) = I [2](q4) = {a, b}.
Finally the recursion goes back to fault φ[1], and the fault tolerant winning set is
synthesized, with the states restricted to set C [2], and with the actions at state q
restricted to I [2](q). In the example W [1] = {q3, q4}, and we claim the fault tolerant
winning set W = W [1].
Unlike the fault tolerant winning set without detection delays, state q2 is not
inside the winning set W . This is because action a /∈ I2(q2), and is hence forbidden
at state q2 in the synthesis. To see why this it is necessary to exclude state q2 from
W , we consider the following scenario. If fault occurs at state q2, the controller will
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not be informed at once. Instead, the controller assumes that the system evolves as
TS[1] and tries to achieve ϕ1. Note that to achieve ϕ1 on TS
[1], the controller has to
take action a whenever the state is at q2. As a result the actual system evolves as





Abstration-based Synthesis of Fuel Cell Thermal
Management
In order to apply the fault-tolerant control synthesis algorithms developed in Chapter
V to a continuous state system, we still need to find a winning set of the continuous
system. This can be done by abstraction-based synthesis. Although the fixed point
algorithms developed for finite transition system are quite mature, the computation
of abstraction is not a trivial task. The main challenge is to reduce the level of
conservatism and to improve efficiency.
In this chapter we show that such abstraction-based synthesis can be done for
a fuel cell thermal management system with complicated nonlinear dynamics and
complicated specifications. We begin by developing a control-oriented model for
the thermal management system of a fuel cell stack. Then, we list the require-
ments associated with thermal management and formalize them using linear tempo-
ral logic. The model and the requirements are then used for controller synthesis with
an abstraction-based technique. To make the abstraction-based synthesis algorithm
computationally efficient, mixed monotonicity of the fuel cell system dynamics are
identified and leveraged. Finally, the closed-loop system behavior with the synthe-
sized controller is demonstrated via simulations.
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Chapter overview. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 intro-
duces the fuel cell thermal management problem. Section 6.2 defines the model and
Section 6.3 lists the considered specification in LTL. Seciton 6.4 then describes the
abstraction-based synthesis of the system, and Section 6.5 presents the results and
some discussion.
Related work. The main technical challenges solved in this Chapter are related
to improving the abstraction computation efficiency by leveraging system (mixed)
monotonicity [69, 26], and reducing conservatism of a abstraction [63, 103, 82, 85, 41,
51, 26, 136, 89, 109]. In particular, it closely follows the line of research studying so
called augmented finite transition systems [89, 109, 82, 85], which are equipped with
a progress group mapping that encodes extra transience property of the underlying
continuous dynamics.
6.1 Fuel Cell Thermal Management Problem
Fuel cells are electrochemical devices that convert chemical energy of gaseous fuel
(i.e., hydrogen) into electricity [94]. In a fuel cell stack, the electrochemical reaction of
oxygen and hydrogen generates electrical power, while heat and water are produced
as by-products. In this work, we focus on developing the thermal management
portion of the controller, which guarantees that the fuel cell operates in a proper
temperature range (340K to 350K), for safety and efficiency considerations [57].
A simplified schematic of the fuel cell thermal management system is shown in
Fig. 6.1. The two main factors that affect the heat supplied or removed from the fuel
cell stack, and hence the stack temperature, are the stack coolant inlet temperature
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and the coolant flow-rate. The coolant flow rate is controlled by an electric pump,
while the coolant inlet temperature is regulated by appropriately flowing the coolant
through a radiator or a heater, where the flow path is selected by a 2-position 3-way
valve, thus making the system dynamics hybrid in nature.
Figure 6.1: Layout of the fuel cell thermal management system. The arrows in the circuit represent
the direction of coolant flows.
The electrical power requirements have a direct influence on thermal manage-
ment, some aspects of which are studied in [50], [79]. First, the power requirements
by the motor and the fuel cell temperature constraint need to be met simultaneously
through system hybridization, that is, through appropriate power management be-
tween the fuel cell stack and an energy storage device. Since the heat generated
in the stack increases with increasing fuel cell output power, the stack temperature
may exceed the desired range while the fuel cell tries to match its output power with
the instantaneous power request from the motor. Hence, a battery is introduced to
“moderate” the power generated by the fuel cell. In addition, power requirements
from the heater when used for warm-up under cold conditions also affect power
management. In this paper, we provide some of the key requirements for fuel cell
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thermal management in the presence of battery state of charge energy constraints.
These requirements are evaluated in the situation where the ambient temperature is
near 283K, where the fuel cell stack loses significant heat to the ambient due to the
large temperature gradient.
In works such as [50], [79], requirements due to both power management and
thermal management are considered in the controller design. The design approaches
in these works are based on optimal control, where the requirements are combined
into one objective function and the controller is developed by solving an optimal con-
trol problem with the combined objective function. The correctness of the designed
controllers need to be verified by running a large number of tests.
6.2 Fuel Cell Model
A block diagram of the fuel cell thermal management system is shown in Fig. 6.2.
The solid lines (red) are temperature signals, the dotted lines (purple) are power
signals, the dashed lines (blue) are battery SOC signals, and the thinner solid lines
(black) are control/reference input signals. The physical meanings of the variables in
Fig. 6.2 can be found in the Appendix. Other operating conditions (such as hydrogen
and oxygen partial pressure, ambient temperature, vehicle speed) that affect system
dynamics are not included in the block diagram for simplicity.



































Figure 6.2: Block diagram of the fuel cell thermal management system.
6.2.1 Fuel Cell Power Generation












































correspond to the effect of enthalpies and entropies, iRΩ
describes Ohmic loss due to cell resistivity, and aMT(
i
iMT
)bMT describes potential loss
caused by mass transport limitations. The variables hrxn, srxn, i0, RΩ depend on fuel
cell average temperature Tavg and operating conditions [93].
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6.2.2 Fuel Cell Temperature Dynamics
The fuel cell stack is divided into two control volumes to capture its temperature
gradient. One control volume is at the coolant inlet side and the other is at the
coolant outlet side. The fuel cell temperature dynamics is described in terms of the
temperature of the two control volumes, i.e., T1, T2. The temperature dynamics are





































where the inlet coolant temperature TFC,in,cool in Eq. (6.4) is defined as
TFC,in,cool = uHRTH + (1− uHR)TR,(6.6)
where uHR is the binary variable controlling the 2-position 3-way valve. The average
fuel cell temperature used in Eq. (6.3) is defined as Tavg = (T1 + T2)/2, while
TFC,out,cool, the outlet coolant temperature from fuel cell stack, is assumed to be
equal to T2.
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6.2.3 Radiator and Heater Temperature Dynamics







(1− uHR)ccoolwcool(TFC,out,cool − TR)









uHRccoolwcool(TFC,out,cool − TH) + PH
)
.(6.8)
Note that when binary control uHR = 1 (or 0), the coolant is fed to the heater (or
the radiator). The term ε(v) in radiator dynamics is the vehicle-speed-dependent
effectiveness of the radiator, which is modeled as an affine function of vehicle speed
v. The outlet coolant temperature from the radiator (the heater, respectively) is
assumed to be TR (TH, respectively).
6.2.4 Battery SOC Dynamics











Note that in Eq. (6.9), PB,output can be negative, meaning charging the battery.
6.2.5 Power Split Module
The power split module combines the output power from the fuel cell and the battery,
and passes part of the combined power to the heater, and the remaining portion to
the motor. To deliver the required power to the motor, we assume the battery always
provides the right amount of power to compensate for what is generated by the fuel
cell, that is,
PB,output = PM + PH − PFC,output.(6.10)
91
6.3 Specifications
In this section, we give the specifications (or requirements) of fuel cell thermal man-
agement. The listed specifications are classified into the following three types:
(i) “reach-stay” type specifications require that the system variables (e.g., state or
control input) reach a target region in finite time and stay in that region once
they arrive;
ϕreach−stay = ♦πtarget, where πtarget is a proposition saying that the variable
belongs to a designated target set. The formula ♦πtarget says that a time
instant exists starting from which πtarget is always true.
(ii) “avoid” type specifications require that the variables avoid some undesired re-
gions forever (or equivalently, the variables always stay in the complement of
the undesired region);
ϕavoid = πsafe, where proposition πsafe says that the variable is not in the
undesired set, or the variable is in the desired set.
(iii) “recurrence” type specifications require that the variables visit a region repeti-
tively;
ϕrecurrence = ♦πrecurrence, where πrecurrence says the variable belongs to a re-
currence target set. The formula ♦πrecurrence is interpreted as: for all time
instants, a time exists in the future at which πrecurrence holds, therefore guaran-
teeing repetition.
For the remainder of this section, we give the fuel cell thermal management specifi-
cations in plain English and express them in LTL. The resulting LTL formulas are
listed in TABLE 6.1.
92
6.3.1 Limitations of Fuel Cell Output Power
Some requirements regarding fuel cell output power are imposed in this part.
Spec1: (avoid) The fuel cell output power PFC,output should not drop below zero.
Fig. 6.3 gives the fuel cell output power predicted by the model in Section 6.2.1.
As show in Fig. 6.3, the model-predicted fuel cell output power becomes negative
when the current density is too high, which makes the model invalid at that value of
current density. This requirement is essential to avoid operating in the region where
the model is invalid.
Spec2: (avoid) Let i∗ be the fuel cell current density that gives the maximum fuel
cell output power, graphically illustrated by Fig. 6.3. The current density should
not exceed the one that gives the maximum output power PFC,max because operating
above PFC,max is inefficient and could lead to irreversible degradation [56]. Note that
i∗ is a function of state and operating conditions.
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Figure 6.3: Fuel cell power versus current density, fuel cell average temperature varies in [273, 360]K,
membrane water content λ = 6.
Based on Fig. 6.3, it is obvious that Spec2 actually implies Spec1. In this work,
we exclude Spec2 from the correct-by-construction synthesis because of the difficulty
in computing i∗. Instead, we handle Spec2 by restricting the current density i to be
smaller than a fixed upper bound ĩ∗, which is found experimentally. In addition, some
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control action selecting heuristics are developed to incorporate Spec2 (see section
6.5). However, since no formal guarantee can be made for achieving Spec2, we still
consider Spec1 in the correct-by-construction synthesis as a hard constraint.
6.3.2 Battery Energy & Power Limitations
In this part, we give some requirements regarding the battery SOC and power. These
requirements are important for guaranteeing the health of the battery and its incor-
poration with energy management.
Spec3: (avoid) The battery stack energy should not drop below 10% or exceed
90%.
Spec4: (recurrence) Battery energy should always recover to SOCB,target (with at
most an error δ) in finite time, where SOCB,target is a set point given by the energy
management module.
This specification can be viewed as a relaxation of the charge sustaining require-
ment of the battery. Since we do not assume any knowledge of the driving cycle in
advance, it is impossible for the battery SOC to recover to the starting level exactly
at the end of the driving period (unless one restricts the battery SOC to always stay
close to the target level, which is a conservative strategy). Hence, we require only
that the battery SOC have the capability of recovering to the target level.
Spec5: (avoid) The battery power should not exceed peak power requirements.
Spec6: (avoid) Power for the battery charge should not exceed maximum allow-
able charging power. Note that by our convention, charging powers (both PB,output
and PB,charge,max) are negative.
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6.3.3 Regular Operation Requirements
The following requirements are related to fuel cell temperature regulation.
Spec7: (reach-stay) Fuel cell block temperatures should reach and then stay in
the target temperature range [340, 350]K.
By this requirement, when the fuel cell is temporarily shut down and motor power
is completely delivered by the battery, we still want the fuel cell temperature to stay
in the range.
Spec8: (avoid) Fuel cell block temperatures should never exceed the maximum
allowable temperature of 353K.
Table 6.1: Specifications in LTL
Specification LTL formula type
Spec1 ϕ1 = (PFC,output ≥ 0) avoid X
Spec2 ϕ2 = (i ≤ i∗) avoid ∼
Spec3 ϕ3 = (0.1 ≤ SOCB ≤ 0.9) avoid X
Spec4 ϕ4 = ♦
(
SOCB,target − δ ≤ SOCB
≤ SOCB,target + δ
)
recurrence X
Spec5 ϕ5 = (PB,output ≤ PB,output,max) avoid X
Spec6 ϕ6 = (PB,output ≥ PB,charge,max) avoid X
Spec7 ϕ7 = ♦
(
∧j=1,2 (Tj ∈ [340, 350])
)
reach-stay1 X
Spec8 ϕ8 = 
(
∧j=1,2 (Tj ≤ 353)
)
avoid X
“X”: the specification is considered in the synthesis.
“∼”: the specification is handled by heuristics.
6.4 Solution Approach
We formulate the control problem as a temporal logic game [86] on a hybrid system
and solve the game using abstraction-based synthesis technique. This section is
divided into three parts. First, we describe the basic steps involved in computing an
abstraction, and show how to leverage the system’s properties introduced in Section
2.1 at each step to simplify computation. Second, we briefly describe the synthesis
1We refer to this LTL specification as “reach-stay” type with a slight abuse of terminology. In fact, ♦(x ∈
target set) does not require that x stays in the target set after its first arrival.
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process on the abstraction. Finally, we motivate and propose multi-action state-
dependent progress groups, and show how they remove spurious behavior from the
abstraction.
6.4.1 Abstraction
The abstraction process returns a finite transition system for a given plant model and
specifications. The transitions capture the flow of the continuous plant dynamics,
and the (discrete) states of the finite transition system are properly labeled according
to the given specifications. In this work, the finite transition systems serving as
abstractions are nondeterministic. That is, given the current state and the control
action applied at that state, there might be multiple succeeding states. Specifically,
we also reinforce such transition systems with so called progress groups, which encode
additional transience properties of the underlying concrete system. Such transition
systems are already well-established in the literature. We refer the reader to [85] for
a formal definition of such abstractions and detailed algorithms generating them.
The abstraction process is decomposed into three steps, that is, discretization,
labeling and transition computation. We now describe each step, incorporated with
the fuel cell system properties for computational efficiency.
Discretization
We first partition the state space of a given concrete system into finitely many regions.
Each region is mapped to a discrete state in the finite transition system. In the rest
of this paper we will call a “discrete state” as “state” for short, when the context is
unambiguous. We use a manually constructed non-uniform rectangular grid partition
in the state space. A rectangular partition reduces the abstraction computation effort
significantly when the system flow/vector field are (mixed) monotone [26] or multi-
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affine [133].
Notice that both continuous-valued control inputs (i, wcool, PH) and boolean con-
trol input (uHR) are present in the system. We discretize control space U by creating
a grid on the continuous-valued control space, which leads to a finite set of control
actions. It should be noted that the discretization of the continuous control variables
leads to more than 70 control actions in total in this application.
Labeling
After the state space partition, each region in the partition needs to be labeled as
“target”, “recurrence target”, “safe” and “unsafe” according to the specifications.
Consider “reach-stay” specification Spec7. The regions contained by set {x ∈ X |
T1 and T2 ∈ [340, 350]} are labeled as “target”. For “recurrence” specification Spec4,
the regions contained by set {x ∈ X | SOCB ∈ [SOCB,target− δ, SOCB,target + δ]} are
labeled as “recurrence target”. The remainder of the specifications are of the “avoid”
type. A region is labeled “safe” if the “avoid” specification is satisfied everywhere in
that region for all operating conditions; it is labeled “unsafe” if the specification is
violated somewhere in the region for some operating conditions.
The challenge is that some “avoid” specifications are implicitly related to states
and operating conditions. For example, requirement Spec1 requires fuel cell output
power PFC,output ≥ 0 (or equivalently EFC,stack ≥ 0 by Eq. (6.1)), PFC,output is a
function of both system state (fuel cell temperature Tavg) and operating condition
(membrane water content λ, hydrogen-oxygen partial pressure pH2 , pO2). Therefore,
to label a region safe or unsafe in terms of Spec1, we need to check the worst case in
that region. That is, if the minimum fuel cell output power PFC,output (or equivalently
EFC,stack) in the region is negative under some operating conditions (which violate
specification Spec1 ), the region is labeled unsafe.
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As described in Section 6.2.1, EFC,stack is a nonlinear function in state x and op-
erating condition d. Therefore, determining the exact minimum value of EFC,stack
requires solving a nonlinear optimization problem over x and d, which might be
intractable. However, function EFC,stack(x, d) allows an efficient and reasonable ap-
proximation by Theorem 2 in Section 2.1 if the considered regions are rectangles.
Theorem 2 applies to function EFC,stack(x, d) because EFC,stack(x, d) is continuously






are bounded on X ×D; thus, EFC,stack(x, d)
satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 2.
By Theorem 2, under-(over-)approximating the minimum (or maximum) value of
EFC,stack reduces to evaluating EFC,stack at the two extreme points of the considered
rectangular region. The result of the approximation is illustrated using Fig. 6.4:
the dashed line is the maximum and minimum value when x1, x2, or T1, T2 varies
in [273, 360]K. Fig. 6.4 shows a gap between the approximated minimum value of
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Figure 6.4: Approximation of polarization, fuel cell average temperature varies in [273, 360]K.
EFC,cell and the true values. This gap indicates that the approximation is conserva-




We compute transitions in the abstraction by arguing about the vector field directions
of the concrete system, over a region in state space, and also over all operating
conditions. In this part we provide an efficient way to compute these transitions
using Theorems 2 from Section 2.1.
X  1 X  2
Vector field 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑢, 𝑑)





Figure 6.5: Computing transitions by arguing direction of vector field.
As shown in the left half of Fig. 6.5, X1 and X2 are two adjacent regions in
the state space of concrete system, F = X1 ∩X2 is the adjacent facet between two
regions, dashed arrow nF is the normal vector of facet F (pointing from X1 to X2),
and the solid arrows on F are the vector field f(x, u, d) under some given u and
operating conditions d. The right half of the figure shows the discrete states in the
abstraction, in particular, discrete state q1 (q2) corresponds to region X1 (X2), and
the transitions between q1 and q2 are defined as follows
q1
u−→ q2 if max
x ∈ F,
d ∈ D
nTFf(x, u, d) > 0.(6.11)
Finally, since any trajectory starting from region Xi will stay in that region after a
small amount of time, we need to add a self-transition on the corresponding discrete
state qi.
Assume a rectangular partition of the state space, the adjacent facets are all
rectangular facets, i.e., F = {x ∈ X | xj ∈ [xj, xj]}, and their normal vectors are
natural basis vectors ei (a vector whose i
th entry is one, and the other entries are
zeros). Also note that allowable operating condition set D is a rectangular set by
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definition, i.e., D = {d | dk ∈ [dk, dk]}. Eq. (6.11) is thus equivalent to
q1
u−→ q2 if max
xj ∈ [xj, xj ]
d ∈ [dk, dk]
fi(x, u, d) > 0.(6.12)
The optimum values in (6.12) can be over approximated using Theorem 2. Fixing
control u, and letting φu be the decomposition function of f(·, u, ·) defined by Eq.
(2.15), we have
max
xj ∈ [xj, xj ]
d ∈ [dk, dk]
fi(x, u, d) ≤ φui ([x, d], [x, d]),(6.13)
where x = [x1, . . . , xn]
T and x = [x1, . . . , xn]
T (similar for d, d). We hence replace
Eq. (6.13) by the following to compute the transitions:
q1
u−→ q2 if φui ([x, d], [x, d]) > 0.(6.14)
Recall the discussion following Theorem 2, if the partial derivative ∂fi
∂xj
is not sign-
stable, the approximations in Eq. (6.13) are not tight. In other words we may have
φui ([x, d], [x, d]) > 0 but max fi(x, u, d) ≤ 0. In that case, Eq. (6.13) and Eq. 6.14
are not equivalent. In fact, we create more transitions when using Eq. (6.14), and
hence introduce more spurious behavior in the abstraction, thus leading to a more
conservative solution but conserving the correctness.
Note that the partial derivative ∂f3
∂v




Eq. (6.7). The sign of ∂f3
∂v
depends on which one of TR and Tamb is larger. In this case,
the conservatism can be reduced. We show f3 is affine in state x and multi-affine in
[Tamb, w] where w := ε(v)v. Hence to maximize (minimize, respectively) vector field
component f3, one need only evaluate f3 at both upper and lower bounds of w, and
pick the maximum (minimum, respectively) f3 value. This practice is equivalent to
evaluating f3 at the upper and lower bounds of vehicle speed v, because w = ε(v)v
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is monotone increasing in v. With this modification, Eq. (6.13) becomes
max
xj ∈ [xj, xj ]
d ∈ [dk, dk]
fi(x, u, d) ≤
max
{
φui ([x, d], [x, d]), φ
u
i ([x, d], [x, d])
}
,(6.15)
where d is the same as d except that its fifth entry (representing vehicle speed v)
takes upper bound value; and d is the same as d except that its fifth entry takes
lower bound value.
Note that to compute the transition from q2 to q1, the only change is to choose the
normal vector in Eq. (6.11) to be nF = −ei, and the above approximation process
still applies to this case.
6.4.2 Synthesis
To synthesize a controller, we solve a temporal logic game on the obtained abstraction
using graph search algorithms. As mentioned at the beginning of Section 6.4.1, the
abstraction used in this work is nondeterministic. The actual evolution of such an
abstraction can be viewed as the outcome of a two player game between the controller
and the environment [112]. In each round of the game, the controller selects an action
first, and then the environment selects a transition that is available under the current
state and action. The goal of the controller is to win the game, that is, to satisfy the
specification regardless of the moves of the environment. The algorithms for solving
such games are fairly standard [112, 15, 82, 118, 85, 11], and refer the readers to
these references for details. Fig. 6.6 shows an illustration of the synthesis process,
and we only briefly describe the process with the following three steps:
1. We first solve the “stay” part of the game, by searching for the maximal con-
trolled invariant set C1 within the discrete states labeled as both “target” and
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“safe”. Each discrete state in C1 will be assigned a set of control actions. Un-
der the assigned actions, the closed-loop path starting from C1 will stay in C1
forever. Such a maximal controlled invariant set can be found by a fixed-point
algorithm given in [82].
2. Next we solve the “recurrence” part of the game, restricted within set C1. In
particular, at each state in C1, we can use only the actions assigned to that
state in step 1 that render C1 to be invariant. The recurrence game can be
solved with the algorithm given in [118]. This gives a set of states contained
by C1, starting from where the “recurrence target” states (again, in C1) can be
reached infinitely often. This set of states is denoted as C2. As shown in Fig.
6.6, C2 ⊆ C1. It should be noted that C2 is also a controlled invariant set when
the recurrence specification is achieved.
3. Then we solve the “reach-avoid” part of the game, using the algorithm given
in [82]. The solution contains a set of states B, called the backwards reachable
set of C2, together with a set of actions assigned to each state in B. If these
actions are applied accordingly, a path starting from B will reach C2 in finite
time, while avoiding “unsafe” states2. The obtained backwards reachable set B
together with set C2 form a winning set of the overall game.
Finally, once the winning set and the associated control actions are determined on
the abstraction, we can extract a switching controller for the concrete system, that
is, we map the actions assigned to each “winning” state to its corresponding region
in the concrete system’s state space. This leads to a look-up table controller defined
in the concrete system state space.
To solve the reachability part, both in the reach-avoid-stay game and the recur-
2As noted in Footnote 1, there is a difference between specification ♦(x ∈ target set) and “reaching the target
set in finite time and staying there once arrived”. Here we are achieving the latter one, which implies the satisfaction
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Figure 6.6: Illustration of synthesis procedure.
rence game, the existence of spurious loops in abstraction may prevent the target
from being reached, therefore reducing the winning set. Hence, it is crucial to elim-
inate the spurious behavior in the abstraction as much as possible. To this end we
encode in abstraction some transient properties of the underlining continuous sys-
tem by progress groups. A set of states (each state assigned a set of control actions)
forms a progress group if these discrete states correspond to a transient region in
the original concrete system, under the assigned actions. A region is transient under
some control actions if all trajectories starting from that region eventually leave the
region in finite time under assigned control actions. Fig. 6.7 illustrates different no-
tions of progress groups. In all three illustrations, the vector field in region X1 ∪X2
is pointing upwards under the assigned actions. Thus, all trajectories starting from
region X1 ∪ X2 will eventually leave the region. We hence group the correspond-
ing states {q1, q2} as a progress group, and forbid any infinite path from staying
within states {q1, q2}. Notice that infinite paths within {q1, q2} exist otherwise due
to the self-loops and cycling between two states. The novel concept introduced here
of multi-action state-dependent progress group will be motivated and explained in
more details in the following section.
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Figure 6.7: Different notions of progress groups.
6.4.3 Multi-action State-dependent Progress Group
In previous works [89], [109], progress groups were defined only for a single action. In
a more recent paper [85], the notion of multi-action progress groups was introduced to
encode richer transience properties of the underlying concrete system. In all of these
works, progress groups were pre-computed before synthesis and are stored as part of
the abstraction. These notions of progress groups, however, are not sufficient for the
specific application considered in this paper. First, we find that single-action progress
groups cannot accommodate the battery SOC requirement and some reachability
requirements at the same time. Moreover, pre-computing and storing multi-action
progress groups requires an unacceptable computation load because the number of
actions in our application is relatively large. Hence, we develop a procedure here to
construct multi-action progress groups on-the-fly during synthesis. This procedure
leads to a more general notion called multi-action state-dependent progress groups.
We use Fig. 6.8 to illustrate why single-action progress groups are not sufficient for
this application, that is, why the battery SOC requirement Spec3 and the reachabil-
ity part of requirement Spec7 cannot be satisfied at the same time with single-action
progress groups. On the left side of the figure, we plot the rectangular partition
and the system’s vector field projected onto SOCB-T1 space. By requirement Spec3,
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Figure 6.8: Illustration of system flow projected onto SOCB-T1 subspace (left), abstraction with
single-action progress group (right (a), (b)) and abstraction with multi-action state-dependent
progress group (right (c)). The self-loops on the discrete states are removed because they are part
of some progress groups and hence correspond to transient regions.
the regions where battery SOC falls below 0.1 or exceeding 0.9 are labeled as unsafe
(gray). By requirement Spec7, the fuel cell temperature should reach and stay be-
tween 340K to 350K, and the corresponding regions are labeled as target (green). To
reach the target region, we can either (i) let the fuel cell do self-heat-up, meanwhile
using the excess power generated to charge the battery (corresponding to action u1),
or (ii) use the heater to warm up the fuel cell, by drawing power from the battery
(corresponding to action u2)
3. Note that no action can keep battery SOC constant
while steering the fuel cell temperature towards the target. This is true due to the
variation in motor requested power PM, which is an operating condition (uncontrolled
variable).
The right section of the Fig. 6.8 shows the abstraction, where the colored ellipses
mark some progress groups and the arrows show the paths when the corresponding
actions are applied. By choosing a single action (i.e., case (a) or (b)), the paths either
3In practice there are more than 70 actions in total, but we only plot the system’s flow under two typical actions
u1 and u2 to simplify the illustration.
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go all the way up (case (a)) or down (case(b)) and lead to unsafe discrete states.
Therefore battery SOC requirement Spec3 is violated on the abstraction. Note that
such paths are spurious because they do not represent any real trajectories of the
concrete system (e.g., choosing u1 at low battery SOC actually leads the trajectory
into the target region before saturating the battery). Such spurious behaviors exist
in abstraction due to the conservatism introduced by partitioning. On the other
hand, the battery SOC requirement can be satisfied by applying multiple actions. As
shown in Fig. 6.8 (c), all the paths stay safe when u1 is applied at the bottom discrete
state and u2 is applied at the upper two discrete states. However, the reachability
requirement is violated by an infinite loop caused by alternatively choosing u1 and
u2. Again, this loop is spurious, as there is a constant flow towards the left no matter
what action is chosen. We thus need multi-action (not necessarily state-dependent)
progress groups to eliminate such loops when they are spurious.
Since the total number of multi-action progress groups grows exponentially in the
number of available control actions (70 for this application), it easily exhausts time
and memory to pre-compute these progress groups and encode them in the abstrac-
tion before synthesis. Therefore, instead of doing computation and storage before
synthesis, we compute progress groups with multiple actions during the synthesis
process, and we restrict the control actions on-the-fly based on the synthesis. As
will be shown later, under such restrictions, the control actions assigned to different
discrete states in the progress group may vary from one to the other, that is, the
action is state-dependent. Algorithm 4 shows how to construct such progress groups
and how to use them to compute a backwards reachable set of the target set.
Algorithm 4 is summarized with the following steps:
1. We start from an initial set B and compute its one-step-predecessors P =
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Algorithm 4 [B] = BackwardsReach(C, S, α). Compute the safe backwards reachable set of C,
with multi-action state dependent progress groups constructed on-the-fly during the computation.
Input: the set C of discrete states to reach, the set S of all discrete states labeled as safe, abstraction
α that maps a region in concrete system’s state space to a discrete state.
Output: Set B, a backwards reachable set of set C.
1: B = C
2: P = Pre1(B)
3: i = 0
4: while B is not satisfactory and i ≤max iter do
5: (B′,K) = CInv
(
B ∪ (P ∩ S)
)
6: if ∃v : ∀b ∈ B′ \B : ∃ub ∈ K(b) : ∀x ∈ α−1(b), d ∈ D : vT f(x, u, d) > 0 then
7: B′\B is a multi-action state-dependent progress group whenever ub is applied at b ∈ B′\B
8: B = B′
9: P = Pre1(B)
10: else
11: Replace P by a proper subset of P that has not been used before
12: end if
13: i = i+ 1
14: end while
15: return B
Pre1(B). A discrete state p is called a one-step-predecessor of a set B, if there
is a transition (under some actions assigned to p) leading p to some discrete
state b ∈ B. Here, since we want to remain in the target set after arriving at it,
set B is initialized as a controlled invariant set contained by the target.
2. Next, sub-procedure (B′, K) = CInv
(
B ∪ (P ∩ S)
)
computes the largest con-
trolled invariant set B′ that is contained by set B ∪ (P ∩ S), together with an
invariance controller K : B′ → 2U that maps every discrete state in B′ to a set
of control actions that renders B′ invariant.
3. If the discrete states inB′\B correspond to a transient region under some actions
restricted by invariance controller K (this is checked by a sufficient condition
in line 6), set B′ \ B form a multi-action state-dependent progress group, and
is added to the backwards reachable set.
4. We repeat steps 1, 2, 3 until the winning set reaches a satisfactory size or a
maximum number of iterations has been reached.
We explain the intuition behind Algorithm 4 as follows. For simplicity, we will
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temporarily omit the “avoid” requirements. Suppose that B is indeed a backward
reachable set of some controlled invariant set C, the following facts must hold:
• Set B is computed in a backwards expanding manner starting from and con-
taining set C; hence, the paths satisfying the reach-stay requirement will always
stay within set B. Thus, set B is controlled invariant under the actions that
achieve the reach-stay requirement.
• For C to be reachable in finite time, no path stays in B \C forever. That is, set
B \ C will form a progress group under the actions that achieve the reach-stay
requirement.
Therefore, in order to find a progress group that helps expanding the backwards
reachable set of C, one need only explore the controlled invariant sets B′ that contain
C, and restrict to the action assignments that render B′ invariant. These restrictions
avoid exploring all subsets of discrete states with all possible action combination when
computing multi-action state-dependent progress groups.
The remainder of this part explains the condition in line 6, Algorithm 4 and
shows how to check this condition. Take Fig. 6.8 as an example. Shaded discrete
states form a multi-action state-dependent progress group when u2 is assigned to
the two discrete states on the top and u1 is assigned to the bottom discrete state.
This is because the region represented by these discrete states is transient under
corresponding actions. The transience can be checked efficiently by arguing the
direction of the vector field of the underlying concrete system. As shown on left
side of Fig. 6.8, the union of three regions X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 is transient because the
horizontal component of the vector field is always positive (i.e., pointing rightwards)
when control u2 is applied in X1 X2, and u1 is applied in X3. More generally, given
a set of regions {Xk}mk=1 in n dimensional state space, each region equipped with one
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control action uk, X =
⋃m
k=1Xk is transient under assigned actions if there exists
v ∈ Rn,
∀k = 1 . . .m : min
x∈Xk,d∈D
vTf(x, uk, d) > 0.(6.16)
If vector v = ±ei (the vector with the ith entry being 1 and the rest being 0),
and if Xk’s are rectangles, the optimization problem in (6.16) can be approximated
efficiently by the approach developed in section 6.4.1.
6.5 Results and Discussion
Using the solution approach described in Section 6.4, a switching controller is syn-
thesized. The controller is in the form of a look-up table (see Step 3 in Section 6.4.2).
At each time instant, the current state locates in one of the regions of the look-up
table and the control action in that region is applied accordingly. Although multi-
ple actions might be available in the region, selecting an arbitrary one is sufficient
to guarantee the correctness. We implement a “lazy switching” heuristic for action
selection to reduce the change in the control inputs, allowing us to always maintain
the previously used control action, where possible. Whenever we enter a new region
in the look-up table and the previous action is no longer available there, we change
the action but try to maintain the position of as many actuators as possible. In
particular, we can assign different priority to different actuators in terms of main-
taining their current positions. If there is no such priority, we always tend to fix the
actuator whose position has changed most recently. This practice helps to balance
the position change of different actuators, avoiding frequent switches. The action se-
lecting heuristics can be also designed to incorporate with specification Spec2, which
is excluded from the correct-by-construction synthesis. Since Spec2 requires that the
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fuel cell current density i is smaller than i∗, we can always select the control actions
with the smallest current density i to avoid violating Spec2.
The controller is shown to be able to achieve the specifications on the entire state
domain X. That is, the computed winning set is equal to the domain X. We il-
lustrate the closed-loop behaviors by simulating the system at 285K. We modify
FTP-72 vehicle speed data [115] to obtain motor power PM and vehicle speed v pro-
file in a driving cycle. First, since the controller allows the vehicle speed v to vary
only in [5,25]m/s, we saturate the v whenever its value falls below 5m/s. Second,
PM, the power requested by the motor, is assumed to be proportional to acceleration
dv
dt
whenever the acceleration is positive, and is assumed to be 0 whenever the accel-
eration is negative. PM is also scaled so that the value lies in the allowable range,
that is, [0, 17]kW.










Figure 6.9: FTP-72 vehicle speed data, saturated to fit the operating condition constraints of the
synthesized controller.
The simulation results are plotted in Figure 6.10, from which we make the follow-
ing observations:
1. By plots (1-1) (1-2) (5-2), all states stay in the domain, and the battery SOC
never exceeds upper or lower bounds.
2. By plot (1-1) fuel cell temperature reaches and stays in the target range (marked
by a dashed green line).
3. By plot (5-2), the battery SOC recurrently visits the reference interval marked
by the dashed blue lines. Here we assume the reference can vary over time, and is
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determined by a higher level power management module. Note that the battery
SOC need not stay in the interval after arriving, even if the reference has not yet
changed: it simply maintains the capability to recover to the desired level. This
can be seen from the simulation before 300s. Such behavior is desired because
it gives more freedom to the controller, while guaranteeing that the battery
SOC is able to recover. For example, while the fuel cell stack does self-heat-up
at the warm-up stage, it generates more power than requested with the extra
power stored in the battery. This explains why the battery SOC increases and
exceeds the reference interval at the beginning of the simulation. However, once
the target temperature is reached, the battery SOC begins to drop towards the
reference interval.
4. By plot (2-2), it can be seen that the heater is not turned on at the warm-up
stage. The fuel cell does self-heat-up instead, indicating that while the controller
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(2-2) Control: HR = 1: coolant->heater; HR = 0: coolant->radiator
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Figure 6.10: Simulations results: states, powers and selected controls. Temperature states start from




In this chapter, we consider the fault tolerant path planning problem for linear sys-
tems to satisfy some high level requirements specified by LTL. Unlike the problems
solved in Chapter V where a winning set (i.e., a set of initial conditions starting
from where the specification is achievable) is to be searched, an initial condition
is given as part of the problem setup. This allows one to leverage Mixed Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) based LTL encoding to search for an open-loop strat-
egy that achieves the specification, and the fault-tolerant path planning problem is
solved under this framework. We first show how open-loop fault tolerant strategies
(associated with each initial state) can be synthesized by solving an MILP. These
open-loop strategies, however, are not robust to the disturbances because of two
reasons. First, since the disturbed system cannot be predicted precisely, the fault
will be detected with a delay. Secondly, even if the faulty status is known, the true
system trajectory may still deviate from the planned trajectory as the impact of the
disturbance accumulates. To solve the two problems, we present a MILP formula-
tion of the problem that incorporates finite detection delays, the open-loop strategy
defined by the MILP’s solution is then robustified with additional linear regulation.
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Chapter overview. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 defines
the fault-tolerant path planning problem. Section 7.2 introduces preliminaries on
MILP encoding of LTL. Section 7.3 presents the proposed MILP based approach for
fault-tolerant path planning problem. Section 7.4 presents the low level regulator
design approach via optimization. Finally the proposed algorithm is illustrated with
a motion planning on 2D plane.
Related work. The MILP-based approach considered in this chapter follows
[58, 95, 119] and is also closely related to the constraint control of mixed-logical sys-
tems [12]. As mentioned in Chapter I, it aligns with [96, 100, 39, 104, 99] that try
to make the obtained strategy more robust and reactive to environment changing.
The use of similar hierarchical control architectures has become a common practice
in many application domains [19]. For simple tasks like reaching a goal while avoid-
ing obstacles that may appear on the fly, approaches based on LQR trees [111] or
contraction theory [105] have been proposed along these lines.
7.1 Simplified Problem Setup
In this section, we define the fault tolerant path planning problem. The problem has
two ingredients: (i) a system whose dynamics can degrade suddenly due to a fault,
and (ii) an LTL formula that specifies the system’s “graceful degradation”.
System Model
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The system model considered in this paper is defined by






∈ {h, f} if σt = h
= f if σt = f
.(7.2)
where xt ∈ X ⊆ Rn is the state, ut ∈ U ⊆ Rm is the control input, wt ∈ W ⊆ Rn
is the disturbance, and σt ∈ {h, f} is the fault status of the system. If σt = h, the
system is healthy and evolves with the dynamics defined by (Ah, Bh, F h); if σt = f,
this indicates that the fault has occurred and the system evolves with the dynamics
defined by (Af , Bf , F f). By Eq. (7.2), the fault is permanent because σt never
recovers to h after it becomes f. In addition, we make the following assumption on
the faults.
Assumption 3. We assume that the fault is T -detectable ([47]), that is, if the fault
occurs at time step to, it will be detected at td where to + 1 ≤ td ≤ to + T .
For Assumption 3, it should be noticed that T is only an upper bound on the
detection delay, and the actual online detection can be earlier than to +T . However,
this fact cannot be incorporated in the offline path planning phase because the actual
detection depends on the realization of wt.
7.2 Mixed Integer Encoding of LTL
Given an LTL formula ϕ, it is well-known from the literature [119] that x |= ϕ can
be encoded with mixed integer linear constraints in the following sense. Instead
of imposing constraints on the infinite sequence x, we search for a finite sequence
x = x1x2 . . . xk, xk+1...xN that satisfies the following linear inequality constraint:
Hϕ,k,N(x,b) ≤ 0,(7.3)
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where b is an N -sequence of auxiliary binary (hence integer) vectors1, and Hϕ,k,N
is an affine function in (x,b). In particular, Hϕ,k,N is constructed in such a way
that the infinite sequence x := (x1x2 . . . xk)(xk+1 . . . xN)
ω, obtained by unfolding
x = x1x2 . . . xN at point k, is guaranteed to satisfy ϕ. In this case, we say that finite
sequence x satisfy ϕ with a slight abuse of terminology.
With such mixed integer encoding technique, the path planning problem of linear
systems can be formulated as a MILP. Let the system model be xt+1 = Axt+But+F
with state x ∈ X and control u ∈ U , where X ⊆ Rn and U ⊆ Rm are polytopes, also
let xinit be the initial state, the MILP formulation is given by
find x,u,b
s.t. ∃1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 : Hϕ,k,N(x,b) ≤ 0 and
Ax(N) +Bu(N) + F = x(k + 1),
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + F, t = 1, . . . , N − 1,
u(t) ∈ U, b(t) ∈ {0, 1}, t = 1, . . . , N,
x(t) ∈ X, t = 1, . . . , N,
x(1) = xinit.
(7.4)
Suppose that the above optimization problem is feasible and let (x,u,b) be one of
its solutions, an infinite control sequence u can be extracted from the finite sequence
u, by unfolding u at some point 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. This control sequence leads to an
infinite state sequence x that satisfies the linear dynamics and LTL specification ϕ.
While formulating the MILP in Eq. (7.4), it is a common practice to modify
the state space labeling with an extra ∆-margin so that the specification is satisfied
robustly [36, 74, 64]. Such modification provides robustness against uncertainties like
disturbances or errors due to the sampling of a continuous-time system. For example,
1In practice, some variables in b need not be restricted as binary in the formulation. Instead, they can be specified
as real and will be binary automatically as a result of the encoding.
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if an unsafe region is required to be avoided (i.e., ϕ = ¬πunsafe) under uncertainties,
one can expand the unsafe set Xunsafe := {x ∈ Rn : πunsafe ∈ L(x)} by ∆, i.e., define
Xunsafe := Xunsafe⊕{x : ‖x‖ ≤ ∆}, where We X⊕Y := {x+y : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y } is the
Minkowski sum of setX, Y ⊆ Rn. Then avoidingXunsafe means thatXunsafe is avoided
with ∆-margin. Similarly, if some target region is required to be reached (i.e, ϕ =
♦πtarget) robustly, one can shrink the target set Xtarget := {x ∈ Rn : πtarget ∈ L(x)}
into Xtarget := Xtarget 	 ∆, where ,X 	 Y := {x : {x} ⊕ Y ⊆ X} is the Minkowski
difference of set X and Y . Reaching the shrunk set Xtarget guarantees that set Xtarget
is reached with ∆-margin. To do such expansion and shrinking systematically for
arbitrary LTL formulas, one needs to rewrite the specification ϕ in positive normal
form [36]. If atomic proposition π has no negation in the front, we shrink the set
Xπ := {x ∈ Rn : π ∈ L(x)} by ∆; and if π has a negation in the front, we expand
the set Xπ by ∆.
7.3 MILP Formulation of Fault Tolerant Path Planning
In this section, we formulate the fault tolerant path planning problem as a MILP.
The system is assumed to be undisturbed (an assumption to be relaxed in the next
subsection) and have a fault that is T -detectable. In addition, the labeling of the
state space is robustified with a ∆-margin. We will also assume that there is a
way (to be presented in the next subsection) to keep the true, disturbed trajectories
∆-close to a nominal trajectory as long as the system’s fault status does not change.
We begin by sketching the strategy that achieves specification Φ in Eq. (4.8). To
satisfy Φ, the system can either stay in the healthy mode forever and satisfy ϕh, or
enter faulty mode at some time to and start to satisfy ϕ
f from then on. However,
since the fault is beyond our control, we can only respond to the fault occurrence
117
passively. In particular, as long as the fault has not been detected yet, there is a
chance that the the system is healthy and will be healthy forever. Hence we need to
achieve specification ϕh for the healthy mode in this case. On the other hand, once
the fault is detected, the first half of Φ (i.e., (¬πf) ∧ ϕh) can no more be satisfied.
Hence the strategy needs to respond to the fault by rendering the system to satisfy
ϕf .
The above analysis leads to a strategy visualized in Fig. 7.1 (upper part). Roughly
speaking, strategy u should contain two pieces: a sequence uh (black) that achieves
ϕh under the healthy dynamics, and a sequence uf (gray) that achieves ϕf under the
faulty dynamics. The two sequences uh and uf can have different length (Nh, N f
respectively), and both of them can be unfolded to obtain infinite sequences (the
loops that are to be unfolded are marked with dashed line arrows in Fig. 7.1). In
addition, there should be different control sequences uf associated with different time
instants of detection because our strategy should respond to the fault detected at
anytime. We denote each control sequence associated with detection time td by
uf [td].(7.5)
Several important remarks on uf [td] are made in what follows.
First, it should be noticed that sequence uf [td] starts from time td, but it may
correspond to any fault that occurs at min{1, td−T} ≤ to ≤ td−1, where min{1, td−
T} is the earliest possible fault occurrence time that associates with td given T -
detectability assumption. All of these fault occurrences associated with the same td
cannot be treated separately because the exact fault occurrence time to is not known
in general. Instead, these different fault occurrences are all controlled with uh and
uf [td] in the following way:
• Within the so called “uninformed execution horizon” (i.e., min{1, td−T} ≤ t ≤
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td− 1), we do not know the system is already faulty and have to apply uh until
time td − 1.
• Starting from time td, the fault is known and uf [td] is applied.
With the above control strategy, each occurrence time to corresponds to a different
trajectory generated under the faulty dynamics, denote by
xf [to, td],(7.6)
and our goal is to ensure that xf [to, td] can be unfolded into an infinite sequence that
satisfies ϕf for all td and min{1, td − T} ≤ to ≤ td − 1.
The family of sequence xf [to, td] associated with a fixed td has a notable property,
that is, they all behave approximately the same as one sequence xh within the unin-
formed execution horizon, where xh denotes the sequence generated by uh under the
healthy dynamics. In particular, xf [to, td] will be ∆-close to x
h at least until td − 1.
This has to be true given the assumption that the disturbed healthy trajectories is
always ∆-close to the nominal trajectory xh as long as the system is healthy. Con-
sequently, the fault should be detected as long as the real trajectory is outside the
∆-tube of xh. The fact that xf [to, td] is close to x
h within the uninformed execution
horizon is highlighted with the blue box in the lower part of Fig. 7.1.
The second remark is about the faults that are detected on the loop. These
situation needs to be handled with extra care because it may correspond to multiple
fault detections after unfolding the loop. In Fig. 7.1, for example, if the fault is
detected at the black node denoting xh(6), the detection time td = 6 + ml where
l is the length of the loop and m = 0, 1, 2, . . . . These cases need to be handled
separately. In particular, all the cases with ml ≥ T can be treated as one. The
number of cases is hence reduced to finitely many and we only need to find uf [td] for
1 ≤ td ≤ Nh + T .
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Figure 7.1: An Illustration of the fault tolerant path planning strategy (upper) and associated
trajectories (lower).
In what follows, we transform the above descriptions of the strategy into MILP
formulations.
Healthy Mode Path Planning
For the healthy mode control sequence uh to achieve healthy specification ϕh under
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the healthy dynamics defined by (Ah, Bh, F h), one needs the following constraints:
∃1 ≤ kh ≤ Nh − 1 :
Hϕh,kh,Nh
(
xh,bh) ≤ 0 and
Ahxh(Nh) +Bhuh(Nh) + F h = xh(k + 1),
xh(t) = xh(t−Nh + k),uh(t) = uh(t−Nh + k),
t = Nh, . . . , Nh + T,(7.7)
xh(t+ 1) = Ahxh(t) +Bhuh(t) + F h,
t = 1, . . . , Nh − 1,(7.8)
xh(1) = xint,(7.9)
where xh is the trajectory generated by the healthy dynamics under uh, Hϕh,kh,Nh
is a function, encoding the specification ϕh within a horizon of length Nh, that is
affine in both xh and auxiliary variables bh, and xinit is the initial state. Note that
we extend xh and uh by T in Eq. (7.7) to handle the detection on the loop.
Faulty Mode Path Planning
We also require all the possible faulty trajectories xf [to, td] to satisfy ϕ
f when they are
controlled by the faulty mode control uf [td], which leads to the following constraints
121
for 1 ≤ td ≤ Nh + T and min{1, td − T} ≤ to ≤ td − 1:
∃1 ≤ kf [to, td] ≤ N f :








f) + F f = xf [to, td](k
f + 1),(7.10)
xf [to, td](t+ 1) = A
fxf [to, td](t) +B
fuf [td](t) + F
f ,
t = T, . . . , N f − 1,(7.11)
xf [to, td](t) = x
h(t+ to − 1),
t = 1, . . . , T, .(7.12)
where Hϕf ,kf ,N f encodes specification ϕ
f within horizon of length N f . In particular,
Eq. (7.12) requires the first T points in sequence xf [to, td] overlaps with the cor-
responding points in healthy sequence xh. This constraint captures the fact that
xh[to, td] stays close to x
h within the uninformed execution horizon. This constraint
hence couples constraints (7.7)-(7.9) with constraints (7.10)-(7.11).
In summary, let uf (xf , respectively) be the vector obtained by stacking uf [td]
(xf [to, td], respectively) for all td (to, td, respectively), the fault tolerant path planning
for nominal system with detection delay can be formulated as the following MILP:
find xh,xf ,uh,uf ,bh,bf
s.t. Eq. (7.7)-(7.12),
xh(t),xf(t) ∈ X, ∀t,
uh(t),uf(t) ∈ U, ∀t,
bh(t),bf(t) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀t.
(7.13)
Comparing to regular path planning MILP formulation, the fault-tolerant path plan-
ning MILP has more constraints and variables. Let nfC, n
f
B and m
f be the number
of continuous and binary variables and constraints respectively, which are required
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to encode the faulty mode LTL specification of a path of length N f , the extra num-
ber of continuous and binary variables, and the number of constraints added on top
of regular path planning MILP is O(NhnfC), O(NhnfB) and O(Nhmf) respectively.
Particularly, these three quantities do not depend on the detection delay T .
7.4 Robustification of MILP Solution via Regulation
From the previous section, we formulate an MILP whose solution leads to a nominal
trajectory x that satisfies the specification Φ. In particular, we allow the real tra-
jectory x to deviate at most ∆ from the nominal (i.e., ‖x(t)− x(t)‖ ≤ ∆) while still
satisfying Φ. In this section, we show how to find the minimum margin ∆ that can
be achieved by a linear regulator and the corresponding regulation gain by solving a
quasi-convex optimization problem.
In what follows we consider system
xt+1 = Axt +But + wt,(7.14)
where wt is disturbance satisfying ‖wt‖ ≤ d for all t, and A, B can refer to the
system matrices for the healthy system or the faulty system. Note that the constant
offset term F in Eq. (7.1) is dropped because it only shifts the equilibrium of the
system and makes no difference when the regulation is of our concern. We call a
system to be nominal if wt = 0 for all t. Given an initial state xinit and an open-
loop strategy u = u1u2 . . . uN , the trajectory x = x1x2 . . . xN generated by nominal
system is governed by
xt+1 = Axt +But,(7.15)
x1 = xinit.(7.16)
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Under the given open-loop strategy, the actual trajectory may deviate from the
planned nominal trajectory in the presence of nonzero disturbance wt. Moreover,
such deviation may accumulate with time because there is no feedback. In this work,
we introduce feedback to keep the actual trajectory close to the planned nominal
trajectory x as time evolves. The block-diagram of the overall hierarchical closed-
loop system is shown in Fig. 7.2. Instead of applying nominal control ut directly to
the system, we use
ut = ut +K(x̂t − xt)(7.17)
where K is the state feedback gain, x̂t is the estimated state that is assumed to
satisfy
‖x̂t − xt‖ ≤ E.(7.18)
Our goal is to design feedback gain K, so that the difference between the actual
trajectory x and the planned nominal trajectory x is bounded by a constant ∆ over
time.
Plant:
𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝑥𝑡 + 𝐵𝑢𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶𝑥𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡
Observer:
ො𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝐴ො𝑥𝑡 + 𝐵𝑢𝑡 + 𝐿(ො𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡)
ො𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶 ො𝑥𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑡
Feedback control:
𝑢𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡 + 𝐾(ො𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡)
Open-loop planner:





Figure 7.2: Block-diagram of the closed-loop system (the extension with output feedback can be
found in the Appendix).
The rest of this section focuses on designing K such that the uniform bound on
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‖xt − xt‖ is minimized. Combining Eq. (7.14), (7.15), (7.17), we have
xt+1 − xt+1 = (A+BK)(xt − xt) +BK(x̂t − xt) + wt,(7.19)
which implies
‖xt+1 − xt+1‖ ≤‖(A+BK)(xt − xt)‖
+ ‖BK(x̂t − xt)‖+ ‖wt‖
≤‖A+BK‖∗‖xt − xt‖
+ ‖BK‖∗‖x̂t − xt‖+ ‖wt‖
≤‖A+BK‖∗‖xt − xt‖
+ ‖BK‖∗E + d,(7.20)
where d is the bound of ‖wt‖ and E is the error bound on the state estimation
from Eq. (7.18). Let ∆ be the desired bound on ‖xt − xt‖, we require the following
recurrence relation:
‖xt − xt‖ ≤ ∆⇒ ‖xt+1 − xt+1‖ ≤ ∆.(7.21)





To minimize ∆, we formulate an optimization problem,
minimizeδ,K δ
s.t. ‖A+BK‖∗ ≤ δ−d−‖BK‖∗Eδ
δ ≥ 0
.(P1)





s.t. ‖A+BK‖∗ ≤ 1
.(P2)
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Proof. We first prove the equivalence between the optimization problems (P1) and
(P2). Then, we prove that the objective function of the second problem is quasi-
convex.








Now let K?, δ? be an optimal solution of (P1). By Eq. (7.23), we know that K◦◦ =




Similarly, let K?? be an optimal to Problem (P2), we know that K◦ = K?? and
δ◦ = d+‖BK
?‖∗E
1−‖A+BK?‖∗ are feasible for (P1) and they lead to the same objective value.
This hence proves the equivalence between the two problems.
Next, we show that d+‖BK‖∗E




∣∣∣ d+‖BK‖∗E1−‖A+BK‖∗ ≤ s, ‖A+BK‖∗ ≤ 1} is a convex set for any s. Without loss
of generality, we only need to consider s ≥ 0 as otherwise Ss = ∅. In that case,
Ss =
K
∣∣∣∣∣ ‖BK‖∗E + s‖A+BK‖∗ ≤ s− d,‖A+BK‖∗ ≤ 1
 .(7.24)
Since constants s, E ≥ 0, and ‖BK‖∗, ‖A + BK‖∗ are convex functions in K, it
follows that Ss is a convex set, and this finishes the proof.
We highlight the following three points regarding the above optimization problem.
First, a quasi-convex optimization problem can be solved by solving a sequence of
convex feasibility problems. The idea is to do a line search on the objective value f(x)
and check if Ss := {x feasible | f(x) = s} is empty or not. Since Ss is a convex set by
quasi-convexity of f , this can be done relatively efficiently. The detailed algorithm
can be found in [16]. Secondly, for the optimization problem (P2) to be feasible, it
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is necessary (but not sufficient) that pair (A,K) is stabilizable. To see this, consider
the equivalent problem in (P1), in which we require ‖A+ BK‖∗ ≤ δ−d−‖BK‖∗Eδ < 1.
If (A,B) is not controllable, this constraint can not be satisfied with any gain K.
Finally, if the system in Eq. (7.14) has an output function and the estimated state x̂t
is given by an observer, a similar quasi-convex problem can be derived to minimize
the estimation error bound E in Eq. (7.18).
Several remarks are provided below, regarding the issues when combining the path
planning with the regulation.
(i) First, note that we need to design Kh for regulating the health dynamics and
K f for the faulty dynamics, which leads to ∆h and ∆f margin respectively.
The state labeling in the MILP formulation is hence modified with ∆h or ∆f
correspondingly.
(ii) The second remark is on splitting the control authority. Let Kh (K f , respec-
tively) be the solution of the problem in Eq. (P2) formulated with the healthy
(faulty, respectively) dynamics. The control authority required by linear regula-
tion is Uhreg = {u ∈ Rm : ‖u‖ ≤ ‖Kh‖∗∆}. Therefore Uhplan, the control authority
reserved for path planning, need to be shrunk by ‖Kh‖∗∆h, i.e., Uhplan = U	Uhreg.
The procedure of splitting U for the faulty mode follows similarly.
(iii) The third remark is about determining the faulty nominal trajectory xf used in
the regulation. Recall that the regulator is in the form of ut = u
f(t)+K f(x(t)−
xf(r)) where xt is define by x
f [to, td] under the faulty mode, but to is not known.
However, we will only switch the regulator gain from Kh to K f at time td, after
which xf [to, td] are the same for all to.
(iv) Finally, note that the true trajectory x may not be ∆h-close to the healthy
nominal trajectory xh at detection time td, although this is true for all t ≤ td−1.
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Hence extra error is introduced in this last step and need to be added on top of
∆h. This extra error is bounded by
∆h + ‖Ah − Af‖∗‖x‖+ ‖Bh −Bf‖∗‖u‖
+ ‖F h − F f‖.(7.25)
However, depending on the criticality of the application, this extra error can
be neglected if the real-time detection has high enough sampling rate, and thus
can report the fault as soon as the ∆ margin is violated by a tiny amount.
We now summarize the above construction in Section IV-A and Section IV-B with
the following proposition:
Propoition 16. Suppose that the healthy system (and the faulty system, respec-
tively) are regulated by Kh (K f , respectively) found by solving problem (P2), around
the trajectory obtained by solving the MILP in Eq. (7.13), then the true trajectory
robustly satisfies specification Φ in Eq. (4.8). This hence solves Problem 1.
Example 3. We present an example on robot path planning in this section. For
simplicity, we assume state feedback in this example.
The considered system is modeled with a double integrator on the plane. The
healthy discrete-time system matrices Ah, Bh, F h in Eq. (7.2) are obtained by sam-
pling the following continuous-time system with a sampling rate τ = 2s.
Ahc =

0 1 0 0
0 −20 0 0
0 0 0 1

















For the faulty system dynamics, we assume that Af = Ah, Bf = Bh, but there is
a non-zero constant offset term F h = [0, 1.5, 0, 0]T , resulting in an undesirable
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drift. Let x = [x1, x2, x3, x4]
T be the state and u = [u1, u2] be the control input, we
restrict that x ∈ X = [−10, 10] × [−2, 8] × [−15, 15] × [−15, 15], and that u ∈ U =
[−15, 15] × [−15, 15]. We also assume that there is an additive disturbance w ∈ R4
as in Eq. (7.14). In particular, disturbance w satisfy ‖w‖ ≤ 0.25. We assume that
the fault detection delay is bounded by 3 samples (i.e., T = 3).
The specification is defined by the LTL formula in Eq. (4.8) with
ϕh =(¬πr) ∧ (♦πg) ∧ (♦πb1) ∧ (♦πb2),(7.27)
ϕf =(¬πr) ∧ (♦πg).(7.28)
The regions (in x1–x3 space) in which each atomic proposition holds are marked
in Fig. 7.3. In particular, the regions for πr and πg are the rectangles with solid
boundaries, and the regions associated with πb1 (πb2, respectively) are to the left
(right, respectively) of the bold blue dashed line.
We first design a linear regulator by solving the quasi-convex optimization problem
in (P2). The quasi-convex problem is solved with a standard line-search algorithm
[16] that reduces to solving a sequence of convex optimization problems. These
convex problems are then solved using CVX [43]. In this example, since Af = Ah,
Bf = Bh, we only need one regulator gain K, and the extra error introduced by
detection delay in Eq. (7.25) can be bounded by ‖F h − F f‖ (here we assume that
the real-time detection has high enough sampling rate so that this extra error can
be neglected). The obtained optimal regulator gain leads to a margin ∆h = ∆f =:
∆ = 0.4604. We hence modify the labeling by ∆. In Fig. 7.3, this modification
corresponds to the transparent margin surrounding the rectangles and the thinner
dashed lines close to the bold ones. Finally, we shrink the control set U by ‖K‖∗∆,
as discussed at the end of Section IV-B in remark (ii).
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The fault tolerant path planning is then solved with the MILP formulated in
Section IV-A. We solve the MILP with Gurobi [44]. Fig. 7.3 shows (i) the scenario
when the system is always healthy, and (ii) a faulty scenario where the fault happens
at time instant to = 1 and is detected at td = 3. The black dotted line represents the
nominal healthy trajectory xh and the red dotted line represents the nominal faulty
trajectory xf [to, td]. The dark gray solid curve is the disturbed trajectory assuming
that the system remains healthy forever, and the purple solid curve is the disturbed
trajectory under the considered faulty scenario. The following observations can be
made based on these simulations:
(i) It can be seen that both the disturbed trajectories satisfy the specification
corresponding to their mode.
(ii) The two curves stay close until the fault detection, where the nominal trajectory
starts to deviate from the healthy trajectory.
(iii) The healthy trajectory (gray) detours to the left more than it requires to satisfy
ϕh, as it needs to preserve extra “room” for the faulty trajectory (purple) to














Figure 7.3: The planned trajectories (dotted) and the disturbed trajectories (solid) for health mode





In this thesis, the problem of correct-by-construction fault-tolerant control was stud-
ied. As the first step towards correct-by-construction fault-tolerance, we studied
model-based fault detection and the associated detectability analysis problems to
provide a guarantee on finite fault detection. By combing LTL monitoring and
model invalidation, an MILP-based detectability analysis was proposed to incorpo-
rate both the knowledge of the dynamical model and certain correct behavior the
healthy system must fulfill. It was shown that the proposed detectability analysis
method is less conservative.
We formalized the fault-tolerant control synthesis problem by defining a hierarchi-
cal system with fault configurations and capturing its graceful degradation require-
ment by two slightly different LTL formulas. The fault-tolerant control synthesis
problem was then solved with two approaches, namely abstraction-based control
synthesis via game solving and MILP-based path planning.
For abstraction-based synthesis, we approached the problem by first considering
it on finite transition systems. A bottom up recursive algorithm was proposed to
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decompose the overall synthesis problem into multiple smaller ones using the partial
order induced by the fault configuration. This led to more scalable algorithms. A
notable feature of the considered synthesis problem is that the worst case detection
delay, if finite, is also incorporated in the synthesis. The problem with detection delay
falls into the category of partial information game, and is hard to solve in general.
However, we showed that, for a class of specifications with suffix-closeness and a
novel property called absolute decomposability, the problem can be solved without
constructing the belief space, and hence the exponential state space explosion can
be avoided. A widely studied LTL fragment specified by GR(1) formula was shown
to satisfy those structural properties.
To demonstrate that the methods developed for discrete systems can be used for
continuous state systems as well, a fuel cell thermal management problem was solved
via abstraction-based approach. To achieve compute a less conservative abstraction
more efficiently, we i) studied the structural property of the fuel cell thermal dynam-
ics and ii) extended the existing synthesis tool. In particular, a structural property
called weak sign-stability was introduced and analyzed from the view of mixed mono-
tonicity.
For the MILP-based path planning, we proposed a control hierarchy that com-
bines high level path planning and low level regulation. The bounded error property
of the low level regulation provided a way to handle detection delay in the fault tol-
erant path planning. Comparing to the regular MILP-based LTL path planning,The
obtained control strategy was shown to be able to react to environment change and
to be robust agianst disturbance.
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8.2 Future Work
First, a potential extension of the fault-tolerant control synthesis problem definition
itself is that we wish to specify graceful degradation with priority. That is, at a faulty
mode, we desire to achieve the associated faulty specification only when achieving
the healthy specification is not possible. Our conjecture is that LTL is not sufficient
to express such priority and we plan to explore lattice-LTL [1] for the extension.
For the abstraction-based fault-tolerant control synthesis techniques presented in
Chapter V, we wish to find a way to algorithmically verify if an LTL formula specifies
an absolutely decomposable property, which is required to guarantee the proposed
algorithm’s soundness if achieving Φ is of our concern (see Section 4.2).
Regarding the abstraction-based synthesis for continuous state systems, one chal-
lenge is that the winning set for each faulty mode may be far from being maximal,
due to the conservativeness of the abstraction. Sometimes in practice, with a small
perturbation in some of the problem setup parameters (e.g., the bounds on distur-
bance), the winning set may change from the entire domain to empty set. This
phenomenon may reduce the value of the proposed approach which requires the
winning sets of different faulty modes to be nested according to the faults severity.
To tackle this problem, one possible solution is to explore another type of abstrac-
tion known as the l-complete approximations [77], which are less conservative as it
precisely encodes the long-term behavior of the underlying continuous-state system.
Such abstractions may be obtained through long-term reachability analysis of the
continuous-state system.
The work regarding fault-tolerant path planning currently presented in Chapter
VII assumes a simplified fault configuration, which consists only one faulty mode
other than the healthy mode. The extension to the system with any fault configura-
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tions can be done naively by applying the same formulation techniques, but unlike
the abstraction-based approach developed in Chapter 4 where the synthesis can be
done in a decomposed manner, this leads to a MILP that can only be solved mono-
lithically. Future work may address this issue, if possible. To extend the proposed
approach to a broader class of systems other than linear ones, we plan to combine
the MILP-based path planner with existing path planners that are more suitable for
general nonlinear dynamics. While the MILP-based planner can work on a simplified
linear model and focus on the high level logic constraints, the existing path planners
will be used to handle the complicated dynamic constraints. Finally, to support the
developed approach with some experiments, we plan to implement the MILP-based




1.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Soundness
We prove the soundness of Algorithm 1 by a bottom up induction. To this end, define
the level of a fault φ[i] to be the longest distance from φ[i] to a leaf mode of F . Clearly,
the level of a fault φ[i] is strictly larger than that of its successor φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]). Let
k be the level of certain faulty modes in F , consider the following statement of k:
• Statement(k): Suppose at some time t, we have
φ(t) = φ[i],(A.1)
q(t) ∈ W [i],(A.2)
φ(t+ 1) = φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]) where φ[j] is of level k,(A.3)
then Ψ is satisfied under strategy µ defined by Eq. (5.2).
If we can prove Statement(k) is true for all k, then the soundness of Algorithm 1 is
immediately proved by picking k to be the level of mode φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[1]). This covers
the case where the system will degrade from healthy mode at time t + 1, and the
soundness of Algorithm 1 under the always-healthy case is trivial. In what follows,
we prove Statement(k) is true for all k by induction over k.
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1◦ Base case: k = 0, i.e., φ[j] is a leaf mode of F .
First, assuming Eq. (A.1)-(A.3), we have q(t) ∈ W [i], φ(t) = φ[i] and hence the
dynamics is governed by TS[i]. By definition of the overall strategy µ in Eq.
(5.2), we know that sub-strategy K [i] is applied at time t, which guarantees ψ[i]
(and hence W [j] by line 8) under TS[i] dynamics (line 10). Hence q(t + 1) ∈
W [j].
Moreover, Eq. (A.3) tells us that, at time t + 1, the dynamics is governed by




, which is well defined
as q(t + 1) ∈ W [j]. Since φ[j] is a leaf faulty mode, there will be no further
degradation from there and thus




, ∀s ≥ t+ 1,













. . . |= ϕ[j] ⇒ LFQ
(







. . . |= ϕ[j].












and hence Ψ. That is, Statement(0) is proved.
2◦ Induction step: Assume that Statement(0), Statement(1), . . . , Statement(k) are
true, we prove Statement(k + 1) also holds in the sequel. There are two cases.
(i) Either φ(s) = φ[j] for all s ≥ t+ 1 and the proof of Statement(k+ 1) follows
exactly the same as in the base case.
(ii) Or there exists s > t + 1 such that φ(s) = φ[`] ∈ succ(φ[j]). In this case,
the level of φ[`] ∈ succ(φ[j]) is known to be strictly smaller than k + 1 (the
level of φ[j]). Then Statement(level of φ[`]), which holds by the hypothesis,
verifies the satisfaction of Ψ.
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Since specification Ψ is satisfied in both cases, the induction step is completed.
Completeness
Similar to the proof of the soundness, the completeness of Algorithm 1 can also be
proved by a bottom up induction on k, the level of faulty modes in F . Consider the
following statement of k:
• Statement(k): Suppose at some time t, we have
φ(t) = φ[i],(A.4)
φ(t+ 1) = φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]) where φ[j] is of level k,(A.5)
q(t+ 1) /∈ W [j],(A.6)
then there is an environment strategy that leads to the violation of Ψ.
Next we prove Statement(k) holds for all k by induction.
1◦ Base case: k = 0, i.e., φ[j] is a leaf mode of F .
Since φ[j] is a leaf, we know




, ∀s ≥ t+ 1,




, ∀s ≤ t,

















, ∀` 6= j.
Also, since it is assumed by Eq. (A.6) that q(t+ 1) /∈ W [j], we know that









· · · 6|= ϕ[j] ⇒ LFQ
(




q(t+ 2), φ(t+ 2)
)
· · · 6|= ϕ[j].













together with (iii) this establishes the violation of Ψ.
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2◦ Induction step: Assume Statement(0), Statement(1), . . . , Statement(k), we
show that Statement(k + 1) also holds.
Assume the hypothesis of Statement(k + 1), we have φ(t + 1) = φ[j] of level
k + 1 and q(t + 1) /∈ W [j]. Consider the following environment strategy that
determines the fault mode transition:
• If W [`] is not yet violated for all φ[`] ∈ succ(φ[j]), the stay at the current
mode φ[j];
• otherwise W [`] is violated for some φ[`] ∈ succ(φ[j]) at time s (i.e., q(s) /∈
W [`]), go to faulty mode φ[`] at time s.
If the above environment strategy is adopted, we may have the following two
possible cases:
(i) W [`] is never violated for all φ[`] ∈ succ(φ[j]) and all time, but ϕ[j] cannot













implies q(t + 1) should be contained by the the maximal winning set W [j]
synthesized against ψ[j] and dynamics TS[j], which contradicts with the
assumption q(t + 1) /∈ W [j]. Hence Ψ is violated in this case because the
faulty mode stays at φ[j] but ϕ[j] is violated.
(ii) q(s) /∈ W [`] for some φ[`] ∈ succ(φ[j]) at time s > t+1. In this case, according
to the faulty mode transition strategy described above, φ(s− 1) = φ[j] and
φ(s) = φ[`] with level ≤ k. By Statement(level of φ[`]) we know that Ψ must
be violated.
Since Ψ is violated in both cases if the above faulty mode selection strategy is
adopted by the environment, Statement(k + 1) is verified, and this finishes the
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induction step.
1.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Assume the actual transitions of faults are given by (φ[i1], φ[i2]), (φ[i2], φ[i3]), · · · , (φ[in−1], φ[in]),
where φ[i1] is the initial fault and φ[in] is the final fault, and (φ[ik−1], φ[ik]) ∈→F are
the nontrivial degradations.
Let W [ik]’s be the winning sets and ψ[ik]’s be the strengthened formulas returned
in each round of recursion. Regarding these sets and formulas, we can make the
following observations.
(a) W [i1] ⊆ W [i2] ⊆ · · ·W [in]. By soundness of oracle Win, W [ik−1] is the winning set
w.r.t. specification ψ[ik−1]. But note that ψ[ik−1] is a conjunction of W [ik] with
other formulas (see line 9, Algorithm 2), thus W [ik−1] ⊆ W [ik]. This hence proves


















To see this, recall line 9 of Algorithm 2, we have
Word(ψ[ik−1]) = Word(ϕ[ik−1]) ∩Word(W [ik]) ∩Word(ψ[ik]safety),
where Word(ϕ[ik−1]) is absolutely decomposable by assumption, Word(W [ik])
is an absolute safety property by Proposition 10, and Word(ψ
[ik]
safety) is abso-
lute safety property presuming that ψ[ik] is absolutely decomposable. One can
easily verify by induction that Word(ψ[ik]) is absolutely decomposable, using
Proposition 10, 5, 8.













Also note that ψ[ik−1] is obtained by conjunction of ψ
[ik]
safety and other formulas
































Now to prove the soundness, consider an execution starting from q0 ∈ W [i1] under
control strategy µ constructed by Eq. (5.2) and arbitrary environment strategy η
ρµ-η(q0) =
(




· · · ,(A.11)
and the word generated by this execution
wρµ-η(q0) = w(0)w(1)w(2), · · · .(A.12)
First, let t[ik] denote the time instant when fault transition (φ[ik−1], φ[ik]) happens.
By observation (a), it is not hard to show by induction that q(t) ∈ W [ik] for t ≤ t[ik].
1◦ Base case: k = 2. The execution starts from q(0) = q0 ∈ W [i1], and the strategy
enforces ψ[i1]. Hence W [i2], which is part of ψ[i1] by construction, is true before
the system degrades at time instant t[i2].
2◦ As induction hypothesis, assume that for all k ≤ m, we have q(t) ∈ W [ik] for
t ≤ t[ik] Now we move to k = m+1. First, by observation (a), W [ik] ⊆ W [im+1] for
all k ≤ m. The hypothesis immediately becomes q(t) ∈ W [im+1] for t ≤ t[im], and
what remains to be verify is when t[im] ≤ t ≤ t[im+1]. Again by hypothesis, we
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know q(t[im]) ∈ W [im+1]. But by construction, strategy µ enforces the succeeding
execution, which starts from q(t[im]), to satisfy W [im+1]. In other words, for
t[im] ≤ t ≤ t[im+1], we have q(t) ∈ W [im+1]. This hence finishes the induction
step.
This immediately implies that q(t[in]) ∈ W [in].




using observation (b). Let w[ik] := w(t[ik]) · · ·w(t[ik+1]− 1) be the word segment that
is generated under fault φ[ik]. Note that this segment is generated starting from
q(t[ik]) ∈ W [ik] (by the result from the last paragraph), under the winning strategy




. By observation (b),





To this point, we have shown that when the final fault occurs at time t[in], the
state q(t[in]) is in the winning set W [in] for this final fault. We also know that finite





that the succeeding strategy will focus on achieving ϕ[in] starting from state q(t[in]),
where the strategy is well defined because q(t[in]) ∈ W [in]. Moreover, this strategy
generates an execution v = v(t[in])v(t[in] + 1) · · · ∈ Word(ϕ[in]). Recall that ϕ[in]
is absolutely decomposable. By Proposition 3, the overall word wv |= ϕ[in]. This
proves the soundness of Algorithm 2 under the given assumptions.
1.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Soundness
The soundness of Algorithm 3 can be proved using a bottom up induction exactly
the same as that in Appendix 1.1. Consider the following statement of faulty mode
level k.
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• Statement(k): Suppose at some time t, we have
φ(t) = φ[i],(A.13)
q(t) ∈ W [i],(A.14)
φ(t+ 1) = φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]) where φ[j] is of level k,(A.15)
then Ψ is satisfied under strategy µ̂ defined by Eq. (5.6).
1◦ Base case: k = 0, i.e., φ[j] is a leaf mode of F .
First, by Assumption 2, no fault is allowed to happen within the uninformed
horizon. Hence φ(t+ 1) = φ[j] 6= φ[i] = φ(t) implies that
φ̂(t+ 1) = φ[i].(A.16)
Moreover, since the detection delay is assumed to be finite, there is r > t + 1
such that
φ̂(s) = φ[i] and φ(s) = φ[j], ∀s ∈ [[t+ 1, r]],(A.17)
φ̂(r + 1) = φ[j].(A.18)
That is, r + 1 is the time instant fault φ[j] is detected.
By Eq. (A.16) and the definition of µ̂ (see Eq. (5.2)), we know that sub-
strategy K [i] is used with in time interval [[t + 1, r]], Since K [i] is synthesized
against TS[i]  I, where the actions in I guarantee invariance in C [j] when the
dynamics is governed by TS[j], hence we have
q(s) ∈ C [j] ⊆ W [j], ∀s ∈ [[t+ 1, r + 1]],(A.19)
By Eq. (A.18) and the definition of µ̂, sub-strategy K [j] is used starting from
time r + 1, which is valid because q(r + 1) ∈ W [j] by Eq. (A.19). Since φ[j] is a
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. . . |= ϕ[j]safety.
Note that ϕ[j] is both absolutely decomposable and suffix-closed, hence ϕ
[i]
safety is
invariance by Proposition 11. This means ϕ
[j]
safety = ψ for some propositional
formula ψ, and L
[j]
Q (q) |= ψ for any state q ∈ W [j] as W [j] is the winning set




liveness = (ψ) ∧ ϕ
[j]




































. . . |= ϕ[j]safety.












. . . |= ϕ[j].
But also note that φ(t) changes from φ[i] to φ[j] at time t + 1 and will stay
at leaf mode φ[j] ever since, therefore we have LFQ
(











. Hence Ψ is achieved and Statement(0)
is proved.
2◦ Induction step: assume that Statement(0), Statement(1), . . . , Statement(k) are
true, we prove Statement(k + 1) also holds in the sequel. There are two cases.
(i) Either φ(s) = φ[j] for all s ≥ t + 1 and the proof of Statement(k) fol-
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liveness, we know that ψ
[j] is also both absolute decomposable and suffix-
closed, and the satisfaction of Ψ can be established in the same way.
(ii) Or there exists s > t+ 1 such that φ(s) = φ[`] ∈ succ(φ[j]), in which case Ψ
must be also satisfied by Statement(level of φ[`]), which holds because the
level of φ[`] ∈ succ(φ[j]) is known to be strictly smaller than k + 1 (i.e., the
level of φ[j]).
Since specification Ψ is satisfied in both cases, the induction step is completed.
With Statement(k) proved for all k, we immediately obtain the soundness of Algo-
rithm 3. This is because either the faulty mode always stays at healthy and ψ[1]
(hence ϕ[1] and Ψ) is satisfied, or a degradation occurs at time t + 1, in which case
Ψ is satisfied by Statement(level of φ[1]).
Completeness
To establish the completeness of Algorithm 3, we need the following Lemmas.
Lemma 4. In Algorithm 3, C [j] = W [j] if ϕ[j] is suffix-closed.
Proof. By construction, we have C [j] ⊆ W [j]. Whenever ϕ[j] is suffix-closed, we also
have W [j] ⊆ C [j] because 1) C [j] is the largest controlled invariant set contained by
W [j] under TS[j] and 2) W [j] is invariant (i.e., q(t) ∈ W [j] for all t) under strategy
K [j] whenever the dynamics is governed by TS[j].
To prove that q(t) ∈ W [j] for all t under dynamics TS[j] and strategy K [j], assume
for a contradiction that q(1) ∈ W [j] but q(t) /∈ W [j] for some t under strategy






for all s, be a generated
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[`]). Therefore wt = w(t)w(t+ 1) . . . |= ψ[j]. But this means
it is possible to achieve ψ[j] starting from state q(t) under some strategy, which
contradicts with W [j] being maximal.
Lemma 5. Let W (Ψ, TSF, T ) be the maximal winning set of Ψ on faulty system
TSF under Assumption 2, and let W (Ψ, TSF, T1) be the winning set under the same
settings and an extra assumption that detection delay T [i] = 1 for all fault φ[i]. We
have W (Ψ, TSF, T ) ⊆ W (Ψ, TSF, T1).
Proof. This should be clear because when T [i] = 1, the environment has more re-
striction in terms of hiding the true faulty mode from the controller, comparing to
the case where T [1] ≥ 1. Formally, this means Vdelay(F, T1) ⊆ Vdelay(F, T ). Let
q(1) ∈ W (Ψ, TSF, T ) and let µ be the associated winning strategy. By Definition
13, this means
∀(f, f̂) ∈ Vdelay(F, T1) ⊆ Vdelay(F, T ) : w ∈W
(
f, f̂, µ, q(1)
)
|= Ψ,(A.21)
that is, q(1) ∈ W (Ψ, TSF, T1).
Figure A.1: Illustration of the completeness proof of Algorithm 3.
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We now prove the completeness of Algorithm 3 under the assumption that ϕ[j]
is both absolutely decomposable and suffix-closed. To this end, we will show by
a bottom up induction that W (Ψ, TSF, T1) ⊆ W [1], where W [1] is the winning set
returned by Algorithm 3. Then we have W (Ψ, TSF, T ) ⊆ W (Ψ, TSF, T1) ⊆ W [1] by
Lemma 5, and this verifies the completeness.
To prove the above statement, let q(1) ∈ W (Ψ, TSF, T1), and let µ1 be the asso-
ciated winning strategy. Note that µ1 is not necessarily the same as µ̂ defined in Eq.
(5.6). Consider the following statement of faulty mode level k:
• Statement(k): Let k be the level of faulty mode φ[i] and t be any time instant,
under strategy µ1, we have φ(t) = φ
[i] ⇒ q(t) ∈ W [i], where q(t) is any possible
state at time t of system TSF initiated from q(1) ∈ W (Ψ, TSF, T1), and W [i] is
defined in Algorithm 3.
Clearly, if Statement(k) can be verified for all k, then applying Statement(level of φ[1])
at time t = 1 immediately yields q(1) ∈ W [1] where W [1] is returned by Algorithm 3,
and this proves the completeness as argued above.
In the sequel we show that Statement(k) is true for all k by induction.
1◦ Base case, k = 0, i.e., φ[i] is a leaf mode of F .




for some r ≤ t. Also since µ1 achieves Ψ, this implies that the word wr :=
w(r)w(r+ 1) · · · generated starting from time r must satisfy ϕ[i]. Note that ϕ[i]
is assumed to be suffix-closed, applying Lemma 4 hence gives q(s) ∈ W [i] for all
s ≥ r. Therefore q(t) ∈ W [i] as t ≥ r.
2◦ Induction step: assume that Statement(0), Statement(1), . . . , Statement(k) are
true, we will prove Statement(k + 1) also holds, i.e. q(t) ∈ W [i] if φ(t) = φ[i].
To this end, first define
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qt = q(1)q(2) · · · q(t),
f̂t = φ̂(1)φ̂(2) · · · φ̂(t),
ft = φ(1)φ(2) · · ·φ(t).
Since µ1 is the winning strategy assoicated with W (Ψ, TS
F, T1), we know the
following facts under φ(t) = φ[i]:
(i) q(t) ∈ ∩j:φ[j]∈succ(φ[i])W [j].
To prove bullet (i), assume for a contradiction that q(t) /∈ W [j] for some
j : φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]). Then we can construct gt = φ(1)φ(2) · · ·φ(t − 1)φ[j],
which is exactly the same as ft except the last element is replaced by φ
[j].
Note that gt has exactly the same estimation sequence ĝt = f̂t due to the
one step detection delay, hence the decision of µ is not affected. But in
that case, we have φ(t) = φ[j] but q(t) /∈ W [j], which contradicts with
Statement(`) where ` ≤ k is the level of mode φ[j].
(ii) ∀a(t) ∈ µ1(qt, f̂t),∀φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]),∀
(
q(t), φ[j], a(t), q(t + 1)
)
∈→TS: q(t +
1) ∈ W [j].
To prove bullet (ii), assume for a contradiction that, funder some φ[j] ∈
succ(φ[i]) and the associated dynamics TS[j], we have q(t+ 1) /∈ W [j] under
some a(t) ∈ µ1(qt, f̂t). The the environment can pick φ(t + 1) = φ[j] and
this contradicts with Statement(level of φ[j], which is ≤ k) that is already
established.





Note that by Lemma 4, W [j] is invariant under TS[j], whereas I [j](q) is
defined to be the set of all actions that assures the invariance of W [j]. By
bullet (i) and (ii), we know that q(t) ∈ W [j] and q(t+ 1) ∈ W [j] under any




for all j : φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]) and
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this proves bullet (iii).
(iv) ∀a(t) ∈ µ1(qt, f̂t),∀φ[j] ∈ succ(φ[i]),∀
(
q(t), φ(t) = φ[i], a(t), q(t + 1)
)
∈→TS:
q(t+ 1) ∈ W [j].
The difference from bullet (ii) is that the evolution is under TS[i] rather
than TS[j]. To prove bullet (iv), assume otherwise q(t + 1) /∈ W [j] for
some a(t), φ[j] and transition under TS[i], then the environment can pick
φ(t + 1) = φ[j] and this contradicts with Statement(level of φ[j], which is
≤ k) that is already established.
(v) Suppose φ(t) = φ[i], then q(t+ 1) ∈ ∩j:φ[j]∈succ(φ[i])W [j].
Applying bullet (iv) gives the desired statement.
Figure A.2: Illustration of facts (i)-(v), induction step in the completeness proof of Algorithm 3
Let us consider the system’s state sequence p = qtpt+1, generated under µ1 and





Note that φ(t) = φ[i] by the hypothesis of Statement(k+1), we have s ≤ t. Also
note that, since φ(s) = φ[i], bullets (i)-(v) developed above hold for q(s) as well.
Consider ps = q(s)q(s + 1) · · · q(t)p(t + 1)p(t + 2) · · · . Since µ is the winning
strategy that achieves Ψ while the faulty mode stays at φ[i] eventually, the word
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generated by ps satisfies ϕ
[i]. Moreover, by applying bullets (i) and (v) induc-
tively on time, we can establish that p(r) ∈ ∩j:φ[j]∈succ(φ[i])W [j] for all r ≥ s.
Hence the word generated by ps models ψ




because C [j] = W [j] by Lemma 4. Also note that this is achieved under dynam-





Hence we have q(s) ∈ Win(ψ[i], TS[i]  I) =: W [i]. Finally, by Lemma 4, the
suffix-closedness of ψ[i] suggests that a winning execution should never leave the
winning set W [i], hence q(t) ∈ W [i].
Hence the induction step is completed.
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Appendix B
Variables and Constants in the Fuel Cell Thermal Model
Control u
uHR uHR = 1 indicating that the coolant flow goes through
the heater
uHR = 0 indicating that the coolant flow goes through
the radiator
i [0,1.5] (A cm−2) Cell current density
PH [0, 35000] (W) Power requested by heater
wcool [0,800] (g s
−1) Coolant mass flow rate
State x
SOCB [0,1] (-) Battery energy
T1 [273, 360] (K) Temperature of first control volumes
T2 [273, 360] (K) Temperature of second control volumes
TH [250, 400] (K) Heater temperature
TR [250, 340] (K) Radiator temperature
Operating Condition d
PM [2, 17] (kW) Power requested by motor
pO2 5× 104 (Pa) Oxygen partial pressure
pH2 1.5× 105 (Pa) Hydrogen partial pressure
rv [0, 10
−7] (mol cm−3 s−1) Volumetric evaporating rate
v [10,20] (ms−1) Vehicle speed
Tamb [273,290] (K) Ambient temperature
λ [4,22] (-) Membrane water content
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Other Variables
EFC,stack (V) Fuel cell stack electrical potential
i0 (A cm
−2) Exchange current density
PB,output (W) Battery output power
PFC,output (W) Fuel cell output power




−1 K−1) Average fuel cell temperature
TFC,in,cool (K) Inlet coolant temperature (into fuel cell)






−1 K−1) Reaction entropy
Constants
cair (1.0 J g
−1K−1) Air specific heat capacity
F (96485 C mol−1) Faraday constant
Pref (101325 Pa) Reference pressure
R (8.314 J mol−1 K−1) Universal gas constant
Parameters
aMT (V) Mass transfer potential loss coefficient
AFC (cm
2) Fuel cell cross section area
AG (cm
2) Fuel cell geometric area
bMT (-) Mass transfer potential loss exponent
ccool (J g
−1K−1) Coolant specific heat capacity
cFC (J g
−1K−1) Fuel cell specific heat capacity
CH (J K
−1) Heater heat capacity
CR (J K
−1) Radiator heat capacity
EB,cell (V) Battery cell open-circuit potential
GB,stack,total (Ws) Battery stack energy capacity
i0,ref (A cm
−2) Reference exchange current density
iMT (A cm
−2) Mass transfer current density
ix (A cm
−1) Crossover current density
kamb→FC (W cm
−3 K−1) Heat transfer coefficient: ambient to stack
kamb→H (W cm
−3 K−1) Heat transfer coefficient: ambient to heater
np (-) Number of battery cells in parallel
ns (-) Number of battery cells in series
nFC,cell (-) Number of fuel cells in stack
rB,cell (Ω) Battery cell internal resistance
VFC (cm
3) Fuel cell volume
α (-) Charge transfer coefficient
δFC (cm) Channel or cell length
κT (W cm
−1 K−1) thermal conductivity
ρFC (g cm
−3) Fuel cell density
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